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CELEBRITY IN CYBERSPACE:  A PERSONALITY RIGHTS PARADIGM FOR 
PERSONAL DOMAIN NAME DISPUTES 
 
JACQUELINE D. LIPTON* 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
When the Oscar™-winning actress Julia Roberts fought for control of the 
<juliaroberts.com> domain name, what was her aim?  Did she want to reap 
economic benefits from the name?  Probably not, as she has not used the name 
since it was transferred to her.  Or did she want to prevent others from using it on 
either an unjust enrichment or a privacy basis?  Was she, in fact, protecting a 
trademark interest in her name?  Personal domain name disputes, particularly 
those in the <name.com> space, implicate unique aspects of an individual’s 
persona in cyberspace.  Nevertheless, most of the legal rules developed for these 
disputes are based on trademark law.  Although a number of individuals have 
successfully used these rules in practice, the focus on trademark law has led to 
inconsistent and often arbitrary results.  Additionally, commentators have 
questioned recent expansions of trademark law in the Internet context.  This Article 
suggests that if personal names merit legal protection in cyberspace, it should be 
under an appropriate set of legal rules, rather than through further expansion of 
trademarks.  This Article develops a new framework for personal domain name 
disputes based on the theories underlying the right of publicity tort.  Unlike 
trademark law, this tort is aimed at the protection of individual names and 
likenesses.  It has not been utilized much in cyberspace largely because of time, 
cost, and jurisdictional disadvantages of litigation as opposed to the quicker and 
cheaper, but trademark-based, Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy 
(“UDRP”).  This article suggests the creation of a new personal domain name 
dispute resolution policy (“PDRP”) that combines the procedural advantages of 
the UDRP with the theory underlying the right of publicity tort.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
When Julia Roberts, the popular Oscar™-winning actress, brought proceedings 
for control of the domain name <juliaroberts.com>,1 just what was her beef?  Was she 
concerned that the registrant of the domain name would be unjustly enriched by its use?  
Or was she rather concerned about unauthorized content that might appear on the 
associated website?  Or both?  She was successful in her complaint against Russell 
Boyd,2 the registrant, in an arbitration under the Uniform Domain name Dispute 
Resolution Policy (“UDRP”).3  But what theoretically was the justification for her 
                                                 
1
  Julia Fiona Roberts v Russell Boyd Case No. D2000-0210 , May 29, 2000, WIPO Arbitration and 
Mediation Center (full text available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-
0210.html , last viewed on November 6, 2007). 
 
2
  id. 
 
3
  The UDRP is a private dispute resolution procedure for domain name disputes that is administered 
by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN”).  The full text of the UDRP is 
available on ICANN’s website at:  http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm , last viewed on 
November 6, 2007. 
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success?  The justification is actually found in trademark law.4  The UDRP was 
implemented to protect trademark holders against the activities of bad faith 
cybersquatters5 - those who register domain names speculatively to profit from selling the 
names to “rightful” trademark owners.6   
 
The UDRP is a global online dispute resolution procedure that is incorporated into 
domain name registration agreements7 by reference.8  Domain name registrants are 
contractually bound to submit to an online arbitration if a third party complains about 
their registration or use of the domain name.9  Complaints are premised on the 
complainant’s assertion of trademark rights corresponding with the relevant domain 
name.
10
  The advantages of the UDRP over litigation are that it is inexpensive and fast,11 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
4
  The policy basis underlying the result was that Julia Roberts had unregistered trademark rights in 
her personal name:  Julia Fiona Roberts v Russell Boyd Case No. D2000-0210 , May 29, 2000, WIPO 
Arbitration and Mediation Center (full text available at 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0210.html , last viewed on November 6, 
2007), ¶ 6 (“the name "Julia Roberts" has sufficient secondary association with Complainant that common 
law trademark rights do exist under United States trademark law”).  The UDRP is premised on protection 
of trademark interests so individuals bringing actions with respect to personal names under the UDRP must 
establish trademark rights in those names in order to bring a successful complaint.  See discussion in 
Landon Moreland and Colby Springer, Celebrity Domain Names:  ICANN Arbitration Pitfalls and 
Pragmatic Advice, 17 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L J 385, 389 (2001) (“The first potential 
pitfall in obtaining a favorable judgment under the UDRP is a celebrity’s failure to establish recognized 
trademark rights in his or her personal or professional name.”) 
 
5
  ANNE GILSON LALONDE, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE, at § 7A.06 (“Cybersquatters 
register trademarks in Internet domain names with no intention of developing a viable web site but instead 
to hold the name for resale to either the trademark owner or a third party.”) [hereinafter, GILSON LALONDE]. 
 
6
  For a discussion of this practice, see Jacqueline Lipton, Beyond Cybersquatting:  Taking Domain 
Name Disputes Past Trademark Policy, 40 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW 1361, 1369-1377 (2005) 
[hereinafter, “Beyond Cybersquatting”]. 
 
7
  Notably disputes involving domain names in the <.com>, <.net> and <.org> domain spaces as 
well as some others.  See introductory notes to the UDRP, available at:  http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-
policy-24oct99.htm, last viewed on January 23, 2008.  The full text of the UDRP is also available at this 
website. 
 
8
  UDRP, para. 1 (“This Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Policy") has been 
adopted by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers ("ICANN"), is incorporated by 
reference into your Registration Agreement, and sets forth the terms and conditions in connection with a 
dispute between you and any party other than us (the registrar) over the registration and use of an Internet 
domain name registered by you. Proceedings under Paragraph 4 of this Policy will be conducted according 
to the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules of Procedure"), which are 
available at www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-rules-24oct99.htm, and the selected administrative-dispute-
resolution service provider's supplemental rules.”) 
 
9
  id. 
 
10
  UDRP, para 4(a) (“You are required to submit to a mandatory administrative proceeding in the 
event that a third party (a "complainant") asserts to the applicable Provider, in compliance with the Rules of 
Procedure, that: (i) your domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in 
which the complainant has rights; and, (ii) you have no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the 
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compared to litigation,12 and its reach is effectively global because relevant parties are 
bound to it by contract, wherever they may physically reside.  Thus, it has been the 
avenue of choice for most domain name complainants.13 
 
The problem is that not all disputed domain names correspond with trademarks.  
Personal names, for example, may or may not be trademarked, depending on the 
circumstances.  UDRP arbitrators often have little guidance as to whether a particular 
name really operates a trademark, despite regularly being required to make such 
determinations.  This has led to inconsistent and arbitrary decisions.  Why, for example, 
should Julia Roberts14 and Tom Cruise15 be regarded as having trademarks in their 
personal names when the same is not true for Bruce Springsteen,16 or the late Anna Nicole 
                                                                                                                                                 
domain name; and, (iii) your domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.”) (emphasis 
added) 
 
11
  Lipton, Beyond Cybersquatting, supra note ___, 1372 (“The UDRP is a private, international, 
inexpensive, relatively fast, and predominantly online dispute resolution procedure for situations in which a 
complainant is disputing the registration of a domain name.  The UDRP does not oust the jurisdiction of 
national courts.  However, all domain name registrants are contractually bound to submit to a mandatory 
arbitration under the UDRP if a complaint is made under the UDRP about the registration of one or more 
relevant domain names.  This dispute is managed by arbitrators licensed by one of the organizations 
charged with hearing disputes under the UDRP.  It involves the receipt of a complaint and a response by 
the registrant.  The arbitrator or panel then provides a decision and resolution based on this material.  There 
are generally no in-person hearings.  The only orders that can be made under the UDRP are orders for 
cancellation of a disputed name or for transfer of a domain name to the complainant.”) 
 
12
  Costs of judicial proceedings can be prohibitive for private individuals:  Moreland, supra note 
___, at 385 (“Prior to the establishment of ICANN Arbitration, recovery of celebrity domain names was an 
expensive and potentially lengthy process.”); Jessica Litman, The DNS Wars:  Trademarks and the Internet 
Domain Name System, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 149, 155 (2000) (noting the often prohibitive cost 
of trademark infringement and dilution litigation in early domain name disputes). 
 
13
  Moreland, supra note ___, at 385 (“Prior to the establishment of ICANN Arbitration, recovery of 
celebrity domain names was an expensive and potentially lengthy process.”) 
 
14
  Julia Fiona Roberts v Russell Boyd, WIPO Case No. D2000-0210, 30 May, 2000 (available at 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0210.html ). 
 
15
  Tom Cruise v Alberta Hot Rods, WIPO Case No D2006-0560, 5 July, 2006 (available at 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2006/d2006-0560.html). 
 
16
  Bruce Springsteen v Jeff Burgar and Bruce Springsteen Club, WIPO Case No. D2000-1532, Jan. 
25, 2001, ¶ 6 (available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-1532.html) (“It 
appears to be an established principle from cases such as Jeanette Winterson, Julia Roberts, and Sade that 
in the case of very well known celebrities, their names can acquire a distinctive secondary meaning giving 
rise to rights equating to unregistered trade marks, notwithstanding the non-registerability of the name 
itself. It should be noted that no evidence has been given of the name "Bruce Springsteen" having acquired 
a secondary meaning; in other words a recognition that the name should be associated with activities 
beyond the primary activities of Mr. Springsteen as a composer, performer and recorder of popular music. 
In the view of this Panel, it is by no means clear from the UDRP that it was intended to protect proper 
names of this nature.”) 
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Smith?17  Why should Senator Hillary Clinton’s name be recognized as a trademark18 
when the same is not true for other politicians such as Kathleen Kennedy Townsend?19  
The reliance on the UDRP to resolve personal domain name disputes raises two related 
issues.  The first is that the UDRP inadvertently encourages the expansion of trademark 
law into questionable areas: for example, situations where an individual’s name is not 
operating as a source indicator for products or services (ie as a trademark or service 
mark).  The second issue is that reliance on trademark-focused regulations for personal 
domain name disputes appears in practice to have stalled the development of legal rules 
more appropriately tailored for these disputes.  
 
This Article suggests that these problems could be mitigated by creating a new 
personal domain name dispute resolution procedure (“PDRP”).  This new procedure 
could retain the time, cost, and jurisdictional benefits of the UDRP, but be based on a 
theoretical model more focused on protecting individual personas than trademark law.  
The obvious set of legal rules that protects individual names and likenesses against 
unauthorized commercial use is the right of publicity – or “personality rights” - tort.20  
Marrying the substance of the right of publicity tort with the procedural benefits of the 
UDRP is suggested in this Article as a useful way forwards.  It would remove the focus 
                                                 
17
  Anna Nicole Smith v DNS Research Inc, Claim No. FA0312000220007, National Arbitration 
Forum, Feb 21, 2004 (available at:  http://www.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/220007.htm) (involving 
annanicolesmith.com domain name) (“it is unlikely that the evidence submitted here by Complainant of her 
career, in and of itself, is sufficient to establish common law trademark rights in the name, which is a 
requirement for Complainant to prevail on this aspect of the case.  While the UDRP does not require a 
registered trademark for protection of a trademark from a confusingly identical domain name, the mere fact 
of having a successful career as an actress, singer or TV program star does not provide exclusive rights to 
the use of a name under the trademark laws.  The cases require a clear showing of high commercial value 
and significant recognition of the name as solely that of the performer.  The Humphrey Bogart case cited by 
the Complainant is a prime example of the type of case that would be expected to prevail, since virtually no 
one familiar with the movie industry would fail to recognize his name as that of a famous movie star.  The 
Panel does not believe Complainant’s name has yet reached that level of fame.”) 
 
18
  Hillary Rodham Clinton v Michele Dinoia, National Arbitration Forum Claim No 
FA0502000414641, March 18, 2005 (full text available at http://www.arb-
forum.com/domains/decisions/414641.htm) (Senator Clinton was regarded as having an unregistered 
trademark right in her personal name in connection with both her political activities and her career as an 
author of a number of books sold in commerce.) 
 
19
  Kathleen Kennedy Townsend v Birt, WIPO Case No D2002-0030, April 11, 2002 (available at 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2002/d2002-0030.html) (individual politician in state 
gubernatorial race held not to hold trademark rights in her personal name). 
 
20
  GILSON LALONDE, supra note ___, at § 2.16[1] (“The right of publicity … is the right of an 
individual to control the commercial use of his or her name, likeness, signature, or other personal 
characteristics.”).  The United States is the only country that has created a specific right of publicity tort.  
Other jurisdictions may protect similar rights in other ways: for example, Trade Practices Act, § 52 in 
Australia (prohibiting misleading and deceptive conduct in commerce).  In the United Kingdom, privacy 
laws have been utilized to create a right similar to the right of publicity in practice:  see, for example, 
Douglas and others v Hello! Ltd, [2001] 2 All ER 289; [2001] 1 FLR 982, [2002] 1 FCR 289 (U.K.) 
(concerned with compensation for unauthorized publication of photographs of the Michael 
Douglas/Catherine Zeta-Jones wedding on a privacy basis in the absence of a right of publicity in the 
United Kingdom). 
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from trademark law, thereby avoiding undesirable extensions of trademark law into areas 
where personal names are not truly functioning as trademarks.  It would also facilitate the 
development of a new jurisprudence focused on identifying and enforcing emerging 
social norms in relation to the protection of personal names online, whilst balancing these 
norms against the need to avoid chilling speech in cyberspace.  Initially, a new PDRP 
should ideally be limited in operation to <name.com> versions of an individual’s name, 
as opposed to, say <name.net>, <name.org> or <namesucks.com>.  This is because the 
<name.com> version of an individual’s name is likely the most closely associated with 
the individual’s “authorized” online persona.21  In other words, it is the domain name that 
most closely approximates an individual’s persona in the domain space.22   
 
Part I categorizes different classes of personal domain name disputes.  It focuses 
respectively on disputes involving celebrities, politicians and public figures, and private 
individuals.  It also identifies the limitations of trademark-based rules in these disputes.  
Part II identifies ways in which personality rights jurisprudence is a better, or at least 
more “honest” substantive fit for these disputes, albeit with inherent practical limitations 
in the domain name context in terms of jurisdiction and cost.  Part III presents a 
framework for a new PDRP that draws on the substance of the personality rights tort, 
while maintaining the procedural and cost benefits of the UDRP.  Part IV presents 
conclusions about ways in which a new PDRP would facilitate the evolution of a 
personality-rights based jurisprudence in cyberspace, while removing disputes that are 
not really about trademarks from the reach of trademark law.   
 
One might argue that developing a PDRP is unnecessary because: (a) it would 
over-propertize personal names online and hence chill free speech; and, (b) domain name 
regulation is irrelevant because sophisticated search engines have taken the place of 
                                                 
21
  Certainly most of the high profile personal domain name disputes involve <name.com> domain 
names.  See, for example, Julia Fiona Roberts v Russell Boyd, WIPO Case No. D2000-0210, 30 May, 2000 
(available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0210.html ) (involving 
juliaroberts.com domain name); Tom Cruise v Alberta Hot Rods, WIPO Case No D2006-0560, 5 July, 2006 
(available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2006/d2006-0560.html) (involving 
tomcruise.com domain name); Kevin Spacey v Alberta Hot Rods, National Arbitration Forum Claim No 
114437, August 1, 2002 (available at http://www.arb-forum.com/domains/decisions/114437.htm) 
(involving the domain name kevinspacey.com); Anna Nicole Smith v DNS Research Inc, Claim No. 
FA0312000220007, National Arbitration Forum, Feb 21, 2004 (available at:  
http://www.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/220007.htm) (involving annanicolesmith.com domain name); 
Bjorn Borg v Miguel Garcia, WIPO Case No. D2007-0591, June 21, 2007 (available at:  
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2007/d2007-0591.html ) (involving the domain name 
bjornborg.com); Hillary Rodham Clinton v Michele Dinoia, National Arbitration Forum Claim No 
FA0502000414641, March 18, 2005 (full text available at http://www.arb-
forum.com/domains/decisions/414641.htm) (involving hillaryclinton.com domain name); Bruce 
Springsteen v Jeff Burgar, WIPO Case No D2000-1532, Jan 25, 2001 (available at 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-1532.html). 
 
22
  Some might argue that this was the intent of the <.name> domain space.  However, that particular 
domain space has not grown in practice in this way, and most personal domain name disputes revolve 
around <.com> versions of an individual complainant’s name.  See id.   
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intuitive domain names as an Internet searching tool.23  Each of these concerns may be 
rebutted.  The suggested PDRP does little more in practice than is currently done by the 
UDRP with respect to propertizing personal names.  However, it does so in a more 
consistent and appropriate manner – by developing a jurisprudence that is specific to 
interests in individual personas as opposed to trademarks.  It therefore removes from the 
trademark arena those disputes that are not really about trademarks, while facilitating the 
development of a more nuanced personality-rights based jurisprudence.24  Further, the 
limitation of the PDRP, at least initially, to <name.com> domains should limit its impact 
on free speech. 
 
 While it is unquestionable that sophisticated search engine technology has a 
significant role to play in locating information online, the fact that personal domain name 
disputes are still routinely arbitrated suggests that their control remains an important issue 
in cyberspace.25  There are a variety of reasons for this.  Even sophisticated search 
engines use algorithms that prioritize domain names in search results.26  Additionally, 
                                                 
23
  Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54 EMORY LAW JOURNAL 
507, 548 (2005) (suggesting increasing sophistication of search engines will portend the death of Internet 
domain names as search tools). 
 
24
  Trademark law has come under attack in recent years for becoming too expansive in scope, 
particularly in relation to the use of trademarks online.  Removing the need to assert trademarks in personal 
names to prevent some inappropriate uses of those names in the domain space would avoid unnecessary 
reliance on expanding the boundaries of trademark law in the personal domain name context.  For more 
general discussions of questionable expansions of trademark law in the Internet context, see Gregory 
Lastowka, Google’s Law,  available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1017536, last viewed on November 8, 
2007; Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54 EMORY LAW JOURNAL 507, 
546 (2005); Mark Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L J 1687, 
1698-1699 (1999); Graeme Dinwoodie and Mark Janis, Confusion Over Use:  Contextualism in Trademark 
Law, 92 IOWA L R 1597 (2007); Stacey Dogan and Mark Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through 
Trademark Use, 92 IOWA L R 1669 (2007); Graeme Dinwoodie and Mark Janis, Lessons from the 
Trademark Use Debate, 92 IOWA L R 1703 (2007). 
 
25
  See, for example, Julia Fiona Roberts v Russell Boyd, WIPO Case No. D2000-0210, 30 May, 
2000 (available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0210.html ) (involving 
juliaroberts.com domain name); Tom Cruise v Alberta Hot Rods, WIPO Case No D2006-0560, 5 July, 2006 
(available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2006/d2006-0560.html) (involving 
tomcruise.com domain name); Kevin Spacey v Alberta Hot Rods, National Arbitration Forum Claim No 
114437, August 1, 2002 (available at http://www.arb-forum.com/domains/decisions/114437.htm) 
(involving the domain name kevinspacey.com); Anna Nicole Smith v DNS Research Inc, Claim No. 
FA0312000220007, National Arbitration Forum, Feb 21, 2004 (available at:  
http://www.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/220007.htm) (involving annanicolesmith.com domain name); 
Bjorn Borg v Miguel Garcia, WIPO Case No. D2007-0591, June 21, 2007 (available at:  
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2007/d2007-0591.html ) (involving the domain name 
bjornborg.com); Hillary Rodham Clinton v Michele Dinoia, National Arbitration Forum Claim No 
FA0502000414641, March 18, 2005 (full text available at http://www.arb-
forum.com/domains/decisions/414641.htm) (involving hillaryclinton.com domain name); Bruce 
Springsteen v Jeff Burgar, WIPO Case No D2000-1532, Jan 25, 2001 (available at 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-1532.html). 
 
26
  See topranker.in, Search Engine Optimization, (“Search engines give top priority for the keyword 
occurring in domain name in Search Engine Result Pages (SERP).”) (available at 
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domain names have an important referential function.  In other words, if I want to 
recommend a given website to a friend or colleague, I will likely refer to it by its domain 
name, and not by the search steps I took to find it.  An intuitive domain name is therefore 
still extremely important even in the age of sophisticated search engine technology. 
 
I.  PERSONAL DOMAIN NAME DISPUTES AND TRADEMARK LAW 
 
A. CATEGORIZING PERSONAL DOMAIN NAME DISPUTES 
 
Different classes of individuals have differing concerns about the use of their 
names in cyberspace.    From past judicial and arbitral decisions, it seems that the major 
classes of disputes involving personal domain names can be divided into three categories 
respectively involving:  (a) celebrities’ names, (b) politicians’ and public figures’ names, 
and (c) private individuals’ names.  These categories, perhaps unsurprisingly, match the 
categories of persona protected historically by the right of publicity tort.  The tort focuses 
on rights in personas and has developed rules, admittedly somewhat disharmonized,27 that 
at least begin to cater to the different needs of these different classes of people, and to 
balance those needs against competing societal interests in free speech.  The right of 
publicity is not perfect,28 but could be used, with some tweaking, as the basis for an 
efficient online arbitration mechanism for personal domain name disputes. 
 
1.  Celebrities’ Names 
 
The most prominent category of disputes involving personal names in the domain 
space revolves around celebrities’ names: that is, people who are famous for their 
commercial activities in fields such as music,29 television,30 movies,31 and sports.32  These 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.topranker.in/important_seo_tips_for_domain_name.htm#seo_tips_for_domain_name , last 
viewed on November 24, 2007). 
 
27
  GILSON LALONDE, supra note ___, at § 2.16[1] (“The publicity right is still developing and the 
courts are far from unanimous in defining its scope.”); GRAEME DINWOODIE AND MARK JANIS, 
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION:  LAW AND POLICY, 813 (2004) (“Most states have recognized 
either statutory or common law rights of publicity.  In the remaining jurisdictions, right of publicity claims 
have not been asserted in recent reported decisions …”) [hereinafter, “TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION”]; Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who?  The Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49 DUKE L J 
383, 389 (1999) (“Existing practice [under the right of publicity] is … confused, with fifty state regimes 
protecting differing aspects of identity, for varied terms, and with disparate remedies.”) 
 
28
  It is equally arguable that some other body of law from another jurisdiction, such as privacy rights 
jurisprudence from Europe, or “misleading and deceptive conduct” jurisprudence in Australia (Trade 
Practices Act 1974, § 52, Aust.) could be used as the substantive basis for a PDRP.  The American law is 
chosen here because it appears to deal the most directly with the kinds of disputes that are arising in the 
<name.com> space.  This may be because much of the celebrity industry is based in the United States, 
notably California, and many of these disputes involve celebrity names. 
 
29
  See, for example, Bruce Springsteen v Jeff Burgar and Bruce Springsteen Club, WIPO Case No. 
D2000-1532, Jan. 25, 2001 (available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-
1532.html) (involving brucespringsteen.com domain name);  Madonna Ciccone v Dan Parisi, WIPO Case 
No. D2000-0847, Oct. 12, 2000 (available at 
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people probably have the most commercially valuable personal names in the sense that 
they trade to a large extent on their names and likenesses for their livelihood.33  However, 
this kind of trading on a personal name does not automatically mean that the name 
functions as a trademark.  Trademarks are defined in the Lanham Act to include “any 
word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof…used by a person … to 
identify and distinguish his or her goods … from those manufactured or sold by others 
and to indicate the source of the goods…”.34     
 
A celebrity will not theoretically have a trademark or service mark in her name 
simply by virtue of being famous.  There must be products or services associated with her 
name, and her name must be used to distinguish her products or services from those sold 
by others.  Nevertheless, celebrities have generally relied on the trademark-focused 
UDRP to bring complaints about unauthorized uses of their names in the domain space.  
This is largely because the UDRP is the simplest and most cost-effective procedural 
avenue for them to take,35 even though it was never intended that the UDRP would 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0847.html) (involving Madonna.com 
domain name); Experience Hendrix LLC v Denny Hammerton, WIPO Case. No. D2000-0364, August 2, 
2000, aff’d August 15, 2000 (available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-
0364.html ) (involving jimihendrix.com domain name). 
 
30
  Anna Nicole Smith v DNS Research Inc, Claim No. FA0312000220007, National Arbitration 
Forum, Feb 21, 2004 (available at:  http://www.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/220007.htm) (involving 
annanicolesmith.com domain name). 
 
31
  Julia Fiona Roberts v Russell Boyd, WIPO Case No. D2000-0210, 30 May, 2000 (available at 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0210.html ) (involving juliaroberts.com 
domain name); Tom Cruise v Alberta Hot Rods, WIPO Case No D2006-0560, 5 July, 2006 (available at 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2006/d2006-0560.html) (involving tomcruise.com 
domain name); Kevin Spacey v Alberta Hot Rods, National Arbitration Forum Claim No 114437, August 1, 
2002 (available at http://www.arb-forum.com/domains/decisions/114437.htm) (involving the domain name 
kevinspacey.com). 
 
32
  See, for example Bjorn Borg v Miguel Garcia, WIPO Case No. D2007-0591, June 21, 2007 
(available at:  http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2007/d2007-0591.html ) (involving the 
domain name bjornborg.com). 
 
33
  However, there is some dispute about the extent to which they trade on those names in a 
“trademark sense”.  For a general critique of this point in the domain name context, see Anthony Verna, 
www.whatsina.name, 14 SETON HALL J OF SPORTS AND ENT L 153 (2004).   
 
34
  15 U.S.C. § 1127.  “Service marks” are similarly defined in 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (“The term “service 
mark” means any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof—  
(1) used by a person, or  
(2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce and applies to register on the principal 
register established by this chapter,  
to identify and distinguish the services of one person, including a unique service, from the services of 
others and to indicate the source of the services, even if that source is unknown. Titles, character names, 
and other distinctive features of radio or television programs may be registered as service marks 
notwithstanding that they, or the programs, may advertise the goods of the sponsor.”) 
 
35
  Costs of judicial proceedings can be prohibitive for private individuals:  Moreland, supra note 
___, at 385 (“Prior to the establishment of ICANN Arbitration, recovery of celebrity domain names was an 
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inadvertently create a situation where personal names are recognized as trademarks in an 
expansive and unprincipled way.  While many UDRP arbitrators have accepted 
trademark claims in personal names,36 others have not.37  It is difficult to ascertain a 
principled distinction between the different approaches.   
 
While it is possible that a “Julia Roberts movie” might be regarded as a product 
involving a “Julia Roberts” trademark, this seems unlikely.  Audiences may go to see a 
movie because Julia Roberts stars in it, or they may associate a certain quality of 
performance with Ms Roberts, but they are unlikely to regard Ms Roberts as the source of 
the movie in a trademark sense.  The movie studio that produced the film is more likely 
to be regarded as the source of the movie.  It is possible that Ms Roberts’ name is a 
trademark or service mark when she sells her performance services to movie producers 
and movie studios.  However, this does not seem to be the basis on which UDRP 
arbitrators decided that she had trademark rights in her name.38  There was very little 
discussion of the point in the Roberts arbitration, other than the arbitrators 
acknowledging that a mark does not have to be registered to attract the protection of the 
UDRP.39  There is a suggestion in the Roberts arbitration, and in other UDRP decisions 
involving personal names, that the name of an author of a creative work, such as the 
                                                                                                                                                 
expensive and potentially lengthy process.”); Jessica Litman, The DNS Wars:  Trademarks and the Internet 
Domain Name System, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 149, 155 (2000) (noting the often prohibitive cost 
of trademark infringement and dilution litigation in early domain name disputes). 
 
36
  See, for example, Julia Fiona Roberts v Russell Boyd, WIPO Case No. D2000-0210, 30 May, 
2000, ¶ 6 (available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0210.html ); Tom 
Cruise v Alberta Hot Rods, WIPO Case No D2006-0560, 5 July, 2006 (available at 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2006/d2006-0560.html); Kevin Spacey v Alberta Hot 
Rods, National Arbitration Forum Claim No FA0205000114437, August 1, 2002, available at 
http://domains.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/114437.htm , last viewed on November 8, 2007. 
 
37
  Bruce Springsteen v Jeff Burgar and Bruce Springsteen Club, WIPO Case No. D2000-1532, Jan. 
25, 2001, ¶ 6 (available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-1532.html); Anna 
Nicole Smith v DNS Research Inc, National Arbitration Forum Claim No FA0312000220007, Feb 21, 2004 
(available at http://www.adr-forum.com/domains/decisions/220007.htm, last viewed on October 25, 2007); 
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem v Alberta Hot Rods, WIPO Case No. D2002-0616, October 7, 2002, 
(available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2002/d2002-0616.html) (involving a 
complaint with respect to the domain name <alberteinstein.com>); Gordon Sumner aka Sting v Michael 
Urvan, WIPO Case No D2000-0596, July 20, 2000, ¶ 6.5  (available at 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0596.html), last viewed on November 8, 
2007 (“In the opinion of this Administrative Panel, it is doubtful whether the Uniform Policy is applicable 
to this dispute. Although it is accepted that the Complainant is world famous under the name STING, it 
does not follow that he has rights in STING as a trademark or service mark.). 
 
38
  Julia Fiona Roberts v Russell Boyd, WIPO Case No. D2000-0210, 30 May, 2000, ¶ 6 (available at 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0210.html ). 
 
39
  id. (“A recent decision citing English law found that common law trademark rights exist in an 
author’s name. The Policy does not require that the Complainant should have rights in a registered 
trademark or service mark. It is sufficient that the Complainant should satisfy the Administrative Panel that 
she has rights in common law trademark or sufficient rights to ground an action for passing off.”) 
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author of a book, may be regarded as a trademark.40  However, even if this test for 
trademark status is correct, an actor in a film is not the film’s author.41  Under this 
analysis, it would be more likely that the writer or director of the film was its author – 
and therefore it would be more sensible to regard their names as trademarks in the 
context of the film.42 
 
Celebrities may have valid reasons for asserting some control over their personal 
names in the domain space, particularly in the <name.com> space which is probably 
viewed by most Internet users as the most likely site for a celebrity’s authorized online 
presence.  Celebrities may want to control this domain for their own commercial motives 
– which seems reasonable, particularly if this is in line with current Internet usage norms.  
For example, Tyra Banks’ management company, Bankable Inc, appears to have 
registered the domain name <tyrabanks.com> precisely for this purpose.43  It is an official 
website authorized and operated by Ms Banks, including details about her and her 
career.
44
  Another example is <parishilton.com> which appears to be an authorized 
website for Paris Hilton, including details of her proposed public appearances and her 
recently released album.45 
 
Celebrities may also want to control relevant domain names to prevent unjust 
enrichment.  In other words, celebrities who may not themselves necessarily want to 
                                                 
40
  id.  (“A recent decision citing English law found that common law trademark rights exist in an 
author’s name.”).  See also Hillary Rodham Clinton v Michele Dinoia, National Arbitration Forum Claim 
No FA0502000414641, March 18, 2005 (full text available at http://www.arb-
forum.com/domains/decisions/414641.htm) (Senator Clinton was regarded as having an unregistered 
trademark right in her personal name in connection with both her political activities and her career as an 
author of a number of books sold in commerce.). 
 
41
  Verna, supra note ___, at 162-163 (“If an author has trademark rights in his or her name, then it 
must come from the rather singular nature of a novel.  Yes, there are editors in the writing process, 
however, editors do relatively little work compared to the author.  A movie, on the other hand, has many 
other people involved in the process …. Looking at the credits of any major motion picture, there are 
writers, assistant directors, and people who need to operate the microphone and the camera.  There may be 
more than one scriptwriter.  The actors and actresses are just a small part of the motion picture.”) 
 
42
  Although some people would disagree even with this analysis because of the collective creative 
nature of a motion picture.  See Verna, supra note ___, at 162-163 (“If an author has trademark rights in his 
or her name, then it must come from the rather singular nature of a novel.  Yes, there are editors in the 
writing process, however, editors do relatively little work compared to the author.  A movie, on the other 
hand, has many other people involved in the process …. Looking at the credits of any major motion picture, 
there are writers, assistant directors, and people who need to operate the microphone and the camera.  
There may be more than one scriptwriter.  The actors and actresses are just a small part of the motion 
picture.”). 
 
43
  See http://www.whois-search.com/whois/tyrabanks.com, last viewed on November 7, 2007. 
 
44
  See www.tyrabanks.com, last viewed on November 7, 2007. 
 
45
  See www.parishilton.com, last viewed on November 7, 2007.  Other examples of apparently 
official websites run by a famous notable personality are www.donaldtrump.com and www.trump.com for 
Donald Trump. 
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make commercial profits from using a domain name may nevertheless wish to prevent 
others from profiting from their name online.  If we are at least initially limiting the scope 
of a PDRP to <name.com> domain names this seems reasonable.  It seems sensible to 
allow a presumption that celebrities’ rights in the <name.com> version of their name 
extend to preventing others from using the name to make a commercial profit from 
Internet users who are actually seeking the authorized website of the relevant celebrity.  
This would likely be the result in applying the right of publicity to a <name.com> case 
where the registrant was making an unauthorized commercial use of the domain name.46   
 
Unjust enrichment situations may be broken down into sub-categories.  One sub-
category might be where a domain name registrant seeks to profit from selling a relevant 
domain name to someone else even if the registrant herself did not use, or intend to use, 
the name.  This is, in effect, cybersquatting on the domain name.47  Another sub-category 
would be where the registrant seeks to derive a commercial profit herself from using the 
domain name in an unauthorized way.  Domain name registrants have, in the past, used 
<name.com> domain names for websites selling advertising that is unconnected with the 
celebrity in question.  In other words, the registrant uses the celebrity’s name in the 
domain name to draw custom to an advertising website that is otherwise unconnected 
with that celebrity.48   
                                                 
46
  In fact, a right of publicity action may well support such an action in relation to some other 
iterations of the name in the domain space, such as <name.net> and <name.org>.  However, these actions 
are seldom taken in current practice because of the costs and jurisdictional issues involved in litigation, as 
contrasted with a UDRP arbitration:  see Part II.B.1 infra.  This article suggests initially restricting the 
operation of a PDRP based on the right of publicity to <name.com> names largely as a trial run to see how 
arbitrators reflect emerging social norms in decisions in respect of the <name.com> space.  If there was a 
later perceived need to expand or otherwise alter the scope of the PDRP, this could be achieved later on in 
light of developments in <name.com> cases. 
 
47
  However, in the absence of a legitimate trademark interest in the personal name, this conduct 
should not theoretically run afoul of anti-cybersquatting laws, except for 15 U.S.C. § 1129(1)(A) which 
does not require the plaintiff to establish a trademark in her personal name:  “Any person who registers a 
domain name that consists of the name of another living person, or a name substantially and confusingly 
similar thereto, without that person’s consent, with the specific intent to profit from such name by selling 
the domain name for financial gain to that person or any third party, shall be liable in a civil action by such 
person.”  
 
48
  Tom Cruise v Alberta Hot Rods, WIPO Case No D2006-0560, 5 July, 2006, ¶ 4 (available at 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2006/d2006-0560.html) (respondent had used 
tomcruise.com domain name to draw custom to a website that advertised products and services unrelated to 
the well-known actor Tom Cruise).  Yet another example of a potential unjust enrichment based claim 
would be a situation where a registrant is using a domain name in order to sell “vanity emails” that utilize a 
celebrity’s name in the domain server part of the name: for example, <john@jimihendrix.com>:  See 
discussion in Miriam Claire Beezy, Good Marksmanship, 29 LOS ANGELES LAWYER 20, 23-24 (2006) 
(discussion of domain name dispute involving the domain name jimihendrix.com in which the registrant 
was offering vanity email addresses for sale including the jimihendrix.com domain); Experience Hendrix 
LLC v Denny Hammerton, WIPO Case. No. D2000-0364, August 2, 2000, aff’d August 15, 2000 (available 
at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0364.html ) (involving 
jimihendrix.com domain name).  If it is true that there is a presumption that famous individuals have some 
rights to the <name.com> versions of their domain names, then the sale of such vanity emails by someone 
other than the individual in question, or her authorized representatives, may be unjustified.  This does not 
necessarily mean that another variation of the vanity emails should not be permitted without the person’s 
consent: for example, <john@jimihendrix.org> or <john@jimihendrixfan.com>.  This approach thus 
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Alternatively, a celebrity might want to control a <name.com> domain name to 
avoid any authorized web content about her.  In other words, some celebrities may wish 
to control <name.com> versions of their names to telegraph to the public that they have 
not authorized any web content about them.  Thus, Internet users will find nothing 
relating to the celebrity under the <name.com> name, and they will be aware that any 
web content they find under other iterations of the celebrity’s name is likely to be 
unauthorized content.  In some ways, this analogizes to a kind of privacy protection 
allowing the celebrity to communicate to the public her desire not to exploit her own 
image online, and perhaps implicitly requesting privacy considerations from others.  
Examples of this are found in the Julia Roberts49 and Tom Cruise50 UDRP arbitrations.  In 
each of these cases, the celebrity in question arbitrated successfully for control of a 
relevant <name.com> domain name.  Currently, the related websites host no content 
about either of them.  Again, such a result does not necessarily chill speech about 
celebrities online.  Many other domain names are available for fans and critics who want 
to communicate about those people.  Search engines will also help Internet users find 
unauthorized content about individuals posted under less intuitive domain names.   
 
The interests identified above in both commercial control of <name.com> names 
and in privacy protections of a celebrity persona match the emphases of the right of 
publicity tort much more so than trademark law.  The right of publicity tort has been 
explained variously on the basis of economic property rights in an individual’s name or 
likeness,51 a need to prevent free riding or unjust enrichment,52 and the need to protect a 
                                                                                                                                                 
allows individuals to make expressive uses of their idols’ names without unduly interfering with 
presumptions about what the individual may have authorized in cyberspace. 
 
49
  Julia Fiona Roberts v Russell Boyd Case No. D2000-0210 , May 29, 2000, WIPO Arbitration and 
Mediation Center (full text available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-
0210.html , last viewed on November 6, 2007). 
 
50
  Tom Cruise v Alberta Hot Rods, WIPO Case No D2006-0560, 5 July, 2006 (available at 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2006/d2006-0560.html). 
 
51
  Various justifications have been put forward for a property basis for personality rights, and have 
equally been criticized over the years.  For a discussion of property theory in this context, see Dogan and 
Lemley, Right of Publicity, supra note ___, 1181-1183 (critique of Lockean labor theory justifications for 
personality rights as property); Mark McKenna, The Right of Publicity and Autonomous Self-Definition, 67 
U PITT L REV 225, 247 (2005) (“It might be true that identity is sufficiently similar to other objects the law 
regards as property and therefore deserves at least some of the sticks in the traditional bundle of property 
rights.  But far too few courts and commentators have offered a theory as to why any of the traditional 
property justifications lead to that conclusion.”); 251-267 (critique of Lockean labor theory justifications 
for property rights in personal identity); Haemmerli, supra note ___, 388 (“Both proponents and critics of 
the right of publicity generally perceive it as a property claim grounded in Lockean labor theory.”), 407-8 
(noting dual property and privacy justifications for right of publicity actions), 412 (“To the extent that 
commentators specifically address publicity rights, they tend to do so within this property context, and to 
use Lockean labor theories of property to explain the assertion of a property right in identity or persona.”); 
Roberta Kwall, Fame, 73 INDIANA L J 1, 15 (1997) [hereinafter, Fame] (“This Article … contends that a 
property-based conception for publicity rights is the natural outgrowth of our cultural norms as well as our 
theoretical conceptions of property.”); David Westfall and David Landau, Publicity Rights as Property 
Rights, 23 CARDOZO ARTS AND ENT LJ 71 (2005) (examining property basis for rights of publicity); Eileen 
Rielly, The Right of Publicity for Political Figures:  Martin Luther King, Jr, Center for Social Change, Inc 
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person’s privacy from unauthorized commercial interference.53    Personality rights 
jurisprudence has also dealt extensively with issues of balancing the public’s interest in 
free speech about a celebrity with the celebrity’s interest in controlling her public 
persona.54  Although these are difficult issues that have not been definitively resolved 
even within the right of publicity, this body of law has at least started to meaningfully 
address these concerns and develop responses to them.  Trademark law, on the other 
hand, even the trademark laws focused on preventing cybersquatting, are not geared 
                                                                                                                                                 
v American Heritage Products, 46 U PITT L REV 1161, 1165-9 (1985) (describing development of a 
property rights rationale for the right of publicity).  See also Diane Zimmerman and Melissa Jacoby, 
Foreclosing on Fame: Exploring the Uncharted Boundaries of the Right Of Publicity, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1322 (2002). 
 
52
  Dogan and Lemley, Right of Publicity, supra note ___, at 1181-3 (critique of unjust enrichment 
explanation of rights of publicity); Sarah Konsky, Publicity Dilution:  A Proposal for Protecting Publicity 
Rights, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER AND HIGH TECH L J 347 (2005) (recognition of unjust enrichment, 
along with Lockean theory and several other theoretical justifications as explanations for the right of 
publicity); McKenna, supra note ___, at 247-248 (critique of unjust enrichment theories of the right of 
publicity); Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image:  Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 
CALIF L REV 125, 196-204 (1993) (critique of unjust enrichment rationales for the right of publicity). 
 
53
  Dogan and Lemley, Right of Publicity,  supra note ___, 1208-1210 (critique of privacy based 
justifications for the right of publicity); Madow, supra note ___, 167-8 (discussion of privacy rights basis 
for some early right of publicity cases); McKenna, supra note ___, at 285 (“Since all individuals share the 
interest in autonomous self-definition, every individual should be able to control uses of her identity that 
interfere with her ability to define her own public character.”), 286 (“Compelling a person to express a 
message herself presents a particular sort of threat to her freedom of belief:  It threatens her ability to 
control what she tells the world about who she is and what she holds important …”); Haemmerli, supra 
note ___, at 407-8 (describing theoretical muddle between property and privacy theory underlying rights of 
publicity claims); Eileen Rielly, The Right of Publicity for Political Figures:  Martin Luther King, Jr, 
Center for Social Change, Inc v American Heritage Products, 46 U PITT L REV 1161, 1164-5 (1985) 
(description of privacy foundations of the right of publicity). 
 
54
  Haemmerli, supra note ___, at 441-458 (analysis of First Amendment issues arising with respect 
to the right of publicity); Peter Felcher and Edward Rubin, Privacy, Publicity, and the Portrayal of Real 
People by the Media, 88 YALE LJ 1577, 1590 (1979) (“The First Amendment inevitably defines the 
operation and extent of the right of publicity; once the defendant can establish that the expression in 
question is protected, he will almost invariably prevail.”); Roberta Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs. the 
First Amendment:  A Property and Liability Rule Analysis, 70 INDIANA L J 47 (1994) [hereinafter, First 
Amendment] (suggesting a property versus liability rule basis for balancing First Amendment concerns 
against right of publicity claims); Eileen Rielly, The Right of Publicity for Political Figures:  Martin Luther 
King, Jr, Center for Social Change, Inc v American Heritage Products, 46 U PITT L REV 1161, 1172-4 
(1985) (balancing First Amendment concerns with the publicity rights of public figures and politicians); 
Madow, supra note ___, at 140 (description of the role of the consumer as an active and creative participant 
in the creation of cultural commodities); Kwall, Fame, supra note ___, at 46-7 (“We do not deprive the 
owners of famous trademarks or the copyright owners of popular works of art or literature of their rights 
just because the public has played some role in placing a value on these works.  Therefore, right-of-
publicity critics must justify why the cachet of a person’s fame should be treated differently.”).  See also 
Diane Zimmerman, Who Put the Right in the Right of Publicity?, 9 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 35 
(1998). 
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towards such balances of interests.  They are aimed predominantly55 at protecting 
valuable trademarks against unauthorized commercial uses.56  Where trademark cases 
have dealt with free speech, the inquiry has focused on balancing the integrity of 
commercial source indicators against First Amendment concerns,57 rather than on 
balancing the integrity of individual personas against the First Amendment.  Personality 
rights jurisprudence has developed responses to questions about balancing First 
Amendment concerns against rights in individual personas.58  Thus, the personality rights 
tort is more suited to personal domain name disputes than trademark law in most cases. 
 
2.  Politicians’ and Public Figures’ Names 
 
Politicians and other public figures may also have concerns about the use of their 
personal names in domain names.  These concerns may differ in some ways from those of 
celebrities, and may be valid to the extent that they do not unduly interfere with freedom 
of expression in the political process.59  Again, trademark law is not a good fit for 
                                                 
55
  The cyberpiracy provisions in 15 U.S.C. § 1129(1) are an exception to this as they are premised on 
the protection of personal names against cyberpiracy and do not require the plaintiff to establish a 
trademark interest in her personal name to succeed on a claim under the provision. 
 
56
  Outside of the UDRP, see, for example, 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (infringement of registered trademark 
by creating consumer confusion as to source of goods or services); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (infringement of 
unregistered mark); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (trademark dilution through tarnishment or blurring); 15 U.S.C. § 
1125(d) (cybersquatting in relation to domain names corresponding with trademarks), § 1129(1) 
(cyberpiracy in relation to domain names corresponding with personal names). 
 
57
  See, for example, Mattel, Inc v MCA Records, Inc, 296 F 3d 894 (2002) (balancing expressive 
interests of popular singers in using the “Barbie” trademark in their “Barbie Girl” song).  It is worth noting 
that some cases have dealt with the balance of free speech against trademark claims and right of publicity 
claims in the alternative:  see, for example Rogers v Grimaldi, 875 F 2d 994 (1989) (dealing with the use of 
Ginger Rogers’ personal name in a movie title for a movie about two cabaret performers who imitated 
Ginger Rogers and Fred Astaire). 
 
58
  Haemmerli, supra note ___, at 441-458 (analysis of First Amendment issues arising with respect 
to the right of publicity); Peter Felcher and Edward Rubin, Privacy, Publicity, and the Portrayal of Real 
People by the Media, 88 YALE LJ 1577, 1590 (1979) (“The First Amendment inevitably defines the 
operation and extent of the right of publicity; once the defendant can establish that the expression in 
question is protected, he will almost invariably prevail.”); Kwall, First Amendment, supra note ___ 
(suggesting a property versus liability rule basis for balancing First Amendment concerns against right of 
publicity claims); Eileen Rielly, The Right of Publicity for Political Figures:  Martin Luther King, Jr, 
Center for Social Change, Inc v American Heritage Products, 46 U PITT L REV 1161, 1172-4 (1985) 
(balancing First Amendment concerns with the publicity rights of public figures and politicians); Madow, 
supra note ___, at 140 (description of the role of the consumer as an active and creative participant in the 
creation of cultural commodities); Kwall, Fame, supra note ___, at 46-7 (“We do not deprive the owners of 
famous trademarks or the copyright owners of popular works of art or literature of their rights just because 
the public has played some role in placing a value on these works.  Therefore, right-of-publicity critics 
must justify why the cachet of a person’s fame should be treated differently.”).  See also Diane 
Zimmerman, Who Put the Right in the Right of Publicity?, 9 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 35 (1998). 
 
59
  See, for example, New York Magazine v The Metropolitan Transit Authority and the City of New 
York, 987 F Supp 254 (1997), aff’d in part, vacated in part, New York Magazine v The Metropolitan 
Transit Authority and the City of New York, 136 F.3d 123 (1998) (on balancing Mayor Rudolph Giuliani’s 
rights of privacy and publicity against the First Amendment); Eileen Rielly, The Right of Publicity for 
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balancing competing interests in such names.  Even if some famous celebrities, such as 
authors,60 have trademarks in their names for reasons explained supra, politicians are less 
likely to hold such trademarks.61  Most politicians do not use their names as source 
indicators as required by trademark law. 62  Rather, they use their names to raise public 
awareness about particular issues63 and, in the case of politicians, often in the context of a 
political campaign.  These names often have a temporal quality that is particularly 
significant to the democratic process.  If, for example, electors are voting on a particular 
issue, a given domain name might be extremely valuable in the lead-up to an election and 
much less valuable thereafter64 - both in the hands of the person whose name it is and in 
the hands of others.   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Political Figures:  Martin Luther King, Jr, Center for Social Change, Inc v American Heritage Products, 
46 U PITT L REV 1161, 1172-4 (1985) (describing need to balance First Amendment interests in political 
debate against the publicity rights of politicians and public figures); Wilson v Brown, 73 N.Y.S. 2d 587, 
589 (Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 1947) (“One who takes an office, whether it is in government or in outside 
organizations, must be deemed to have agreed to any reasonable public use of, or reference to, his name …. 
Persons who accept high positions ought not to be so tender about the mention of their names; they must 
bear “the white light that beats upon a throne.”  If they want peace and privacy they should stay out of 
public life; if they object to having their names legitimately mentioned they need only to resign and they 
will quickly subside into happy obscurity.”) 
 
60
  Of course, where a politician is also an author, she may assert trademark rights in her name under 
this analysis.  See, for example, Hillary Rodham Clinton v Michele Dinoia, National Arbitration Forum 
Claim No FA0502000414641, March 18, 2005 (full text available at http://www.arb-
forum.com/domains/decisions/414641.htm) (Senator Clinton was regarded as having an unregistered 
trademark right in her personal name in connection with both her political activities and her career as an 
author of a number of books sold in commerce.) 
 
61
  Jacqueline Lipton, Who Owns Hillary.com?  Political Speech and the First Amendment in 
Cyberspace, 49 BOSTON COLLEGE L REV 55 (2008); Report of the Second WIPO Internet Domain Name 
Process, Sept 3, 2001, ¶ 188, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/processes/process2/report/html/report.html#5, last viewed on November 11, 
2007 (“the names of political figures, religious leaders, scientists and historical persons may never have 
been used in commerce and, thus, are unlikely to have trademarks associated with them.”).  However, some 
politicians have been regarded as having commercial trademark rights in their personal names in relation to 
certain commercial activities:  Hillary Rodham Clinton v Michele Dinoia, National Arbitration Forum 
Claim No FA0502000414641, March 18, 2005 (full text available at http://www.arb-
forum.com/domains/decisions/414641.htm) (Senator Clinton was regarded as having an unregistered 
trademark right in her personal name in connection with both her political activities and her career as an 
author of a number of books sold in commerce.) 
 
62
  See definitions of “trademark” and “service mark” in 15 U.S.C. § 1127. 
 
63
  That is not to say that celebrities do not also get involved in public interest issues – it is just more 
typical of politicians in their day to day activities. 
 
64
  There can also obviously be temporal aspects to a celebrity’s fame.  However, the temporal issues 
can be more pronounced and more important in the lead-up to an election where election day is effectively 
the deadline for a politician to get her message across to the electorate.  The temporal issues in politics are 
also much more significant to the operation of a representative democracy than temporal issues relating to a 
celebrity’s fame which are likely to have more to do with the creation and waning of public interest in 
cultural commodities at any given point in time. 
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The kind of balancing exercise needed to protect a politician’s interests in her 
personal identity against the need of the public to engage in discourse about her will be 
different to balancing speech and commerce under trademark law.  The First Amendment 
is likely to be more seriously implicated in the political context than in the commercial 
context.65  This is yet another area in which personality rights jurisprudence may be 
helpful because of its developed focus on protecting different classes of individuals 
against improper use of their names and personas.  The right of publicity has already 
developed rules for protecting politicians and public figures against certain unauthorized 
intrusions,66 while at the same time promoting society’s interests in free speech where 
these interests should override a public figure’s desire not to have her name or likeness 
used in a certain way.67   
                                                 
65
  New York Magazine v The Metropolitan Transit Authority and the City of New York, 987 F Supp 
254, 262 (1997), aff’d in part, vacated in part, New York Magazine v The Metropolitan Transit Authority 
and the City of New York, 136 F.3d 123 (1998) (discussing continuum of protections available under the 
First Amendment for political versus commercial speech about politicians in the right of publicity context). 
 
66
  Notable examples of right of publicity cases in which courts were concerned about the personality 
rights of politicians or public figures include: New York Magazine v The Metropolitan Transit Authority 
and the City of New York, 987 F Supp 254 (1997), aff’d in part, vacated in part, New York Magazine v The 
Metropolitan Transit Authority and the City of New York, 136 F.3d 123 (1998) (involving then New York 
City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani’s public image in relation to an advertising campaign on city buses); Rosa 
Parks v LaFace Records, 329 F 3d 437 (2003) (involving publicity rights of Rosa Parks in the context of a 
song title using her name in relation to a hip hop recording that had nothing in particular to do with her or 
her work); Martin Luther King Jr, Center for Social Change Inc v American Heritage Products, 694 F 2d 
674 (11th Cir. 1993) (the estate of Martin Luther King Jr sought an injunction to prevent the defendant from 
selling plastic busts of Dr King). 
 
67
  New York Magazine v The Metropolitan Transit Authority and the City of New York, 987 F Supp 
254, 266 (1997), aff’d in part, vacated in part, New York Magazine v The Metropolitan Transit Authority 
and the City of New York, 136 F.3d 123 (1998) (“as a highly visible public figure Giuliani’s interest in his 
privacy is very limited.  One who chooses to be the Mayor of the “Big Apple” must expect that he will be 
the subject of all kinds of public comments, even in advertisements.”)  Of course publicity rights 
jurisprudence is not perfect in the political context.  It is disharmonized common law that has not yet had 
an international reach:  GILSON LALONDE, supra note ___, at § 2.16[1] (“The publicity right is still 
developing and the courts are far from unanimous in defining its scope.”); GRAEME DINWOODIE AND MARK 
JANIS, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION:  LAW AND POLICY, 813 (2004) (“Most states have 
recognized either statutory or common law rights of publicity.  In the remaining jurisdictions, right of 
publicity claims have not been asserted in recent reported decisions …”) [hereinafter, “TRADEMARKS AND 
UNFAIR COMPETITION”]; Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who?  The Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49 
DUKE L J 383, 389 (1999) (“Existing practice [under the right of publicity] is … confused, with fifty state 
regimes protecting differing aspects of identity, for varied terms, and with disparate remedies.”); Report of 
the Second WIPO Internet Domain Name Process, Sept 3, 2001, ¶ 173, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/processes/process2/report/html/report.html#5, last viewed on November 11, 
2007 (“Because of the diversity of interests affected by the treatment of personal names, the legal principles 
and policies that can be deployed to protect personal names are similarly diverse and vary, as might be 
expected, from country to country.  These legal principles and policies include the right to publicity or the 
right to control the commercial use of one’s identity, recognized in many States of the United States of 
America;  the tort of unfair competition;  the tort of passing-off (conceptually treated, in many cases, as 
part of the law of unfair competition), recognized generally in common-law countries;  and the right to 
privacy.”).  Nevertheless, it is the most developed attempt at creating workable interests in individual 
personas, and balancing those interests against the rights of the public to engage in discourse about famous 
people. 
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Politicians and public figures will naturally have some concerns about 
unauthorized uses of <name.com> domains that mirror those of celebrities.  An obvious 
example is cybersquatting.  A cybersquatter may well register either a celebrity’s name or 
a policitian’s name in the hopes of making a commercial profit from its transfer.  There 
may be situations in which cybersquatting is more serious for a politician than a celebrity 
in terms of practical consequences of failing to secure control of a given name.  For 
example, in the lead-up to an election, a politician will likely have a strong desire to 
control a domain name relating to her personal name, particularly the <name.com> 
version, as the Internet has become a very important tool for communicating with the 
electorate and also for political fundraising.68 
 
Like celebrities, politicians and public figures will also have concerns about 
situations where a domain name registrant is not cybersquatting on a given name, but 
rather wants to use the name herself for some expressive or commercial purpose.  Where 
the purpose is purely commercial, the right of publicity would presumably proscribe the 
conduct on the basis that the tort prohibits unauthorized commercial exploitations of a 
person’s name or likeness.69  Where the purpose is expressive, it is likely that the 
registrant’s intention is to harm the politician in question.  Given the temporal importance 
of political domain names, particularly in the lead-up to elections, a supporter of a 
politician would presumably not wish to keep the name from the politician.70  However, a 
critic may well want to use the name to express views critical of the politician.   
 
An opposing party or candidate may be highly motivated to engage in such 
conduct.  Because of the importance of free speech in the political process, these uses of a 
                                                 
68
  Most politicians now run websites where supporters can donate funds to their campaigns.  See, for 
example, www.hillaryclinton.com (last viewed on November 8, 2007), www.barackobama.com (last 
viewed on November 8, 2007).  Senator Obama’s website has a rather sophisticated fundraising project 
where individuals can set up accounts and set fundraising goals that they plan to achieve to support the 
senator’s campaign – see http://my.barackobama.com/page/outreach/login/main, last viewed on November 
8, 2007.  Little has been written about the impact of the Internet on political fundraising to date.  For a 
survey of Howard Dean’s use of the Internet in his run for the 2004 presidential ticket, see Abigail Brown, 
Politics, Innovation, and the Internet:  A Source of Howard Dean’s Fundraising Success? (September 6, 
2007) (available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1012481, last viewed on November 
8, 2007) (examining Dean’s use of the Internet to set up town hall meetings for campaign and fundraising 
purposes).  On domain name use in politics more generally, see Matthew Coleman, Domain Name Piracy 
and Privacy:  Do Federal Election Regulations Offer a Solution?, 19 YALE L & POL’Y REV 235 (2000). 
 
69
  GILSON LALONDE, supra note ___, at § 2.16[1] (“The right of publicity … is the right of an 
individual to control the commercial use of his or her name, likeness, signature, or other personal 
characteristics.”). 
 
70
  This may be true of supporters of celebrities in many cases. For example, the registrants of 
annanicoleamith.com argued in a UDRP that they had offered to transfer the name to Ms Smith’s 
management at no cost to them:  Anna Nicole Smith v DNS Research Inc, National Arbitration Forum 
Claim No FA0312000220007, Feb 21, 2004 (available at http://www.adr-
forum.com/domains/decisions/220007.htm, last viewed on October 25, 2007).  This situation may be 
contrasted with the recent dispute over various intellectual property rights allegedly belonging to the 
popular singer Prince, who is now threatening operators of certain fan websites for their unauthorized use 
of his image in their websites:  see www.princefansunited.com, last viewed on November 7, 2007.   
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<name.com> domain name raise important competing aspects of the need for the 
electorate to communicate effectively about politicians.  On the one hand, if all political 
speech is to be protected, regardless of content or forum, then anyone should arguably be 
entitled to register and use a <name.com> domain name about a politician for any 
expressive purpose.  On the other hand, if there is an expectation that <name.com> 
domains will resolve to websites authorized by relevant politicians, it could be 
misleading to allow even purely expressive unauthorized messages about a politician 
under those domain names.  Internet users could be misled in these cases as to the 
identity of the speaker, and it could make it more difficult for Internet users to find 
authorized messages by the politicians in question. 
 
There are two recent examples of this conduct in Montana.  One involves Bob 
Keenan, a Republican candidate running for the United States Senate.  The domain name 
<bobkeenan.com> has been registered by the Montana Democratic Party and hosts a 
website critical of Keenan’s past policies and practices.  The second example involves a 
Democratic candidate for Montana Secretary of State, Linda McCulloch.  The Montana 
Republican State Central Committee has registered the domain name 
<lindamcculloch.com> and is using it for a website critical of McCulloch.  Given the lack 
of likely trademark interest in these politicians’ names,71 it is unlikely that trademark law 
would help either candidate.  The conduct would not even run afoul of the personal name 
provisions in § 1129(1)(A) of the Lanham Act (which does not require a trademark 
interest) because technically the registrants of the domain names are not cybersquatters.  
Section 1129(1)(A) requires an attempt to sell a domain name for profit for liability to 
attach.72  The registrants in these scenarios are rather utilizing the names to communicate 
messages critical of the politicians in question.  They are not attempting to sell the names. 
 
There is some state legislation in California that indirectly addresses this question 
by prohibiting fraudulent and misleading conduct on the Internet in relation to a ballot 
measure.
73
  This would likely catch certain instances of misleading Internet users by 
registering a domain name similar to a politician’s name, particularly in the lead up to an 
election.  However, this approach has not yet been picked up in other states within the 
United States, let alone at a more global level.  In any event, it is not targeted specifically 
at the protection of individual names from unauthorized uses, but rather deals with ballot 
measures more generally.74  Thus, it would not apply outside the electoral context.  There 
                                                 
71
  Often, local politicians, as compared with some federal politicians, are not regarded as having 
sufficient trademark interests in their names to support trademark-related actions.  See, for example, 
Kathleen Kennedy Townsend v Birt, WIPO Case No D2002-0030, April 11, 2002 (available at 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2002/d2002-0030.html ) (individual politician in state 
gubernatorial race held not to hold trademark rights in her personal name).   
 
72
  15 U.S.C. § 1129(1)(A) (“Any person who registers a domain name that consists of the name of 
another living person, or a name substantially and confusingly similar thereto, without that person’s 
consent, with the specific intent to profit from such name by selling the domain name for financial gain to 
that person or any third party, shall be liable in a civil action by such person.”). 
 
73
  Political Cyberfraud Abatement Act, Cal. Elec. Code, §§ 18320-23. 
 
74
  Cal. Elections Code, § 18320(c)(1) (““Political cyberfraud” means a knowing and willful act 
concerning a political Web site that is committed with the intent to deny a person access to a political Web 
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is also some Californian state legislation that deals specifically with unauthorized 
registrations and uses of domain names corresponding with personal names.75  This 
covers all personal names, whether relating to politicians or public figures76 or otherwise.  
However, again it only exists in California and is therefore probably not a realistic option 
to address these issues at least in the short term.   
 
The development of specific principles dealing with uses of personal names in 
general, and politicians’ names in particular, under a new PDRP would be able to more 
directly deal with the kinds of situations described here.  Such an approach would also 
have the advantage of being globally harmonized.  Additionally, a PDRP would not be 
limited to the electoral context, but would cover all politicians and public figures 
attempting to use their names to promulgate messages on the Internet, regardless of 
whether an election was looming at a given time.  Importantly, it would take disputes 
about free speech in the political process away from trademark policy by avoiding UDRP 
complaints involving politicians’ names.  The development of online jurisprudence 
related to free speech in the political process should not be decided by focusing on 
trademark principles where the conflict in question is not about balancing commercial 
trademarks against the First Amendment.77   
 
3.  Private Individuals’ Names 
 
Private individuals’ names are different again than those of celebrities or 
politicians in the issues they raise in the domain space.  These names are perhaps less 
                                                                                                                                                 
site, deny a person the opportunity to register a domain name for a political Web site, or cause a person 
reasonably to believe that a political Web site has been posted by a person other than the person who posted 
the Web site, and would cause a reasonable person, after reading the Web site, to believe the site actually 
represents the views of the proponent or opponent of a ballot measure.”) 
 
75
  California Business and Professions Code, §§ 17525-17526.  See, in particular, § 17525(a) (“It is 
unlawful for a person, with a bad faith intent to register, traffic in, or use a domain name, that is identical or 
confusingly similar to the personal name of another living person or deceased personality, without regard to 
the goods or services of the parties.”) 
 
76
  In fact, there is specific mention of using a domain name corresponding with an individual 
person’s name in bad faith to mislead electors:  See § 17526(j), California Business and Professions Code, 
including as a bad faith factor:  “The intent of a person alleged to be in violation of this article to mislead, 
deceive, or defraud voters.” 
 
77
  Nevertheless, disputes about politician’s names in domain names have been brought under the 
UDRP in the past and the focus has been on establishing trademark interests – or lack thereof – in a 
relevant politician’s name, rather than on the balance of speech interests in the political context.  See, for 
example, Hillary Rodham Clinton v Michele Dinoia, National Arbitration Forum Claim No 
FA0502000414641, March 18, 2005 (full text available at http://www.arb-
forum.com/domains/decisions/414641.htm) (In respect of a dispute involving the <hillaryclinton.com> 
domain name, Senator Clinton was regarded as having an unregistered trademark right in her personal 
name in connection with both her political activities and her career as an author of a number of books sold 
in commerce); Kathleen Kennedy Townsend v Birt, WIPO Case No D2002-0030, April 11, 2002 (available 
at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2002/d2002-0030.html ) (individual politician in 
state gubernatorial race held not to hold trademark rights in her personal name). 
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important in the context of this discussion than celebrities’ and public figures’ names.  
There are significantly fewer disputed situations involving unauthorized registration and 
use of private individuals’ names on the Internet.78  A number of disputes involving 
private individuals’ names actually do relate to trademark uses of those names where a 
name has acquired secondary meaning79 as being synonymous with the relevant person’s 
business activities.80  Thus, trademark-focused laws, including the UDRP, will, in fact, be 
appropriate avenues for dispute resolution in many of these cases. 
 
Where a private individual’s name is not a trademark in the commercial context, it 
is unlikely to raise many conflicts in the <name.com> space.  There is much less profit to 
be made by cybersquatting on non-famous names, and little reason to set up gripe sites or 
parody sites about private individuals.  However, one obvious example of where such a 
situation might arise would be the case where more than one person shares the same 
personal name and one person controls the name without the consent of the other.81  This 
situation is analogous to the case where more than one company legitimately shares the 
same or similar trademarks in different product or geographic markets.82  In the absence 
                                                 
78
  Although there are some cases on record involving the names of private individuals:  Paul Wright 
v Domain Source Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16024 (2002); Trudeau v Lanoue, 2006 U.S. Dixt. LEXIS 
7956 (2006); Stephan Schmidheiny v Steven Weber, 285 F. Supp. 2d 613 (2003).  All of these cases 
involved personal names used in conjunction with businesses conducted by the complainant. 
 
79
  GILSON LALONDE, supra note ___, at § 2.03[4][d] (“Just as with descriptive terms, a trademark or 
trade name that consists of a personal name (first name, surname, or both) is entitled to legal protection 
only if it attains secondary meaning.”). 
 
80
  Many businesses, in fact, use their chief officers’ names as business names and trademarks: for 
example, The Trump Organization (owned by Donald Trump).  See www.trump.com, last viewed on 
January 23, 2008.  Of course, because of his participation in the television show “The Apprentice”, it is 
possible that Trump’s name also functions as a celebrity name.  Nevertheless, due to his business activities 
(and perhaps also his authorship of several books), Trump’s name is likely a trademark.  Trump has also 
registered a variety of permutations of his personal name as registered marks with respect to particular 
goods and services:  http://tess2.uspto.gov/bin/gate.exe (result of United States Patent and Trademark 
Office Search for “Trump” trademark conducted on January 23, 2008). 
 
81
  Ultimately, this was what happened in the paulwright.com dispute:  Paul Wright v Domain Source 
Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16024 (2002).  Although the plaintiff was successful in an action to have the 
domain name paulwright.com transferred back to him by a defendant cybersquatter, the order was 
conditional on no third party having acquired bona fide rights in the name.  Another person called Paul 
Wright had the paulwright.com domain name transferred to him before the court order went into effect so 
the plaintiff never regained control of the name. 
 
82
  Stuart Weinstein, The Cyberpiracy Prevention Act:  Reconciling Real Space Sectoral and 
Geographic Distinctions in the Use of Internet Domain Names Under the Lanham Act, 9 U MIAMI BUS L 
REV  145, 158 (2001) (“an entity may use an identical mark as another, as long as he does not use that mark 
within the same sector or industry. As with geographical protection of a user's mark, the scope of protection 
is determined as an evidentiary matter, looking at the likelihood of consumer confusion.”); David Barrett, 
The Future of the Concurrent Use of Trademarks Doctrine in the Information Age, 23 HASTINGS COMM 
AND ENT LJ 687, 689-692 (2001) (examining American legislative history of the “concurrent use” doctrine 
in trademark law which allows different trademark holders to use similar marks in different geographic 
areas); Dawn Donut Co v Hart’s Food Stores, Inc, 267 F 2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959) (holding no likelihood of 
confusion in case where plaintiff and defendant used similar marks in different product markets and 
different jurisdictions); National Association for Healthcare Communications, Inc v Central Arkansas Area 
 CELEBRITY IN CYBERSPACE 
  22 
of some kind of domain name sharing strategy,83 it may be that the “first come, first 
served” rule has to apply here.84 
 
More relevant to this discussion would be the admittedly less usual case where 
someone registered one or more domain names relating to private individuals’ names 
either in the hope of extracting money from those individuals for transfer of the names,85 
or, perhaps more likely, extracting money for offering web hosting services under the 
names.  The first iteration of this conduct – the pure sale motive – sounds like 
cybersquatting, but probably is not covered by trademark law because private, non-
commercial personal names will generally not be trademarked.86  It may be covered in the 
United States by § 1129(1)(A) of the Lanham Act which does not require a trademark in 
a personal name to support a cybersquatting action.87  The second iteration may or may 
                                                                                                                                                 
Agency on Aging Inc, 257 F 3d 732 (8th Cir 2001) (granting injunction against federal trademark owner in 
order to allow user of the same mark to use it in established six county area in California); Jessica Litman, 
The DNS Wars:  Trademarks and the Internet Domain Name System, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 149, 
152 (2000) (“Out here in meat space, we can have a whole bunch of different owners of Acme as a 
trademark - the last time I counted there were more than a hundred different trademark registrations, in 
addition to all the local unregistered Acme marks you can find by just looking in the telephone book. On 
the Internet, only one person can own acme.com.”); Jacqueline Lipton, A Winning Solution for Youtube and 
Utube?  Corresponding Trademarks and Domain Name Sharing, (forthcoming, HARVARD JOURNAL OF 
LAW AND TECHNOLOGY, 2008) (suggesting a domain name sharing mechanism for situations where two 
legitimate trademark holders are asserting rights in the same domain name simultaneously). 
 
83
  Jacqueline Lipton, A Winning Solution for Youtube and Utube?  Corresponding Trademarks and 
Domain Name Sharing, (forthcoming, HARVARD JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY, 2008) (suggesting a 
domain name sharing mechanism for situations where two legitimate trademark holders are asserting rights 
in the same domain name simultaneously); Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark 
Law, 54 EMORY LAW JOURNAL 507, 546 (2005) (“some domain names resolve to a “gateway page” (also 
referred to as a “shared page” or “intermediate page”) for the sole purpose of allowing multiple trademark 
owners or licensees to “share” the domain name through links on the page to their respective sites”). 
 
84
  Jessica Litman, The DNS Wars:  Trademarks and the Internet Domain Name System, 4 J. SMALL 
& EMERGING BUS. L. 149, 151 (2000) (“Network Solutions registered .com domain names on a first-come 
first-served basis, just as all the Internet domain names had always been allocated.”); Stephen Moccaldi, 
Do Any Viable Solutions Exist to Prevent The Exploitation of Trademarks Used as Internet Domain 
Names?, 21 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 179, 182-183 (1997)  (“Network Solutions, Inc. (NSI), a United 
States business, controls the registration of internet domain names worldwide. Under the original 
registration policy, NSI simply registered domain names on a first-come, first-served basis with no 
requirement that the registrant actually intend to use the name in commerce. The method enabled domain 
name pirates to register famous trademarks as domain names without ever using them in commerce. Many 
pirates registered popular names and auctioned them off to the highest bidder.  Trademark holders filed 
suits against the pirates for trademark infringement, and against NSI for contributory infringement.”)  
 
85
  See, for example, Paul Wright v Domain Source Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16024 (2002) 
(involving the paulwright.com domain name); Stephan Schmidheiny v Steven Weber, 285 F. Supp. 2d 613 
(2003) (involving the schmidheiny.com domain name).  
 
86
  GILSON LALONDE, supra note ___, at § 2.03[4][d] (“Just as with descriptive terms, a trademark or 
trade name that consists of a personal name (first name, surname, or both) is entitled to legal protection 
only if it attains secondary meaning.”) 
 
87
  15 U.S.C. § 1129(1)(A) (“Any person who registers a domain name that consists of the name of 
another living person, or a name substantially and confusingly similar thereto, without that person’s 
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not be cybersqsuatting depending on whether the registrant would be prepared to release 
the name to the relevant person without receiving a profit in the event that the person in 
question did not want to accept the web hosting services.  If the registrant is only holding 
the name in the hope of selling web hosting services and is prepared to give it up if the 
relevant person does not agree, then it will not likely amount to cybersquatting.  
However, if the registrant seeks a profit to transfer the name, it will likely amount to 
cybersquatting and would be covered by § 1129(1)(A) of the Lanham Act.88 
 
B. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Before turning to ways in which the substance of the personality tort might 
usefully inform the development of a new PDRP, it is worth briefly surveying the 
shortcomings of the current trademark-focused options, in particular the UDRP.  It may 
seem counter-intuitive to say that the UDRP has shortcomings in the personal domain 
name dispute context, as a number of celebrities and some politicians have used it 
successfully in the past to gain control of relevant domain names.89  Ironically, the very 
success of personal domain name complaints under the trademark-focused UDRP may 
evidence a serious problem with the current system.  The major problem with the UDRP 
in this context is that it requires complainants to establish trademark rights in their 
                                                                                                                                                 
consent, with the specific intent to profit from such name by selling the domain name for financial gain to 
that person or any third party, shall be liable in a civil action by such person.”)  
 
88
  One permutation of this conduct that is occurring with increasing frequency with respect to 
personal names and other names, is where an individual has registered his own name as a domain name and 
then accidentally lets the registration lapse.  Some online businesses quickly register lapsed domain names 
of all kinds and then try to extort money from selling the names back to the original registrants or to 
someone else with an interest in the name.  See, for example, Paul Wright v Domain Source Inc., 2002 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 16024 (2002) (defendant registered plaintiff’s domain name – paulwright.com – when plaintiff 
accidentally let it lapse and then attempted to resell it to plaintiff for almost $2,000).  This is basically a 
new form of cybersquatting that differs from traditional cybersquatting only in terms of timing.  Traditional 
cybersquatters registered domain names in a more anticipatory way: that is, the cybersquatter would 
estimate what domain names would likely be valuable to “rightful owners” in the future and would register 
those names in the hope of extorting money for their transfer.  This new permutation relates to names that 
have been valuable to someone in the past, and the cybersquatter hopes that that person, or someone else 
with a competing interest in the name, will pay significant sums for transfer of the name, after its original 
registration has lapsed.  This conduct will be caught by the anti-cybersquatting legislation assuming that 
second registrant – the cybersquatter- has no legitimate interest in the name other than seeking to make a 
profit from its sale back to the original owner or perhaps to someone else with an interest in the name. 
 
89
  See, for example, Julia Fiona Roberts v Russell Boyd, WIPO Case No. D2000-0210, 30 May, 
2000 (available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0210.html ) (involving 
juliaroberts.com domain name); Tom Cruise v Alberta Hot Rods, WIPO Case No D2006-0560, 5 July, 2006 
(available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2006/d2006-0560.html) (involving 
tomcruise.com domain name); Kevin Spacey v Alberta Hot Rods, National Arbitration Forum Claim No 
114437, August 1, 2002 (available at http://www.arb-forum.com/domains/decisions/114437.htm) 
(involving the domain name kevinspacey.com); Hillary Rodham Clinton v Michele Dinoia, National 
Arbitration Forum Claim No FA0502000414641, March 18, 2005 (full text available at http://www.arb-
forum.com/domains/decisions/414641.htm) (involving hillaryclinton.com domain name). 
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personal names.90  Personal names, like other descriptive marks, are only trademarkable if 
they attain secondary meaning.91  The question as to whether a particular name has 
acquired such a meaning can be quite a difficult one as has generally been left to the 
courts within domestic trademark systems.   
 
Asking UDRP arbitrators to resolve these questions raises several concerns.  For 
one thing, UDRP arbitrators, unlike courts, will generally not have the benefit of detailed 
judicial precedent on the question of secondary meaning in front of them when making a 
decision.92  In any event, they are not bound by judicial precedent.  This has led to 
inconsistent, and often arbitrary or superficial, reasoning in personal domain name 
arbitrations.93  Secondly, the fact that the UDRP is the easiest and most cost effective 
avenue for domain name disputes results in most personal domain name disputes being 
                                                 
90
  UDRP, para 4(a) (“You are required to submit to a mandatory administrative proceeding in the 
event that a third party (a "complainant") asserts to the applicable Provider, in compliance with the Rules of 
Procedure, that: (i) your domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in 
which the complainant has rights; and, (ii) you have no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the 
domain name; and, (iii) your domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.”) (emphasis 
added). 
 
91
  GILSON LALONDE, supra note ___, at § 2.03[4][d] (“Just as with descriptive terms, a trademark or 
trade name that consists of a personal name (first name, surname, or both) is entitled to legal protection 
only if it attains secondary meaning.”). 
 
92
  Although complainants under the UDRP are required to assert legitimate trademark interests, the 
proceedings do not require registered trademark interests, or detailed discussions of the nature of a 
complainant’s alleged trademark interest.  The Julia Roberts arbitration is a good example of how little 
time is often spent on the trademarkability question with respect to a personal name:  Julia Fiona Roberts v 
Russell Boyd, WIPO Case No. D2000-0210, 30 May, 2000, ¶ 6 (available at 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0210.html ) (“A recent decision citing 
English law found that common law trademark rights exist in an author’s name. The Policy does not 
require that the Complainant should have rights in a registered trademark or service mark. It is sufficient 
that the Complainant should satisfy the Administrative Panel that she has rights in common law trademark 
or sufficient rights to ground an action for passing off.”). 
 
93
  Why, for example, should Julia Roberts and Tom Cruise be regarded as having trademark interests 
in their personal names when the same is not necessarily true for Bruce Springsteen, or the late Anna 
Nicole Smith?  Why should “Hillary Clinton” be recognized as a trademark when the same is not true for 
other politicians such as Kathleen Kennedy Townsend?  See, for example, Julia Fiona Roberts v Russell 
Boyd, WIPO Case No. D2000-0210, 30 May, 2000 (available at 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0210.html ) (involving juliaroberts.com 
domain name); Tom Cruise v Alberta Hot Rods, WIPO Case No D2006-0560, 5 July, 2006 (available at 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2006/d2006-0560.html) (involving tomcruise.com 
domain name); Anna Nicole Smith v DNS Research Inc, Claim No. FA0312000220007, National 
Arbitration Forum, Feb 21, 2004 (available at:  http://www.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/220007.htm) 
(involving annanicolesmith.com domain name); Hillary Rodham Clinton v Michele Dinoia, National 
Arbitration Forum Claim No FA0502000414641, March 18, 2005 (full text available at http://www.arb-
forum.com/domains/decisions/414641.htm) (involving hillaryclinton.com domain name); Bruce 
Springsteen v Jeff Burgar, WIPO Case No D2000-1532, Jan 25, 2001 (available at 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-1532.html); Kathleen Kennedy Townsend 
v Birt, WIPO Case No D2002-0030, April 11, 2002 (available at 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2002/d2002-0030.html ). 
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directed to UDRP arbitrators, rather than courts.94  This compounds the difficulties for 
UDRP arbitrators because of the sheer volume of disputes in the personal name area they 
need to adjudicate without the benefit of much detailed judicial precedent on the 
trademarkability question. 
 
This Part considers the development of trademark practice from the early days of 
the domain name system through to the adoption of the UDRP.  Its aim is to illustrate 
how we arrived at a situation where the UDRP is, by default, the best available avenue 
for personal domain name disputes, despite its shortcomings.  Parts II and III then focus 
on how an online dispute resolution mechanism based largely on the substance of the 
right of publicity tort could improve matters. 
 
1.  Trademark Infringement 
 
In the early days of the domain name system, litigants turned to existing 
trademark law – trademark infringement and dilution actions – to protect their valuable 
source-identifiers in cyberspace.  The trademark infringement action95 protects a 
trademark holder against an unauthorized use of the mark in commerce that is likely to 
confuse consumers as to the source of a particular product or service.96  It was applied 
successfully in early domain name cases involving trademarks on the basis that 
unauthorized registration and use of domain names corresponding with someone else’s 
trademark would likely confuse consumers.97   
 
It was not often applied to disputes involving personal names.98  Perhaps personal 
name litigants did not feel that they could support a trademark infringement action 
because of concerns that they might not be able to establish a trademark interest in their 
names.  It may also have been that the cost of judicial proceedings in trademark law was 
                                                 
94
  Moreland, supra note ___, at 385 (“Prior to the establishment of ICANN Arbitration, recovery of 
celebrity domain names was an expensive and potentially lengthy process.”). 
 
95
  15 U.S.C. §§ 1114 (infringement of registered trademarks); 1125(a) (infringement of unregistered 
trademarks). 
 
96
  GILSON LALONDE, supra note ___, at § 5.01 (the general aim of trademark law is to prevent 
consumer confusion about the source of products or services). 
 
97
  Planned Parenthood Federation of America Inc v Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1430 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) 
(defendant’s use of plannedparenthood.com domain name for messages critical of the Planned Parenthood 
organization was likely to confuse consumers as to the source of various services provided by the plaintiff); 
Brookfield Communications Inc v West Coast Ent Corp, 174 F 3d 1036 (9th Cir 1999) (use of 
“moviebuff.com” domain name by one video library was likely to confuse customers of one of its 
competitors where each had some association with an iteration of the term “Movie Buff” in its trademark). 
 
98
  There are some notable exceptions of cases that do involve personal names and have been litigated 
under trademark law largely on the basis of trademarks in personal names:  Lamparello v Falwell, 420 F 3d 
309, 320 (2005) (involving an intentional misspelling of the Reverend Falwell’s name as a domain name); 
Trudeau v Lanoue, 2006 U.S. Dixt. LEXIS 7956 (2006) (involving Mr Kevin Trudeau’s name as a domain 
name); Stephan Schmidheiny v Steven Weber, 285 F. Supp. 2d 613 (2003).   
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prohibitive for private individuals,99 even those most likely to be able to establish 
trademark interests in their own names.  This is probably the reason why most disputes 
involving personal domain names have been brought under the faster and less expensive 
UDRP.100  Trademark based actions can also raise jurisdictional concerns that do not arise 
under the UDRP.101  The actor Kevin Spacey, for example, failed to establish personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant in litigation for control of the domain name 
<kevinspacey.com>.102  He then went on to successfully obtain control of the name in a 
UDRP proceeding.103  
 
Even in situations where the complainant is able to bear the cost of trademark 
litigation and can establish a trademark interest in her name, there will be the problem of 
satisfying the “consumer confusion” element of a trademark infringement action.104  
Consumer confusion is the key to a successful trademark infringement suit.105  Many 
situations involving personal domain names will not involve consumer confusion in the 
trademark sense.  It may be that a person is making unauthorized commercial use of a 
domain name, but it is clear that the registrant does not represent the person whose name 
is used in the domain name.106  This could happen where the registrant is simply using the 
name as a “draw” to attract unrelated commercial custom.107       
                                                 
99
  Costs of judicial proceedings can be prohibitive for private individuals:  Moreland, supra note 
___, at 385 (“Prior to the establishment of ICANN Arbitration, recovery of celebrity domain names was an 
expensive and potentially lengthy process.”); Jessica Litman, The DNS Wars:  Trademarks and the Internet 
Domain Name System, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 149, 155 (2000) (noting the often prohibitive cost 
of trademark infringement and dilution litigation in early domain name disputes). 
 
100
  Moreland, supra note ___, at 385 (“ICANN Arbitration provides an inexpensive and extremely 
quick means of recovering a domain name. In addition, celebrities have come to enjoy a very high success 
rate in arbitration.”) 
 
101
  See, for example, Paul Wright v Domain Source Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16024, ¶¶ 1-3 (2002) 
(discussion of jurisdictional issues raised in complaint against cybersquatter’s registration of 
paulwright.com domain name).   
 
102
    Kieren McCarthy, Kevin Spacey Loses Pivotal Cybersquatting Court Case, THE REGISTER, Nov 
26, 2001 (available at 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2001/11/26/kevin_spacey_loses_pivotal_cybersquatting/, last viewed on 
November 8, 2007). 
 
103
  Kevin Spacey v Alberta Hot Rods, National Arbitration Forum Claim No FA0205000114437, 
August 1, 2002, available at http://domains.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/114437.htm , last viewed on 
November 8, 2007. 
 
104
  GILSON LALONDE, supra note ___, at § 5.01 (the general aim of trademark law is to prevent 
consumer confusion about the source of products or services).  
 
105
  id. 
 
106
  There may be an argument that the right of publicity should not prohibit such conduct.  However, 
if there is something significant about protecting the integrity of individual personas online, theories of 
personhood as well as property would come into play here, and they might support an argument for a right 
of publicity action here, even if such an action would not arise under trademark law.  On personhood 
theories as a basis for the right of publicity, see generally Haemmerli, supra note ___; McKenna, supra 
note ___. 
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There would still be an open question in the celebrity cases at least as to whether 
the misleading use of the mark was “in commerce” in the sense required by trademark 
law.  If the domain name registrant was not actually using the unauthorized website for 
commercial purposes in the sense of selling any goods or services, the use of the name 
purely to attract Internet users may not be sufficiently “in commerce” to support a 
trademark infringement action.  There is some case law in the domain name context 
suggesting that any unauthorized use of a trademark as a domain name could be 
sufficiently “in commerce” for a trademark infringement action on the basis that the 
nature of the Internet itself is a multi-jurisdictional commercial communications 
medium.108  On this reasoning, any use of a trademarked personal name in a domain name 
could potentially give rise to a trademark infringement action.  However, it remains to be 
seen whether future courts would follow this line of reasoning.109   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
107
  Such conduct could amount to trademark infringement under the “initial interest confusion” 
doctrine or perhaps to trademark dilution.  However, both these approaches to domain name disputes under 
domestic trademark principles have come under attack for over-extending the boundaries of trademark law 
in cyberspace.  On initial interest confusion see, for example, Lastowka, supra note ___,  35-36 (“With 
respect to search engines … a … significant expansion of trademark law is the doctrine of initial interest 
confusion.  Traditionally, and not surprisingly, most courts have focused analysis of consumer confusion on 
the time period proximate to consumer purchases.  The doctrine of initial interest confusion shifts the focus 
of confusion analysis to a time prior to the time of purchase.  Initial interest confusion can be found to exist 
even if that confusion was not present at the time of purchase.”); see also Jennifer Rothman, Initial Interest 
Confusion:  Standing at the Crossroads of Trademark Law, 27 CARDOZO L REV 105 (2005); Goldman, 
supra note ___, 559 (“[Initial interest confusion] lacks a rigorous definition, a clear policy justification, and 
a uniform standard for analyzing claims.  With its doctrinal flexibility, [it] has become the tool of choice 
for plaintiffs to shut down junior users who have not actually engaged in misappropriative uses.”).  On 
dilution, see discussion in Part I.B.2 infra. 
 
108
  Planned Parenthood Federation of America Inc v Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1430, ¶ 11 (S.D.N.Y. 
1997)  (“Internet users constitute a national, even international, audience, who must use interstate telephone 
lines to access defendant's web site on the Internet. The nature of the Internet indicates that establishing a 
typical home page on the Internet, for access to all users, would satisfy the Lanham Act's "in commerce" 
requirement.”)  See also American Libraries Association v Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) 
(“In addition, many of those users who are communicating for private, noncommercial purposes are 
nonetheless participants in interstate commerce by virtue of their Internet consumption. Many users obtain 
access to the Internet by means of an on-line service provider, such as America Online, which charges a fee 
for its services. "Internet service providers," including plaintiffs Panix, Echo, and NYC NET, also offer 
Internet access for a monthly or hourly fee. Patrons of storefront "computer coffee shops," such as New 
York's own CyberCafe, similarly pay for their access to the Internet, in addition to partaking of food and 
beverages sold by the cafe. Dial-in bulletin board systems often charge a fee for access.”) 
 
109
  Gregory Lastowka, Google’s Law, 64, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1017536, last viewed 
on November 8, 2007 (“[I]t is not clear how Bucci had used the Planned Parenthood mark in commerce, 
given that he lacked any product or service.  Those who advocate for an expansion of trademark use often 
criticize Bucci for this reason.”). 
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Of course, right of publicity jurisprudence also has an “in commerce” 
requirement110 which may or may not be interpreted in the same way as trademark law’s 
“in commerce” requirement in cyberspace.  Whether or not this requirement is interpreted 
in the same way for the right of publicity, there is a good argument that unauthorized 
non-commercial uses of even a <name.com> name should not be proscribed under a new 
PDRP.  These uses may well, for the most part, be purely expressive uses that are 
protected by the First Amendment.  The balance of the First Amendment against 
personality rights in personal domain names is considered further in Part III.  
 
2.  Trademark Dilution 
 
Trademark dilution111 also has limited application to personal domain name 
disputes because of its requirement of a trademark interest in the personal name, and 
because of the time, cost and jurisdictional problems often associated with litigation.  
Dilution differs from trademark infringement in that it is not focused on the prevention of 
consumer confusion, and does not require a showing of consumer confusion on the part 
of the plaintiff.  Rather, it protects famous marks112 from blurring113 or tarnishment.114  
Dilution at the federal level is designed to prevent people from creating “noise” around a 
mark that might have the effect of lessening the strength of the mark in terms of its 
capacity to identify the plaintiff’s goods or services.115  Thus, a dilution action could 
prevent the sale of Sony potato chips as potentially dilutive of the Sony corporation’s 
marks for audio-visual and electronic equipment.116  There is a non-commercial use 
exception from trademark dilution liability.117  Additionally, under revisions to the 
                                                 
110
  GILSON LALONDE, supra note ___, at § 2.16[1] (“The right of publicity … is the right of an 
individual to control the commercial use of his or her name, likeness, signature, or other personal 
characteristics.”) (emphasis added). 
 
111
  15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). 
 
112
  15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (statutory definition of “famous mark” as inserted into the Lanham Act 
under the Trademark Dilution Revision Act, H.R. 683 of 2006). 
 
113
  15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (defines “blurring” as an “association arising from the similarity 
between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that impairs the distinctiveness of the famous mark”).  
 
114
  15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C) (defines “tarnishment” of a famous mark as an “association arising 
from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that harms the reputation of the 
famous mark.”)  
 
115
  Mark Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L J 1687, 
1698-1699 (1999) (“Dilution laws are directed against the possibility that the unique nature of a mark will 
be destroyed by companies who trade on the renown of the mark by selling unrelated goods, such as Kodak 
pianos or Buick aspirin.”); GILSON LALONDE, supra note ___, at § 5A.01[1] (“Federal dilution law protects 
famous trademarks from unauthorized uses that are likely to impair their distinctiveness or harm their 
reputation. It enables owners of those marks to maintain their value as source indicators and as symbols of 
good will. While the law benefits only famous trademarks, it adds a potent weapon against the whittling 
away of the hard-to-measure distinctive quality of those marks.”) 
 
116
  id.  
 
117
  15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(C). 
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Lanham Act in 2006,118 there is an expanded fair use defense that contemplates various 
forms of commentary on a trademark holder as a defense to the action.119   
 
Trademark dilution actions were used successfully by trademark holders in the 
early days of the domain name system.120  These actions were particularly effective in 
cases involving cybersquatters.121  This is because the use of someone else’s trademark in 
a domain name for no particular purpose other than to sell the name to the trademark 
holder – or perhaps to a competitor of the trademark holder – could be said to be creating 
noise around the mark in the dilution sense.  Early courts held that a domain name 
corresponding to a trademark is integral to a business’ ability to engage in commerce on 
the Internet such that cybersquatting on such a name would be prohibited as interfering 
with this ability.122 
 
However, a dilution action requires that the plaintiff establish not only a 
trademark interest, but that she holds a famous mark.123  Despite the fact that it has 
historically been reasonably easy in practice for commercial plaintiffs to establish that 
their mark is sufficiently famous to bring a dilution action,124 this may not be the case 
with respect to personal names.  Personal names are often not trademarks at all, even with 
respect to some rather well-known celebrities.125  Recent amendments to the federal 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
118
  Trademark Dilution Revision Act, H.R. 683 of 2006 (“TDRA”). 
 
119
  15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A)(ii). 
 
120
  See, for example, Panavision Int’l L.P. v Toeppen, 141 F 3d 1316 (9th Cir 1998) (successful 
trademark dilution action against cybersquatter who was not using the name for any purpose other than 
attempting to sell it to the corresponding trademark holder). 
 
121
  id. 
 
122
  id., 1327 (“We reject [defendant’s] premise that a domain name is nothing more than an address. 
A significant purpose of a domain name is to identify the entity that owns the web site.”), 1327 
(“[Defendant’s] use of Panavision.com also puts Panavision's name and reputation at his mercy.”) 
 
123
  15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (“Subject to the principles of equity, the owner of a famous mark that is 
distinctive, inherently or through acquired distinctiveness, shall be entitled to an injunction against another 
person who, at any time after the owner's mark has become famous, commences use of a mark or trade 
name in commerce that is likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment of the famous 
mark, regardless of the presence or absence of actual or likely confusion, of competition, or of actual 
economic injury.”).  “Famous mark” is now defined for these purposes in 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A). 
 
124
  Mark Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L J 1687, 
1698-1699 (1999).  However, since the enactment of the TDRA in 2006, it may be more difficult to 
establish that a mark is famous than in the past due to the new definition of “famous mark” now inserted 
into 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A).  At least courts may have to undertake an analysis of whether a mark is 
famous or not with regard to this provision. 
 
125
  See, for example, Moreland, supra note ___, at 390 (comparing UDRP arbitrations where 
celebrities have not been able to establish trademark rights in their personal names); Bruce Springsteen v 
Jeff Burgar and Bruce Springsteen Club, WIPO Case No. D2000-1532, Jan. 25, 2001, ¶ 6 (available at 
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-1532.html) (“It appears to be an established 
principle from cases such as Jeanette Winterson, Julia Roberts, and Sade that in the case of very well 
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dilution statute may make it more difficult for individuals, even famous individuals, to 
establish that their personal names operate as famous marks.  The new definition of 
“famous mark” inserted into the Lanham Act in October 2006 contemplates the notion of 
a famous mark in very consumer-oriented terms with respect to the source of goods or 
services.126  Many famous individual’s names will not, in fact, operate in this way.  Thus, 
it may be more difficult in theory at least for a plaintiff to establish trademark dilution 
with respect to a personal name than even to establish trademark infringement.  
Celebrities to one side, presumably most politicians, public figures and private 
individuals will not be able to show marks at all, or at least marks with sufficient fame, to 
bring a successful dilution action.  This coupled with the costs of litigation make a 
trademark dilution action an inappropriate and unlikely avenue for the future resolution 
of personal domain name disputes. 
 
3.  The Anti-Cybersqsuatting Consumer Protection Act, and California’s 
Business and Professions Code 
 
The ACPA was enacted in 1999 to address some of the specific concerns of 
trademark holders in relation to cybersquatting.  It is focused on protecting trademarks in 
cyberspace, although it does make some specific provision for personal names – the only 
law to have done so in the Internet context.  The ACPA inserted two new provisions into 
                                                                                                                                                 
known celebrities, their names can acquire a distinctive secondary meaning giving rise to rights equating to 
unregistered trade marks, notwithstanding the non-registerability of the name itself. It should be noted that 
no evidence has been given of the name "Bruce Springsteen" having acquired a secondary meaning; in 
other words a recognition that the name should be associated with activities beyond the primary activities 
of Mr. Springsteen as a composer, performer and recorder of popular music. In the view of this Panel, it is 
by no means clear from the UDRP that it was intended to protect proper names of this nature.”); Anna 
Nicole Smith v DNS Research Inc, National Arbitration Forum Claim No FA0312000220007, Feb 21, 2004 
(available at http://www.adr-forum.com/domains/decisions/220007.htm), last viewed on October 25, 2007 
(“it is unlikely that the evidence submitted here by the Complainant of her career, in and of itself, is 
sufficient to establish common law trademark rights in the name, which is a requirement for Complainant 
to prevail on this aspect of the case.  While the UDRP does not require a registered trademark for 
protection of a trademark from a confusingly identical domain name, the mere fact of having a successful 
career as an actress, singer or TV program star does not provide exclusive rights to the use of a name under 
the trademark laws.”); Gordon Sumner aka Sting v Michael Urvan, WIPO Case No D2000-0596, July 20, 
2000, ¶ 6.5  (available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0596.html), last 
viewed on November 8, 2007 (“In the opinion of this Administrative Panel, it is doubtful whether the 
Uniform Policy is applicable to this dispute. Although it is accepted that the Complainant is world famous 
under the name STING, it does not follow that he has rights in STING as a trademark or service mark. 
Unlike the personal names in issue in the cases Julia Fiona Roberts v Russell Boyd, Jeannette Winterson v 
Mark Hogarth, and Steven Rattner v BuyThisDomainName (John Pepin), the personal name in this case is 
also a common word in the English language, with a number of different meanings.”) 
 
126  15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (“For purposes of paragraph [15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)], a mark is 
famous if it is widely recognized by the general consuming public of the United States as a designation of 
source of the goods or services of the mark's owner. In determining whether a mark possesses the requisite 
degree of recognition, the court may consider all relevant factors, including the following: (i) The duration, 
extent, and geographic reach of advertising and publicity of the mark, whether advertised or publicized by 
the owner or third parties. (ii) The amount, volume, and geographic extent of sales of goods or services 
offered under the mark. (iii) The extent of actual recognition of the mark…”) 
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the Lanham Act – one directed at the prevention of cybersquatting with respect to 
trademarks,127 and the other directed at the prevention of cybersquatting with respect to 
personal names.128  Both provisions prohibit the registration of a domain name with a bad 
faith profit motive129 where there is no other legitimate purpose for using the name.130  The 
trademark-focused provision is of limited use to personal name holders again because 
many personal names will not be trademarks.131  However, the personal name provision -  
§ 1129(1)(A) - is available to people who are concerned about cybersquatters registering 
their names as domain names.132  This should provide some comfort to those concerned 
about having to pay exorbitant sums of money for return of a name that should 
“rightfully” be theirs.  However, interestingly, the provision has not been utilized much in 
practice, particularly in comparison with the UDRP.133  This is probably because the 
UDRP is faster and cheaper,134 even though it is premised on the existence of a trademark 
interest.   
 
                                                 
127
  15 U.S.C. § 1125(d). 
 
128
  15 U.S.C. § 1129(1). 
 
129
  15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii) prohibits registering, trafficking, or using a domain name in bad 
faith for a profit while § 1129(1)(A) contemplates an attempted sale of the name in bad faith. 
 
130
  15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(d)(1)(A)(i), 1129(1)(A). 
 
131
  GILSON LALONDE, supra note ___, at § 2.03[4][d] (“Just as with descriptive terms, a trademark or 
trade name that consists of a personal name (first name, surname, or both) is entitled to legal protection 
only if it attains secondary meaning.”).  
 
132
  Examples of cases where this section was argued in situations involving cybersquatting on 
personal names include:  Paul Wright v Domain Source Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16024 (2002) 
(successful action under 15 U.S.C. § 1129(1)(A) with respect to the paulwright.com domain name); 
Stephan Schmidheiny v Steven Weber, 285 F. Supp. 2d 613 (2003) (successful action under § 1129(1) of the 
Lanham Act for transfer of the schmidheiny.com domain name to the plaintiff, Mr Schmidheiny, and 
injunction against the defendant registering any further iterations of the plaintiff’s name as a domain name).  
Note also discussion of these provisions by UDRP arbitrator in Kathleen Kennedy Townsend v Birt, WIPO 
Case No D2002-0030, April 11, 2002 (available at 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2002/d2002-0030.html) (“The Panel finds that the 
protection of an individual politician's name, no matter how famous, is outside the scope of the Policy since 
it is not connected with commercial exploitation as set out in the Second WIPO Report.  This does not 
mean that Complainant is without remedy. The ACPA contains express provisions protecting the rights in 
personal names. Complainant is free to pursue her claims in that forum. And, as mentioned, the committee 
may have rights in the marks that are sufficiently commercial as to entitle the committee to protection 
under the Policy.”) 
 
133
  Moreland, supra note ___, at 386 (noting high success rate of celebrities in personal domain name 
disputes under the UDRP, and citing Statistical Summary for Proceedings under the Uniform Domain 
Name Dispute Resolution Policy (February 26, 2001), 394 (“A plethora of disputes involving personal 
names have been submitted to ICANN Arbitration.”)). 
 
134
  Moreland, supra note ___, at 385 (“ICANN Arbitration provides an inexpensive and extremely 
quick means of recovering a domain name.”) 
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One significant limitation of the ACPA is that it does not cover situations where 
the registrant is not a cybersquatter, but is using a domain name for some other purpose 
which may be commercial, or may be expressive, or may be a combination of both.135  
Some registrants of <name.com> names will use them to attract commercial custom 
through advertising, for example.  If they can make more money by doing this than by 
selling the name, they will not be a cybersquatter under § 1129(1)(A).  Unauthorized uses 
of personal domain names for purely expressive purposes raise more difficult policy 
questions.  Should there be an overriding presumption that <name.com> names in 
particular “rightfully” belong to people with corresponding names, regardless of the use a 
registrant is making of the domain name?  Such a presumption may well trample on First 
Amendment concerns where the registrant’s use of the name is purely expressive.     
 
Issues of the First Amendment versus the rights of trademark holders have arisen 
already in trademark disputes that do not involve personal names: for example, some 
UDRP arbitrators have suggested that legitimate commentary about a trademark holder 
should be protected on the Internet.136  This might include allowing an unauthorized use 
of a domain name that corresponds in some way with a registered trademark for, say, a 
gripe site about the trademark holder.137    However, judges and arbitrators in the 
trademark context have not generally accepted that commentators  should be allowed to 
utilize the most intuitive domain name corresponding to the trademark – that is, the 
<trademark.com> version of the name.138  They have been relegated to “lesser” forms of 
                                                 
135
  Beezy, supra note ___, at 24 (“the distinction between cybersquatter and cybergriper – that is, the 
difference between bad faith registration and use of a domain name that incorporates another’s mark and 
permissible registration and use, albeit unauthorized, of another’s mark – will become difficult to 
discern.”). 
 
136
  Bridgestone Firestone v Myers, WIPO Case No, D2000-0190, July 6, 2000, (available at 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0190.html) (“Although free speech is not 
listed as one of the [UDRP’s] examples of a right or legitimate interest in a domain name, the list is not 
exclusive, and the Panel concludes that the exercise of free speech for criticism and commentary … 
demonstrates a right or legitimate interest in the domain name under Paragraph 4(c)(iii).  The Internet is 
above all a framework for global communication, and the right to free speech should be one of the 
foundations of Internet law.”). 
 
137
  id.  There is some judicial authority suggesting the same thing:  Bosley v Kremer, 403 F 3d 672, 
679-80 (9th Cir., 2005) (“Kremer is not Bosley's competitor; he is their critic. His use of the Bosley mark is 
not in connection with a sale of goods or services - it is in connection with the expression of his opinion 
about Bosley's goods and services. The dangers that the Lanham Act was designed to address are simply 
not at issue in this case. The Lanham Act ... does not prohibit all unauthorized uses of a trademark ... . Any 
harm to Bosley arises not from a competitor's sale of a similar product under Bosley's mark, but from 
Kremer's criticism of their services. Bosley cannot use the Lanham Act either as a shield from Kremer's 
criticism or as a sword to shut Kremer up.”) 
 
138
  Bridgestone Firestone v Myers, WIPO Case No, D2000-0190, July 6, 2000, (available at 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0190.html) (“In the cybersquatting cases, 
the domain names in question generally were www.trademark.com domain names, which prevented the 
trademark holder from utilizing the customary commercial domain name for its “official” site …. Here, 
however, the domain name registrant has not usurped the <.com> domain, but has utilized only the <.net> 
domain, has posted disclaimers on the website homepage, and has included criticism or commentary on the 
site so that a reasonably prudent Internet user can tell that the site is not the trademark holder’s “official” 
site.”). 
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the domain name, such as those using a different generic Top Level Domain (“gTLD”) 
such as <.org> or <.net>, or those using a “qualifier” at the end of the domain, such as 
<trademarksucks.com>.139  On this analogy, there perhaps is, or should be, a presumption 
that well known people such as celebrities and public figures do have rights to the 
<name.com> versions of their names if this is an identifiable Internet usage norm.  If this 
presumption is correct, the ACPA will not assist with its development or enforcement 
because of its focus on cybersquatting, as opposed to web commentary. 
 
Interestingly, one state – California – has experimented with legislation directed 
at personal name cybersquatting.  The relevant provisions can be found in §§ 17525-
17526 of California’s Business and Professions Code.  Section 17525(a) provides that: 
 
It is unlawful for a person, with a bad faith intent to register, 
traffic in, or use a domain name, that is identical or confusingly 
similar to the personal name of another living person or deceased 
personality, without regard to the goods or services of the parties. 
 
This legislation is broader than § 1129(1)(A) of the Lanham Act in that it 
contemplates deceased as well as living persons and that it includes a list of “bad faith 
factors” that are somewhat broader than those in § 1129(1)(A).  The Californian 
legislation also includes as a bad faith factor an intention on the part of the registrant to 
“mislead, deceive, or defraud voters.”140  This may be relevant to situations where a 
politician is complaining about unauthorized use of her name in a corresponding domain 
name, at least if the use of the name is misleading or fraudulent in some way.141  
However, it is an open question as to whether the legislation would, or indeed should, 
cover pure political gripe sites, such as the <bobkeenan.com> and <lindamcculloch.com> 
examples described in Part I.A.2.  This is because a legitimate criticism of a politician 
may not be regarded as misleading, deceiving or defrauding voters, provided it is clear 
from the context that these websites are not endorsed by the politician in question.  On 
the other hand, if the view is taken that using a <name.com> domain name for a website 
other than that authorized by the person in question is automatically a misleading use of 
the name because Internet users would expect the domain name to resolve to an 
                                                 
139
  Although, some arbitrators have held that even domain names employing pejorative qualifiers 
should be in the control of the trademark holder rather than anyone else.  See, for example, Societe Air 
France v. Virtual Dates, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2005-0168 (WIPO Arb. and Mediation Ctr., Admin. Panel 
Decision, May 24, 2005), available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/ 2005/d2005-
0168.html (majority panelists decided that airfrancesucks.com domain name should be transferred to the 
trademark holder and ought not be controlled by a gripe site operator). 
 
140
  California Business and Professions Code, § 17526(j). 
 
141
  On this point, see also Cal. Elections Code, § 18320 which prohibits certain activities described as 
“political cyberfraud”.  This legislation, although not specifically targeted at personal name protection, may 
have the same results in practice as the Business and Professions Code with respect to some uses of 
politician’s names in the lead-up to elections.  For a more general discussion of the operation of both 
Californian statutes in the political domain name context, see Jacqueline Lipton, Who Owns Hillary.com?  
Political Speech and the First Amendment in Cyberspace, 49 BOSTON COLLEGE L REV 55 (2008). 
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authorized website, then the section might have some application.  Time will tell whether, 
and how effectively, these provisions are utilized in practice.   
 
4.  The Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy 
 
This brings us back to the most popular avenue for personal domain name 
disputes142 – the UDRP – which was adopted at the same time that the ACPA was 
enacted.  The UDRP is global in jurisdictional scope because of its incorporation into 
relevant143 domain name registration agreements.144  It thus does away with some of the 
jurisdictional problems inherent in both trademark and personality rights based 
litigation.145  Again, the UDRP is aimed at preventing cybersquatting over trademarks.146  
The two major hurdles for a personal domain name complainants under the UDRP are 
that:  (a) a trademark must be established in the personal name, and (b) the UDRP will 
only apply to cybersquatting.147  The UDRP contains a specific defense for domain name 
                                                 
142
  Beezy, supra note ___, at 23-24 (noting high success rate of celebrities in personal domain name 
proceedings under the UDRP and surveying some of the recent decisions); Moreland, supra note ___, at 
386 (noting high success rate of celebrities in personal domain name disputes under the UDRP, and citing 
Statistical Summary for Proceedings under the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy 
(February 26, 2001), 394 (“A plethora of disputes involving personal names have been submitted to 
ICANN Arbitration.”)) 
 
143
  ICANN, UDRP Notes, Note 2, available at http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm, 
last viewed on November 10, 2007,  (“This policy has been adopted by all accredited domain-name 
registrars for domain names ending in .com, .net, and .org. It has also been adopted by certain managers of 
country-code top-level domains (e.g., .nu, .tv, .ws).”) 
 
144
  UDRP, clause 1 (“This Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Policy") has been 
adopted by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers ("ICANN"), is incorporated by 
reference into your Registration Agreement, and sets forth the terms and conditions in connection with a 
dispute between you and any party other than us (the registrar) over the registration and use of an Internet 
domain name registered by you.”) 
 
145
  See, for example, Paul Wright v Domain Source Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16024, ¶¶ 1-3 (2002) 
(discussion of jurisdictional issues raised in complaint against cybersquatter’s registration of 
paulwright.com domain name).  The movie actor Kevin Spacey was also initially unsuccessful in a 
cybersquatting claim against the registrant of kevinspacey.com on jurisdictional grounds, but later 
succeeded under a UDRP proceeding:  Kieren McCarthy, Kevin Spacey Loses Pivotal Cybersquatting 
Court Case, THE REGISTER, Nov 26, 2001 (available at 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2001/11/26/kevin_spacey_loses_pivotal_cybersquatting/, last viewed on 
November 8, 2007).  For completeness, it should also be noted that the ACPA contains some in rem 
provisions to simplify jurisdictional issues for actions taken under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1).  See 15 U.S.C. § 
1125(d)(2). 
 
146
  UDRP, clause 4(a)(i) (“You are required to submit to a mandatory administrative proceeding in 
the event that a third party (a "complainant") asserts to the applicable Provider, in compliance with the 
Rules of Procedure, that (i) your domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service 
mark in which the complainant has rights…”)     
 
147
  Beezy, supra note ___, at 24 (“the distinction between cybersquatter and cybergriper – that is, the 
difference between bad faith registration and use of a domain name that incorporates another’s mark and 
permissible registration and use, albeit unauthorized, of another’s mark – will become difficult to 
discern.”); Moreland, supra note ___, at 390-2 (noting that the UDRP will not assist a complainant where a 
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registrants making a “legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the relevant domain 
name”.
148
  It has not been clear what will constitute “fair use” in this context, although 
noncommercial use should be relatively easy to identify in practice.  Further, it is unclear 
whether the UDRP is intended to cover personality rights in individual names.149  A 
World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) Report on the subject specifically 
suggested that these rights are not covered under the UDRP.150  However, some UDRP 
arbitrators have felt that in the absence of any specific prohibition on the protection of 
such rights, they are covered by the UDRP.151  Thus, to the extent that complainants are 
specifically basing claims on personality interests rather than trademark rights, there will 
be some confusion as to whether or not they should be successful in the absence of a 
trademark right.152   
                                                                                                                                                 
domain name registrant is using a domain name for commentary or otherwise to refer to the complainant in 
a legitimate manner). 
 
148
  UDRP, clause 4(c)(3). 
 
149
  Moreland, supra note ___, at 394-5 (citing WIPO report to the effect that personality rights were 
never intended to be covered by the UDRP). 
 
150
  Second WIPO Internet Domain Name Process, Sept 3, 2001, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/processes/process2/report/html/report.html#5, last viewed on November 11, 
2007, ¶199 (“It is clear that many sensitivities are offended by the unauthorized registration of personal 
names as domain names.  It is clear also that UDRP does not provide solace for all those offended 
sensitivities, nor was it intended to do so, as originally designed.  The result is that there are some 
perceived injustices.  Persons who have gained eminence and respect, but who have not profited from their 
reputation in commerce, may not avail themselves of the UDRP to protect their personal names against 
parasitic registrations.  The UDRP is thus perceived by some as implementing an excessively materialistic 
conception of contribution to society.  Furthermore, persons whose names have become distinctive in 
countries that do not recognize unregistered trademark rights are unlikely to find consolation in the UDRP 
in respect of bad faith registration and use of their personal names as domain names in those countries.”), ¶ 
202 (“It is recommended that no modification be made to the UDRP to accommodate broader protection 
for personal names than that which currently exists in the UDRP.”) 
 
151
          Second WIPO Internet Domain Name Process, Sept 3, 2001, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/processes/process2/report/html/report.html#5, last viewed on November 11, 
2007, ¶181-184 (surveying decisions in which UDRP arbitrators have ordered transfers of domain names 
based on personal names); Kevin Spacey v Alberta Hot Rods, National Arbitration Forum Claim No 
114437, August 1, 2002 (available at http://www.arb-forum.com/domains/decisions/114437.htm) 
(“Respondent has argued that the Final Report of the WIPO Internet Domain Name Process reveals that 
“personality” disputes are outside the scope of the Policy.  We would find the report persuasive on this 
issue as “legislative history” if we found some ambiguity in the Policy itself.  Because the Policy does not 
purport to exclude the category of disputes involving “personality rights,” we join the many other Panels 
that have recognized that the Policy does, indeed, protect such interests.”) 
  
152
  See, for example, Kevin Spacey v Alberta Hot Rods, National Arbitration Forum Claim No 
114437, August 1, 2002 (available at http://www.arb-forum.com/domains/decisions/114437.htm) 
(“Respondent has argued that the Final Report of the WIPO Internet Domain Name Process reveals that 
“personality” disputes are outside the scope of the Policy.  We would find the report persuasive on this 
issue as “legislative history” if we found some ambiguity in the Policy itself.  Because the Policy does not 
purport to exclude the category of disputes involving “personality rights,” we join the many other Panels 
that have recognized that the Policy does, indeed, protect such interests.”) 
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The current application of the UDRP to personal domain name disputes is 
certainly confused in terms of the scope of the policy over personal names.  Some 
arbitrators are more prepared to recognize protectable interests in personal names than 
others, usually on the basis of an unregistered trademark right.  Julia Roberts153 and Tom 
Cruise154 were found to have trademark interests in their personal names, but a majority 
panel of UDRP arbitrators felt that Bruce Springsteen did not have such rights.155  A 
UDRP arbitrator also held that the late Anna Nicole Smith was not sufficiently famous to 
assert a trademark interest in her personal name.156  In the political context, “Hillary 
Clinton” has been recognized as a trademark under the UDRP,157 but the same was not 
true for the Maryland gubernatorial candidate Kathleen Kennedy Townsend.158   
 
                                                 
153
  Julia Fiona Roberts v Russell Boyd, WIPO Case No. D2000-0210, 30 May, 2000 (available at 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0210.html ). 
 
154
  Tom Cruise v Alberta Hot Rods, WIPO Case No D2006-0560, 5 July, 2006 (available at 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2006/d2006-0560.html). 
 
155
  Bruce Springsteen v Jeff Burgar and Bruce Springsteen Club, WIPO Case No. D2000-1532, Jan. 
25, 2001, ¶ 6 (available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-1532.html) (“It 
appears to be an established principle from cases such as Jeanette Winterson, Julia Roberts, and Sade that 
in the case of very well known celebrities, their names can acquire a distinctive secondary meaning giving 
rise to rights equating to unregistered trade marks, notwithstanding the non-registerability of the name 
itself. It should be noted that no evidence has been given of the name "Bruce Springsteen" having acquired 
a secondary meaning; in other words a recognition that the name should be associated with activities 
beyond the primary activities of Mr. Springsteen as a composer, performer and recorder of popular music. 
In the view of this Panel, it is by no means clear from the UDRP that it was intended to protect proper 
names of this nature.”) 
 
156
  Anna Nicole Smith v DNS Research Inc, Claim No. FA0312000220007, National Arbitration 
Forum, Feb 21, 2004 (available at:  http://www.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/220007.htm) (involving 
annanicolesmith.com domain name) (“it is unlikely that the evidence submitted here by Complainant of her 
career, in and of itself, is sufficient to establish common law trademark rights in the name, which is a 
requirement for Complainant to prevail on this aspect of the case.  While the UDRP does not require a 
registered trademark for protection of a trademark from a confusingly identical domain name, the mere fact 
of having a successful career as an actress, singer or TV program star does not provide exclusive rights to 
the use of a name under the trademark laws.  The cases require a clear showing of high commercial value 
and significant recognition of the name as solely that of the performer.  The Humphrey Bogart case cited by 
the Complainant is a prime example of the type of case that would be expected to prevail, since virtually no 
one familiar with the movie industry would fail to recognize his name as that of a famous movie star.  The 
Panel does not believe Complainant’s name has yet reached that level of fame.”) 
 
157
  Hillary Rodham Clinton v Michele Dinoia, National Arbitration Forum Claim No 
FA0502000414641, March 18, 2005 (full text available at http://www.arb-
forum.com/domains/decisions/414641.htm) (Senator Clinton was regarded as having an unregistered 
trademark right in her personal name in connection with both her political activities and her career as an 
author of a number of books sold in commerce.) 
 
158
  Kathleen Kennedy Townsend v Birt, WIPO Case No D2002-0030, April 11, 2002 (available at 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2002/d2002-0030.html ) (individual politician in state 
gubernatorial race held not to hold trademark rights in her personal name). 
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Although one could attempt some factual distinctions, it appears that Roberts, 
Cruise, Springsteen and the late Anna Nicole Smith are all basically entertainers who do 
not sell products or services under their names in a trademark sense unless you consider 
their names to be marks for the movies or television shows they appear in or the songs 
they perform.159  If the marks work in this way, it is not clear why Bruce Springsteen 
would not be a mark in the same way as Julia Roberts and Tom Cruise.  A UDRP 
arbitrator recognized a trademark interest in Hillary Clinton’s name partly on the basis 
that she had authored books under her name.160  If this is the basis for a trademark interest 
in a personal name, shouldn’t “Bruce Springsteen” also be a trademark as the writer and 
performer of songs?  If the test for trademarkability relates to whether a person has 
written a song or book or appeared in a movie, then would this not lead to peculiar 
results?  For example, would all politicians and public figures have to write an 
autobiography in order to achieve protected trademark status for their personal names 
under the UDRP?  What about merchandising to establish trademark rights?161  Senator 
Barack Obama currently sells a series of “Obama 2008” merchandise on his campaign 
website,162 as does Senator Clinton with respect to her own presidential campaign.163  
Would the use of the Senators’ respective names on t-shirts, blankets and keyrings 
amount to a trademark use?164 
 
Obviously rules relating to the protection of trademark interests are not 
automatically geared towards protecting personal names, although they may cover 
                                                 
159
  Verna, supra note ___ (questioning why certain famous personalities are able to establish 
trademark rights in their personal names for UDRP purposes while others are not).   
 
160
  Hillary Rodham Clinton v Michele Dinoia, National Arbitration Forum Claim No 
FA0502000414641, March 18, 2005 (full text available at http://www.arb-
forum.com/domains/decisions/414641.htm) (Senator Clinton was regarded as having an unregistered 
trademark right in her personal name in connection with both her political activities and her career as an 
author of a number of books sold in commerce.) 
 
161
  See Stacey Dogan and Mark Lemley, The Merchandising Right:  Fragile Theory or Fait 
Accompli? 54 EMORY L J 461, 465 (2005) (describing merchandising right as the protected use of a 
trademark not as a source indicator but as a desirable feature of a product) [hereinafter, Merchandising 
Right]; Dogan and Lemley, Right of Publicity, supra note ___, 1175-1178 (discussion of merchandising 
right in trademark law). 
 
162
  See www.barackobama.com, last viewed on November 11, 2007. 
 
163
  Senator Clinton, in fact, has a stand-alone website for merchandising purposes.  See 
www.hillarystore.com, last viewed on November 11, 2007. 
 
164
  In Senator Obama’s case, it should be noted that he has already authored two books, so, following 
the reasoning of the UDRP arbitrator in the <hillaryclinton.com> case, Senator Obama would arguably 
already have trademark rights in his personal name on that basis:  Hillary Rodham Clinton v Michele 
Dinoia, National Arbitration Forum Claim No FA0502000414641, March 18, 2005 (full text available at 
http://www.arb-forum.com/domains/decisions/414641.htm) (Senator Clinton was regarded as having an 
unregistered trademark right in her personal name in connection with both her political activities and her 
career as an author of a number of books sold in commerce.) 
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personal names in some cases.165  Creating a new PDRP that replaces the UDRP’s 
trademark focus with a personality rights model would help here. It would lead to more 
predictable results, and to the development of a more nuanced jurisprudence geared at 
balancing the integrity of individual personas against other interests such as free speech.  
It would remove the need for arbitrators to explain why certain individuals should have 
trademark rights in their personal names while others would not.  In so doing, it would 
prevent an inappropriate expansion of trademark law into the personal name context in 
cyberspace.   
 
II.  PERSONALITY RIGHTS 
 
A. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AND PERSONAL NAME DISPUTES 
 
The right of publicity has been described as, “the right of an individual to control 
the commercial use of his or her name, likeness, signature, or other personal 
characteristics.”166  It derives originally from the right of privacy.167  Admittedly, this 
genesis has caused some confusion about the scope of the modern day tort which covers 
both privacy and some property-like aspects of an individual’s persona.168  Over the years, 
the right has developed in different states sometimes as a matter of common law169 and 
sometimes under state legislation.170  High profile examples include situations relating to 
unauthorized uses of Elvis Presley’s name and likeness after his death,171 John Wayne’s 
                                                 
165
  The obvious case is where the personal name is, in fact, used as a trademark in a business context.  
See, for example, Trudeau v Lanoue, 2006 U.S. Dixt. LEXIS 7956 (2006) (involving Mr Kevin Trudeau’s 
name as a domain name); Stephan Schmidheiny v Steven Weber, 285 F. Supp. 2d 613 (2003). 
 
166
  GILSON LALONDE, supra note ___, at § 2.16[1]. 
 
167
  id, at § 2.16[5]; Haemmerli, supra note ___, at 406 (“It is worth asking why we are here, why the 
doctrinal confusion is so extreme.  One reason is that the doctrine [of the right of publicity] may have taken 
a wrong turn forty-six years ago, when Second Circuit Judge Jerome Frank severed the right of publicity 
from the right of privacy.”); GILSON LALONDE, supra note ___, at §2.16[1][a] (“some courts view the right 
of publicity as a direct descendant of the right of privacy”); Madow, supra note ___, at 167 (“As Thomas 
McCarthy tells the story, the right of publicity was “carved out of the general right of privacy” – “like Eve 
from Adam’s rib.”  In my view, this simile is … misleading.  The right of publicity was created not so 
much from the right of privacy as from frustration with it.”) 
 
168
  Haemmerli, supra note ___, at 407-8 (“The doctrine … developed in a schizoid manner: publicity 
rights were purely economic property rights, as distinct from “personal” privacy rights (thereby enabling 
publicity rights to become transferable and descendible); but publicity rights, even though economic in 
nature, were also part of the tort of invasion of privacy, thereby implying that they should be viewed as a 
species of personal privacy rights, and as such nonassignable and nondescendible.”); Dogan and Lemley, 
Right of Publicity, supra note ___, 1208-9 (noting that privacy based justifications for right of publicity are 
legitimate and are different from economic trademark rationale for publicity rights). 
 
169
  Kentucky, for example, has a common law basis for the right of publicity:  see discussion in 
DINWOODIE AND JANIS, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note ___, at 823-827. 
 
170
  See, for example, Indiana Code Title 32 (Property), Art. 36 (Publicity), Chap. 1 (Rights of 
Publicity). 
 
171
  Estate of Elvis Presley v Russen, 513 F Supp 1339 (1981). 
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likeness on greeting cards,172 Martin Luther King’s likeness on unauthorized plastic 
busts,173 Rosa Parks’ name as a song title,174 Arnold Schwarzenegger’s likeness as a 
bobblehead doll,175 and Rudolph Giuliani’s likeness on an advertisement run on city buses 
in New York City.176     
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
172
  See discussion in Madow, supra note ___, 141-143.   
 
173
  Martin Luther King Jr, Center for Social Change Inc v American Heritage Products, 694 F 2d 674 
(11th Cir. 1993) (the estate of Martin Luther King Jr sought an injunction to prevent the defendant from 
selling plastic busts of Dr King). 
 
174
  Rosa Parks v LaFace Records, 329 F 3d 437 (2003) (involving publicity rights of Rosa Parks in 
the context of a song title using her name in relation to a hip hop recording that had nothing in particular to 
do with her or her work) 
 
175
  Charles Harder and Henry L Self III, Schwarzenegger vs. Bobbleheads:  The Case for 
Schwarzenegger, 45 SANTA CLARA L REV 557 (2005); William Gallagher, Strategic Intellectual Property 
Litigation, the Right of Publicity, and the Attenuation of Free Speech:  Lessons from the Schwarzenegger 
Bobblehead Doll War (and Peace), 45 SANTA CLARA L REV 581 (2005); David Welkowitz and Tyler 
Ochoa, The Terminator as Eraser:  How Arnold Schwarzenegger Used the Right of Publicity to Terminate 
Non-Defamatory Political Speech, 45 SANTA CLARA L REV 651 (2005). 
 
176
  New York Magazine v The Metropolitan Transit Authority of the City of New York, 987 F Supp 
254 (1997); aff’d in part, vacated in part, New York Magazine v The Metropolitan Transit Authority and 
the City of New York, 136 F.3d 123 (1998).  Mayor Giuliani ultimately failed in his appeal on free speech 
grounds.  The right of publicity tort has also been extended to “lookalikes” and “soundalikes” of famous 
people, notably the use of a Vanna White lookalike robot in a television commercial (Vanna White v 
Samsung Electronics America Inc, 971 F 2d (9th Cir 1992); cert denied, 508 U.S. 951 (1993)), and the use 
of imitators of Bette Midler’s and Tom Waits’ distinctive singing voices in advertising campaigns:  Bette 
Midler v Ford Motor Company, 849 F 2d 460 (1988); Tom Waits v Frito-Lay Inc, 978 F 2d 1093 (1992). 
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Because the right is arguably based both on aspects of property theory177 and 
aspects of personhood,178 it is uniquely able to protect individual personas in ways that 
more purely economically based laws – such as trademark law – cannot.  Most 
importantly, it protects aspects of an individual’s persona regardless of commercial 
trademark rights in the person’s name.  It can thus protect personas of celebrities, public 
figures and private individuals against unauthorized commercial exploitations.  Past 
practices have demonstrated that the combination of interests people want to protect in 
their names online179 corresponds to the same mixture of morally and economically based 
protections derived from the right of publicity.180  A PDRP based on personality rights 
                                                 
177
  Various justifications have been put forward for a property basis for personality rights, and have 
equally been criticized over the years.  For a discussion of property theory in this context, see Dogan and 
Lemley, Right of Publicity, supra note ___, 1181-1183 (critique of Lockean labor theory justifications for 
personality rights as property); McKenna, supra, note ___, 247 (“It might be true that identity is 
sufficiently similar to other objects the law regards as property and therefore deserves at least some of the 
sticks in the traditional bundle of property rights.  But far too few courts and commentators have offered a 
theory as to why any of the traditional property justifications lead to that conclusion.”); 251-267 (critique of 
Lockean labor theory justifications for property rights in personal identity); Haemmerli, supra note ___, 
388 (“Both proponents and critics of the right of publicity generally perceive it as a property claim 
grounded in Lockean labor theory.”), 407-8 (noting dual property and privacy justifications for right of 
publicity actions), 412 (“To the extent that commentators specifically address publicity rights, they tend to 
do so within this property context, and to use Lockean labor theories of property to explain the assertion of 
a property right in identity or persona.”); Kwall, Fame, supra note ___, 15 (“This Article … contends that a 
property-based conception for publicity rights is the natural outgrowth of our cultural norms as well as our 
theoretical conceptions of property.”); David Westfall and David Landau, Publicity Rights as Property 
Rights, 23 CARDOZO ARTS AND ENT LJ 71 (2005) (examining property basis for rights of publicity); Eileen 
Rielly, The Right of Publicity for Political Figures:  Martin Luther King, Jr, Center for Social Change, Inc 
v American Heritage Products, 46 U PITT L REV 1161, 1165-9 (1985) (describing development of a 
property rights rationale for the right of publicity).  See also Diane Zimmerman and Melissa Jacoby, 
Foreclosing on Fame: Exploring the Uncharted Boundaries of the Right Of Publicity, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1322 (2002). 
 
178
  See, for example, McKenna, supra note ___, at 285 (“Since all individuals share the interest in 
autonomous self-definition, every individual should be able to control uses of her identity that interfere 
with her ability to define her own public character.”, 286 (“Compelling a person to express a message 
herself presents a particular sort of threat to her freedom of belief:  It threatens her ability to control what 
she tells the world about who she is and what she holds important …”); Haemmerli, supra note ___, at 390 
(“Viewing the right of publicity as an extension of human worth and autonomy, rather than as a purely 
economic interest, also changes the nature of the exercise that balances the right against competing social 
claims …. [A] Kantian grounding is preferable to a Lockean justification not only because a Kantian 
foundation forces the realization that the balancing challenge is complex, but because it more accurately 
reflects the value of the human being behind the persona at issue.”); Rielly, supra note ___, 1164-5 
(description of privacy foundations of the right of publicity). 
 
179
  For example, rights to control the economic value of their personas in cyberspace (e.g. Prince 
threatening legal action against unauthorized fan sites’ exploitation of images and information about him) 
as well as an interest in protecting individual privacy rights (e.g. the desires of some celebrities to prevent 
anyone using a <name.com> version of their personal name, such as Julia Roberts and Tom Cruise).   
 
180
  GILSON LALONDE, supra note ___, at § 2.16[5] (noting different courts’ approaches to treating the 
right of publicity either as a property-based or a privacy-based right); Haemmerli, supra note ___, at 407-8 
(“The doctrine … developed in a schizoid manner: publicity rights were purely economic property rights, 
as distinct from “personal” privacy rights (thereby enabling publicity rights to become transferable and 
descendible); but publicity rights, even though economic in nature, were also part of the tort of invasion of 
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theory can draw on the policy justifications underpinning protection of an individual’s 
persona against unauthorized use.  This would include protections of an individual’s 
online privacy as well as supporting that notion that individuals should have some 
economic control of at least the <name.com> versions of their personal names. 
 
Another advantage of personality rights theory is that it can effectively address 
situations that fall somewhere in between privacy, defamation, copyright, and trademark 
law.  Consider, for example, a case where a person manufactures and sells an 
unauthorized coffee mug bearing a photograph of Britney Spears.  It may difficult for Ms 
Spears to bring an invasion of privacy action when her persona has been developed 
largely for public consumption.  In other words, it is hard to claim invasion of privacy for 
something that she herself has put into public view – her image and likeness181 – unless 
the image on the coffee mug was taken in an unauthorized private context: for example, 
by a photographer using a telephoto lens to shoot her in the privacy of her own home.182  
Further, if the coffee mug does not suggest anything defamatory about Ms Spears, there 
will be no remedy in defamation law.183  Copyright, also, will be an unlikely avenue for 
Ms Spears unless she can bring a copyright infringement action with respect to the 
                                                                                                                                                 
privacy, thereby implying that they should be viewed as a species of personal privacy rights, and as such 
nonassignable and nondescendible.”); Dogan and Lemley, Right of Publicity, supra note ___, 1208-9 
(noting that privacy based justifications for right of publicity are legitimate and are different from economic 
trademark rationale for publicity rights); Kwall, Fame, supra note ___, 36-7 (“[Other than economic harm], 
the right of publicity protects another type of incentive, one that focuses on moral rather than economic 
concerns.  For most celebrities, the cachet of fame is attributed to an image that the publicity plaintiff has a 
reputational interest in controlling.  The author has argued elsewhere that “the unauthorized use of an 
individual’s persona potentially poses the maximum harm [to that individual] when the persona is being 
appropriated in an objectionable context or for an objectionable purpose.”  Although some celebrities still 
might want to pursue the limelight even if the law sanctioned such unauthorized appropriations, other 
celebrities, particularly those with strong moral philosophies, might not.  The impact of the decisions 
regarding the use of a celebrity’s persona are felt more directly by the celebrity since it is the celebrity, 
rather than anyone in the celebrity’s entourage, whose reputation is at stake.” 
 
181
  Madow, supra note ___, at 168 (“Claims of … emotional injury [under privacy law] were not 
nearly as convincing when they came from celebrities …. After all, how could a movie star or professional 
athlete, who had deliberately and energetically sought the limelight, complain of embarrassment or hurt 
feelings when an advertiser or merchandiser simply gave his face some additional publicity?”); Kwall, 
Fame, supra note ___, 36 (“Some courts … hold that celebrities cannot maintain right-of-privacy actions, 
although this view is not universal.”); Dogan and Lemley, Right of Publicity, supra note ___, 1171 (noting 
that privacy actions were not generally much use to celebrities because they were regarded as having 
purposely sought out the limelight so there was no obvious invasion of privacy). 
 
182
  For a summary of the genesis of privacy rights based on media intrusion into personal space, see, 
for example, Madow, supra note ___, at 167-170. 
 
183
  Kwall, Fame, supra note ___, 36 (“Another significant disadvantage [for celebrities protecting 
their personality rights] derives from the law of defamation, under which celebrities enjoy less protection 
than other citizens.  Defendants in defamation actions involving public officials and public figures must 
meet the higher, “actual malice” standard of liability that requires knowledge of falsity as to the libelous 
statement or reckless disregard as to its truth.”) 
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photograph in question.184  She does not hold a copyright interest in her own person, 
although she may own copyright in a particular photograph.   
 
Trademark law, as we know, is also potentially problematic here.  Trademark law 
protects source indicators of products and services to prevent consumer confusion185 and 
to encourage investment in developing those products and services.186  Thus, if Ms Spears 
could establish trademark rights in her image, and could establish that the coffee mugs in 
question were confusing consumers as to source, origin, or affiliation with her, she may 
be able to establish a trademark infringement claim.  Alternatively, if she could establish 
a trademark in her image, and also that the coffee mugs were blurring or tarnishing the 
mark in the marketplace, she may be able to sustain a claim in trademark dilution.187  
However, it is not clear whether Ms Spears actually has a trademark in her name or 
image.188   
 
Even if Ms Spears could establish a trademark interest in her likeness, would it be 
sufficiently connected to the sale of merchandise, like coffee mugs, to support a 
successful trademark infringement action?  It would seem more likely that any mark that 
did exist would relate to concerts and music products and not merchandising of coffee 
                                                 
184
  Copyright generally subsists in the author of an original work, which would typically include a 
photographer in the case of a photograph, or the person who hired the photographer to take the photograph 
under the “works for hire” doctrine.  See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (“Copyright in a work protected under this title 
vests initially in the author or authors of the work.”), § 201(b)(“ In the case of a work made for hire, the 
employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this 
title, and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns 
all of the rights comprised in the copyright.”) 
 
185
  GILSON LALONDE, supra note ___, at § 5.01 (the general aim of trademark law is to prevent 
consumer confusion about the source of products or services); DINWOODIE AND JANIS, TRADEMARKS AND 
UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note ___, 16-17 (citing S. Rep No. 1333, 79th Cong, 2d Sess 3 (1946)) (“In the 
United States, two primary justifications have traditionally been offered in support of trademark protection:  
to “protect the public so that it may be confident that, in purchasing a product bearing a particular 
trademark which it favorably knows, it will get the product which it asks for and which it wants to get”; and 
to ensure that “where the owner of a trademark has spent energy, time and money in presenting to the 
public the product, he is protected in his investment from its appropriation by pirates and cheats.””) 
 
186
  DINWOODIE AND JANIS, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note ___, 16-17 (citing S. 
Rep No. 1333, 79th Cong, 2d Sess 3 (1946)) (“In the United States, two primary justifications have 
traditionally been offered in support of trademark protection:  to “protect the public so that it may be 
confident that, in purchasing a product bearing a particular trademark which it favorably knows, it will get 
the product which it asks for and which it wants to get”; and to ensure that “where the owner of a trademark 
has spent energy, time and money in presenting to the public the product, he is protected in his investment 
from its appropriation by pirates and cheats.””) 
 
187
  15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). 
 
188
  A search of the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s Trademarks Database as of 
November 11, 2007 shows that Britney Spears has, in fact, registered her name as a trademark for various 
products and services.  However, the mere fact of registration does not prove that a trademark is valid:  
DINWOODIE AND JANIS, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note ___, at 315 (“Trademark 
registration … does not create rights; it only confirms the existence of rights.”) 
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mugs and associated products.189  While there are some trademark cases that accept 
trademark infringement in the merchandising context,190 this use of trademark law has 
been criticized as straying from the basis of trademark infringement law in protecting 
marks per se rather than marks used as trademarks.191   
 
Of course, there is also a possibility of a trademark dilution action, but, again, Ms 
Spears would have to establish the existence of a trademark right in her image to begin 
with, as well as establishing that the use of the picture on the coffee mug blurred or 
tarnished her mark in some way.  By increasing circulation of her image in the 
marketplace, it may actually enhance the value of her mark rather than blurring or 
tarnishing it.192  Additionally, the dilution action is limited to “famous marks”,193 and the 
name of a famous person is not necessarily a famous mark.   
 
                                                 
189
  A search of the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s Trademarks Database as of 
November 11, 2007 shows that Britney Spears has registered her name as a mark for a variety of products 
including arts and craft kits, desk organizers and backpacks.  However, there does not appear to be a 
registration specifically for coffee mugs.   
 
190
  For a detailed critique of the merchandising right in trademark law, see Dogan and Lemley, 
Merchandising Right, supra note ___. 
 
191
  In fact, there is currently a significant debate as to whether “trademark use” by a defendant is an 
essential element of a trademark infringement action in the United States:  Graeme Dinwoodie and Mark 
Janis, Confusion Over Use:  Contextualism in Trademark Law, 92 IOWA L R 1597 (2007); Stacey Dogan 
and Mark Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through Trademark Use, 92 IOWA L R 1669 (2007); 
Graeme Dinwoodie and Mark Janis, Lessons from the Trademark Use Debate, 92 IOWA L R 1703 (2007); 
Lastowka, supra note ___, 45-47. 
 
192
  Madow, supra note ___, at 168 (“Claims of … emotion injury [under privacy law] were not nearly 
as convincing when they came from celebrities …. After all, how could a movie star or professional athlete, 
who had deliberately and energetically sought the limelight, complain of embarrassment or hurt feelings 
when an advertiser or merchandiser simply gave his face some additional publicity?”)  There is also some 
debate about whether increased circulation of a name or image actually increases or rather decreases the 
value of the celebrity identity:  McKenna, supra note ___, at 269-270 (“Landes and Posner argue that 
overgrazing on identity leads to “face wearout,” a reduction in the value of one’s persona due to declining 
interest in the person as her persona is increasingly used.  Their argument is at odds with the well-known 
maxim that “all publicity is good publicity,” though both sentiments are oversimplifications of the 
phenomenon of fame.  Publicity tends to feed off of itself and, as a result, many uses actually increase the 
value of a celebrity’s identity, whatever the character of those uses.  But additional publicity will increase 
the value of an individual’s identity only until a certain point, after which interest may wane, along with the 
value of the identity.  In other words, early additional uses may create “network effects” that increase the 
value of an identity, but at some point the number of uses will lead consumers to tire of the identity and it 
no longer will capture their attention.  In most cases, consumers lose interest in particular cultural objects 
simply because something has come along that better defines them at that point in time.  The point of 
tedium, however, may be accelerated, at least in terms of chronological time, as a result of overexposure.  
Some celebrities have more enduring cultural significance than others and, as a result, almost every aspect 
of an identity’s long-term value will vary from individual to individual:  the rate at which value is added by 
early uses, the point at which additional uses begin to erode value and the value of the persona at that point, 
and the rate at which the value will decline beyond the wearout point.”). 
 
193
  15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (statutory definition of “famous mark” as inserted into the Lanham Act 
under the Trademark Dilution Revision Act, H.R. 683 of 2006). 
 
 CELEBRITY IN CYBERSPACE 
  44 
People other than sports and entertainment celebrities may have greater 
difficulties with trademark focused laws.  A politician, public figure, or private individual 
may have more trouble establishing trademark rights in her name or likeness than a sports 
or entertainment celebrity.194  Thus, if the above hypothetical involved Rudolph Giuliani 
coffee mugs, rather than Britney Spears coffee mugs, Giuliani may have much more 
trouble establishing a trademark interest in his name or likeness, simply because he does 
not sell any goods or services in connection with his name or likeness in the trademark 
sense. 
 
These are the kinds of situations where personality rights may be extremely 
helpful in substance, if not in terms of process or procedure.195  Personality rights cover 
celebrity personas of course.196  However, they have also been used by politicians,197 
public figures,198 and private individuals199 to provide remedies against unauthorized 
commercial uses of their personas.  Although generally regarded as an “economic” tort 
protecting against commercial harm on the basis of a property-like right in a famous 
person’s identity,200 it has also been recognized as having “moral” elements.201  The key 
                                                 
194
  Report of the Second WIPO Internet Domain Name Process, Sept 3, 2001, ¶ 188, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/processes/process2/report/html/report.html#5, last viewed on November 11, 
2007 (“the names of political figures, religious leaders, scientists and historical persons may never have 
been used in commerce and, thus, are unlikely to have trademarks associated with them.”). 
 
195
  There are a number of procedural disadvantages of the right of publicity as opposed to a fast and 
inexpensive dispute resolution mechanism such as the UDRP.  Judicial proceedings are more costly and 
time-consuming than private arbitration.  Additionally, jurisdictional problems arise with right of publicity 
actions that do not arise under the UDRP.  The procedural advantages of the UDRP were discussed in Part 
I.B.4. 
 
196
  GILSON LALONDE, supra note ___, at § 2.16[1][b] (“The right of publicity is generally available 
only to celebrities, the Luciano Pavarottis, the John McEnroes, the Robert Redfords.  Cases involving 
unknowns are usually brought under the older right of privacy.”) 
 
197
  New York Magazine v The Metropolitan Transit Authority and the City of New York, 987 F Supp 
254 (1997), aff’d in part, vacated in part, New York Magazine v The Metropolitan Transit Authority and 
the City of New York, 136 F.3d 123 (1998) (action with respect to then Mayor Rudolph Giuliani’s 
personality rights). 
 
198
  Rosa Parks v LaFace Records, 329 F 3d 437 (2003) (involving publicity rights of Rosa Parks in 
the context of a song title using her name in relation to a hip hop recording that had nothing in particular to 
do with her or her work); Martin Luther King Jr, Center for Social Change Inc v American Heritage 
Products, 694 F 2d 674 (11th Cir. 1993) (the estate of Martin Luther King Jr sought an injunction to prevent 
the defendant from selling plastic busts of Dr King). 
 
199
  GILSON LALONDE, supra note ___, at § 2.16[1][a] (“The first successful right of privacy action for 
appropriation of name and likeness was designed to enable a non-public figure to retain his anonymity.  
The courts gave effect to the right by enjoining the unauthorized commercial use of the plainitff’s name and 
likeness, and they awarded general damages for injury to individual feelings, much as is done for libel and 
slander.”); Tellado v Time-Life Books, Inc., 643 F Supp 904 (D.N.J. 1986) (unauthorized use of image of 
private individual plaintiff in Vietnam war for book and advertising materials relating to book); see also 
discussion in Kwall, First Amendment, supra note ___, 96-100. 
 
200
  Haemmerli, supra note ___, at 392 (“The right of publicity is traditionally formulated as the right 
to exploit the commercial value of personal identity.”); Kwall, Fame, supra note ___, 15 (“a property-based 
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moral harm that has been protected by the right of publicity is more like a privacy 
protection than a property protection.  The obvious example is where unauthorized 
commercial use is made of an individual’s name or likeness in circumstances where that 
individual wants to maintain privacy of her image, rather than control commercial profits 
derived from her image.  Another advantage of a right of publicity framework is that 
courts have already engaged in balancing exercises between personality rights and the 
First Amendment in a variety of contexts.202  Such jurisprudence is more relevant to the 
personal domain name dispute context than that relating to the balance between 
trademark interests and the First Amendment. 
 
Questions have arisen under the right of publicity as to whether purely expressive 
conduct by the defendant, not necessarily resulting in a commercial profit, should be 
compensable.  Rogers v Grimaldi,203 for example, is a case in which the expressive speech 
                                                                                                                                                 
conception for publicity rights is the natural outgrowth of our cultural norms as well as our theoretical 
conceptions of property”); Dogan and Lemley, Right of Publicity, supra note ___, 1172-1174 (note growth 
of the right of publicity as an economic right); Konsky, supra note ___, 349 (“most courts and 
commentators now ground the right of publicity in property rationales.”); McKenna, supra note ___, at 226 
(“Because the right of publicity has focused entirely on the economic value of a celebrity’s identity, courts 
considering claims have no basis to differentiate among the variety of ways in which others might exploit 
that value.”) 
 
201
  McKenna, supra note ___, at 231 (“All individuals have a legitimate interest in autonomous self-
definition, and celebrities deserve protection against uses of their identities that implicate that interest.”); 
Haemmerli, supra note ___, at 390 (“Viewing the right of publicity as an extension of human worth and 
autonomy, rather than as a purely economic interest, also changes the nature of the exercise that balances 
the right against competing social claims …. [A] Kantian grounding is preferable to a Lockean justification 
not only because a Kantian foundation forces the realization that the balancing challenge is complex, but 
because it more accurately reflects the value of the human being behind the persona at issue.”); Kwall, First 
Amendment, supra note ___, 50 (“In evaluating the nature of the harm to the plaintiff, this Article asserts 
that economic harms are typically far less onerous than nonmonetizable harms which derive from uses the 
plaintiff would never have condoned.  These nonmonetizable, or morally based, harms can include 
reputational damage, distasteful associations, or uses which advance a substantive argument the plaintiff 
finds objectionable.  In addition, the potential for consumer deception is particularly strong where the use is 
one to which the plaintiff would never have consented.”) 
 
202
  Haemmerli, supra note ___, at 441-458 (analysis of First Amendment issues arising with respect 
to the right of publicity); Peter Felcher and Edward Rubin, Privacy, Publicity, and the Portrayal of Real 
People by the Media, 88 YALE LJ 1577, 1590 (1979) (“The First Amendment inevitably defines the 
operation and extent of the right of publicity; once the defendant can establish that the expression in 
question is protected, he will almost invariably prevail.”); Kwall, First Amendment, supra note ___ 
(suggesting a property versus liability rule basis for balancing First Amendment concerns against right of 
publicity claims); Eileen Rielly, The Right of Publicity for Political Figures:  Martin Luther King, Jr, 
Center for Social Change, Inc v American Heritage Products, 46 U PITT L REV 1161, 1172-4 (1985) 
(balancing First Amendment concerns with the publicity rights of public figures and politicians); Madow, 
supra note ___, at 140 (description of the role of the consumer as an active and creative participant in the 
creation of cultural commodities); Kwall, Fame, supra note ___, at 46-7 (“We do not deprive the owners of 
famous trademarks or the copyright owners of popular works of art or literature of their rights just because 
the public has played some role in placing a value on these works.  Therefore, right-of-publicity critics 
must justify why the cachet of a person’s fame should be treated differently.”).  See also Diane 
Zimmerman, Who Put the Right in the Right of Publicity?, 9 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 35 (1998). 
 
203
  875 F 2d 994 (1988). 
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elements of the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s name and likeness were not 
compensable under trademark law or under the right of publicity.204  In that case, the 
defendant had used the title “Ginger and Fred” in a film about a cabaret act that 
impersonated Ginger Rogers and Fred Astaire.205  The court held that the defendants had 
used no more of Ms Rogers’ identity than was necessary for expressive artistic 
purposes.206  Ms Rogers was therefore unsuccessful on her claims in both trademark law 
and publicity rights. 
 
In the Internet context, one analog to the Rogers facts might be the use of a 
personal domain name resolving to a website that commented on the person in question.  
The commentary could be a fan website, a parody, or a website critical of the person.  
Assuming the domain name registrant did not receive any commercial profit from the use 
of the domain name, the right of publicity may not provide any compensation to the 
plaintiff.  However, if the registrant was attempting to make a profit from the name either 
by selling the name itself – that is, cybersquatting – or by using the name to attract 
customers to the website for commercial purposes, a right of publicity claim would more 
likely be successful.   
 
B. DOES A PERSONALITY RIGHTS FRAMEWORK IMPROVE ON THE  
CURRENT SITUATION? 
 
1. Personality Rights vs the UDRP 
 
Despite the theoretical suitability of personality rights law for personal domain 
name disputes, most disputes are currently brought under the UDRP?207  There are a 
number of reasons why this has been the case, relating to cost, timing, and general 
                                                 
204
  id.   
 
205
  id., 996-7. 
 
206
  id., 1005 (“[W]e hold that section 43(a) of the Lanham Act does not bar a minimally relevant use 
of a celebrity's name in the title of an artistic work where the title does not explicitly denote authorship, 
sponsorship, or endorsement by the celebrity or explicitly mislead as to content. Similarly, we conclude 
that Oregon law on the right of publicity, as interpreted by New York, would not bar the use of a celebrity's 
name in a movie title unless the title was "wholly unrelated" to the movie or was "simply a disguised 
commercial advertisement for the sale of goods or services.")  
 
207
  There are only a small handful of cases where the right of publicity has been argued in the domain 
name context.  See, for example, Kevin Trudeau v George Lanoue, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7956 (2006) (in 
which a right of publicity claim was made, amongst other unfair competition claims, in a dispute involving 
a domain name corresponding with the plaintiff’s personal name); Paul Wright v Domain Source Inc., 2002 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16024 (2002) (plaintiff brought a claim under § 17525 of the Californian Business and 
Professions Code, which is a cyberspace analog to right of publicity law in some respects as it protects 
personal names in the domain space against certain unauthorized uses); Beezy, supra note ___, at 23-24 
(noting high success rate of celebrities in personal domain name proceedings under the UDRP and 
surveying some of the recent decisions); Moreland, supra note ___, at 386 (noting high success rate of 
celebrities in personal domain name disputes under the UDRP, and citing Statistical Summary for 
Proceedings under the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (February 26, 2001), 394 (“A 
plethora of disputes involving personal names have been submitted to ICANN Arbitration.”)). 
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accessibility for individual complainants when compared to litigation under either 
trademark or right of publicity law.208  Judicial proceedings will be more costly and time 
and resource intensive than online arbitration.209  Compared even with federal trademark 
law, the right of publicity has a number of procedural disadvantages.  For one thing, it is 
state law that is not harmonized nationally within the United States,210 let alone globally.  
This potentially causes conflicts of law issues, including problems of asserting 
jurisdiction over an out of state defendant,211 as well as choice of law issues.212 
 
Apart from these problems with litigation, it is likely that complainants are simply 
more focused on the UDRP for any domain name dispute than with the right of publicity.  
When complainants and their legal counsel think of personal domain name disputes, they 
probably instinctively categorize them as “domain name disputes”, rather than “personal 
name disputes” and so focus on the set of rules geared towards resolving the former.213  In 
many ways, this is a problem of classification.  If one classifies a given dispute as a 
“domain name dispute” rather than as a “dispute to protect the integrity of an individual’s 
persona”, one will tend to think of domain name focused rules, rather than personal 
identity rules.   
 
This article identifies advantages in marrying the substance of the personality 
rights tort with the procedural advantages of the UDRP to arrive at the best solutions 
regardless of whether the dispute is classified as being primarily “about domain names” 
                                                 
208
  Moreland, supra note ___, at 395 (“ICANN Arbitration offers celebrities and their lawyers a 
quick, cost effective and usually successful means to recover domain names registered by third parties that 
incorporate the celebrity’s name.”) 
 
209
  id.   
 
210
  Haemmerli, supra note ___, at 389 (“Existing practice [under the right of publicity] is … 
confused, with fifty state regimes protecting differing aspects of identity, for varied terms, and with 
disparate remedies.”); GILSON LALONDE, supra note ___, at § 2.16[1] (“The publicity right is still 
developing and the courts are far from unanimous in defining its scope.  Precedent (or the lack of it) in the 
selected forum may thus dictate reliance on trademark rights and unfair competition claims to the exclusion 
of, or in addition to, the publicity right.”); Rogers v Grimaldi, 875 F 2d 994, 1002-1004 (1988) (court 
discussing problems of applying Oregon’s right of publicity law in a New York forum).   
 
211
  This has been an issue with respect to personal domain name disputes in the past.  See Paul 
Wright v Domain Source Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16024, ¶¶ 1-3 (2002) (discussion of jurisdictional 
issues raised in complaint against cybersquatter’s registration of paulwright.com domain name).  The 
movie actor Kevin Spacey was also initially unsuccessful in a cybersquatting claim against the registrant of 
kevinspacey.com on jurisdictional grounds, but later succeeded under a UDRP proceeding:  Kieren 
McCarthy, Kevin Spacey Loses Pivotal Cybersquatting Court Case, THE REGISTER, Nov 26, 2001 
(available at http://www.theregister.co.uk/2001/11/26/kevin_spacey_loses_pivotal_cybersquatting/, last 
viewed on November 8, 2007). 
 
212
  See, for example, Rogers v Grimaldi, 875 F 2d 994, 1002-1004 (1988) (court discussing problems 
of applying Oregon’s right of publicity law in a New York forum). 
 
213
  Of course, there are some legislative provisions that could be categorized as aimed at both domain 
name disputes and personal names: for example, 15 U.S.C. § 1129(1)(A).  However, these laws require 
expensive domestic litigation as opposed to inexpensive online arbitration. 
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or “about personality”.  Under a new PDRP, one could achieve the time and cost benefits 
of the UDRP, but with a clearer focus on the aspects of an individual’s persona that 
should be protected in the domain space as a substantive policy matter.  One could also 
avoid undesirable expansions of trademark law into matters involving personal names 
that do not really operate as trademarks, as well as minimizing inconsistencies in 
arbitrations about which personal names should be accepted as trademarks. 
 
In substance, what would a personality rights based PDRP do differently than the 
UDRP?  Take, at a broad level of generality, the two major classes of conduct that 
concern potential personal domain name complainants.  The first are cybersquatting 
situations where a registrant has registered or used a domain name corresponding with 
the plaintiff’s personal name with the intent to sell it for a profit.  The second are 
situations where a registrant does not want to sell the domain name, but wants to use it 
for commercial or commentary purposes.  With respect to the first class – cybersquatting 
– a personality rights framework improves on the UDRP in several ways.  It does not 
require the complainant to establish a trademark interest in her personal name.214  Thus, it 
applies equally to extremely famous celebrities215 as to politicians,216 public figures,217 and 
                                                 
214
  Of course, infringement under legislative provisions such as 15 U.S.C. § 1129(1)(A) does not 
require establishment of a trademark in a personal name, but it does require often expensive litigation. 
 
215
  The right of publicity has its most obvious applications in the case of celebrity personas:  GILSON 
LALONDE, supra note ___, at § 2.16[1] (“The right of publicity, a developing common law right of great 
value to the celebrity …”); Dogan and Lemley, Right of Publicity, supra note ___, 1164 (conceiving right 
of publicity in terms of protecting celebrities’ names and likenesses); Bette Midler v Ford Motor Company, 
849 F 2d 460 (1988) (right of publicity action involving Bette Midler’s distinctive singing voice); Tom 
Waits v Frito-Lay Inc, 978 F 2d 1093 (1992) (right of publicity action involving Tom Waits’ distinctive 
singing voice); Rogers v Grimaldi, 875 F 2d 994 (1988) (right of publicity action involving Ginger Rogers’ 
name); Michael Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE L J 1, 
141-142 (2004) (“Celebrities play a central role in discourse today … In a world of increasing 
fragmentation, references to celebrities are essential for dialogue on issues such as culture and values … By 
putting alternative conceptions of celebrity off limits, the right of publicity … threatens to suppress 
expression and to give celebrities the power to censor alternative versions of their images that are, for 
example, iconoclastic or irreverent.”); McKenna, supra note ___, at 226 (conceiving of the right of 
publicity as being focused “entirely on the economic value of a celebrity’s identity”); Madow, supra note 
___ (critiquing the right of publicity in the celebrity context). 
 
216
  Rielly, supra note ___, at 1169-1172 (discussing the application of the right of publicity to 
political figures); New York Magazine v The Metropolitan Transit Authority and the City of New York, 987 
F Supp 254 (1997), aff’d in part, vacated in part, New York Magazine v The Metropolitan Transit Authority 
and the City of New York, 136 F.3d 123 (1998) (on Mayor Rudolph Giuliani’s rights of privacy and 
publicity); Charles Harder and Henry L Self III, Schwarzenegger vs. Bobbleheads:  The Case for 
Schwarzenegger, 45 SANTA CLARA L REV 557 (2005); William Gallagher, Strategic Intellectual Property 
Litigation, the Right of Publicity, and the Attenuation of Free Speech:  Lessons from the Schwarzenegger 
Bobblehead Doll War (and Peace), 45 SANTA CLARA L REV 581 (2005); David Welkowitz and Tyler 
Ochoa, The Terminator as Eraser:  How Arnold Schwarzenegger Used the Right of Publicity to Terminate 
Non-Defamatory Political Speech, 45 SANTA CLARA L REV 651 (2005); Jacqueline Lipton, Who Owns 
Hillary.com?  Political Speech and the First Amendment in Cyberspace, 49 BOSTON COLLEGE L REV 55 
(2008). 
 
217
  Rosa Parks v LaFace Records, 329 F 3d 437 (2003) (involving publicity rights of Rosa Parks in 
the context of a song title using her name in relation to a hip hop recording that had nothing in particular to 
do with her or her work); Martin Luther King Jr, Center for Social Change Inc v American Heritage 
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private individuals,218 not to mention “lesser celebrities”.219  It would clearly cover 
cybersquatting because it prevents the use of another’s name or likeness for an 
unauthorized commercial profit.220  Thus, it would cover all cybersquatting involving a 
personal name regardless of the trademarkability of the name.221 
   
One might argue that the deficiencies of the UDRP here could be remedied easily 
enough by simply including a personal name as a protected interest under the UDRP 
alongside a trademark.  This would prohibit all cybersquatting involving any personal 
name regardless of whether or not the name in question operated as a trademark.222  
                                                                                                                                                 
Products, 694 F 2d 674 (11th Cir. 1993) (the estate of Martin Luther King Jr sought an injunction to prevent 
the defendant from selling plastic busts of Dr King). 
 
218
  Kevin Trudeau v George Lanoue, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7956 (2006) (in which a right of 
publicity claim was made, amongst other unfair competition claims, in a dispute involving a domain name 
corresponding with the plaintiff’s personal name); Paul Wright v Domain Source Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 16024 (2002) (plaintiff brought a claim under § 17525 of the Californian Business and Professions 
Code, which is a cyberspace analog to right of publicity law in some respects as it protects personal names 
in the domain space against certain unauthorized uses). 
 
219
  In other words, it would cover situations where people like Bruce Springsteen and Anna Nicole 
Smith had trouble convincing UDRP arbitrators that they held trademark interests in their personal names.  
See Bruce Springsteen v Jeff Burgar and Bruce Springsteen Club, WIPO Case No. D2000-1532, Jan. 25, 
2001, ¶ 6 (available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-1532.html) (“It appears 
to be an established principle from cases such as Jeanette Winterson, Julia Roberts, and Sade that in the 
case of very well known celebrities, their names can acquire a distinctive secondary meaning giving rise to 
rights equating to unregistered trade marks, notwithstanding the non-registerability of the name itself. It 
should be noted that no evidence has been given of the name "Bruce Springsteen" having acquired a 
secondary meaning; in other words a recognition that the name should be associated with activities beyond 
the primary activities of Mr. Springsteen as a composer, performer and recorder of popular music. In the 
view of this Panel, it is by no means clear from the UDRP that it was intended to protect proper names of 
this nature.”); Anna Nicole Smith v DNS Research Inc, National Arbitration Forum Claim No 
FA0312000220007, Feb 21, 2004 (available at http://www.adr-forum.com/domains/decisions/220007.htm), 
last viewed on October 25, 2007 (“it is unlikely that the evidence submitted here by the Complainant of her 
career, in and of itself, is sufficient to establish common law trademark rights in the name, which is a 
requirement for Complainant to prevail on this aspect of the case.  While the UDRP does not require a 
registered trademark for protection of a trademark from a confusingly identical domain name, the mere fact 
of having a successful career as an actress, singer or TV program star does not provide exclusive rights to 
the use of a name under the trademark laws.”).   
 
220
  Kwall, First Amendment, supra note ___, 47 (“The right of publicity is a legal theory which 
enables individuals to protect themselves from unauthorized, commercial appropriations of their 
personas.”); Carrier, supra note ___, 22-23 (“The right of publicity prevents the appropriation of an 
individual’s name or likeness for commercial advantage.”); Konsky, supra note ___, 347 (“The right of 
publicity prohibits commercial use of a person’s name or likeness without the person’s consent.”); GILSON 
LALONDE, supra note ___, at § 2.16[1] (“The right of publicity … is the right of an individual to control the 
commercial use of his or her name, likeness, signature, or other personal characteristics.”) 
 
221
  Of course, § 1129 of the Lanham Act would also cover the same conduct.  However, that involves 
litigation as opposed to inexpensive online arbitration, so a PDRP would be an improvement over the 
Lanham Act for personal domain name disputes. 
 
222
  See discussion in Jacqueline Lipton, Who Owns Hillary.com?  Political Speech and the First 
Amendment in Cyberspace, 49 BOSTON COLLEGE L REV 55 (2008). 
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Nevertheless, the UDRP for the most part is still geared at protecting marks in cyberspace 
against unauthorized commercial uses likely to confuse consumers as to source or origin 
of goods or services.223  In other words, it is still focused on aspects of trademark law that 
are not necessarily well suited to addressing concerns about unauthorized commercial 
uses of personal names.  Thus, even adding a personal name as a protected interest under 
the existing UDRP would likely lead to inconsistent and arbitrary results as UDRP 
arbitrators attempted to apply trademark-like tests to personal name disputes. 
 
Additionally, the UDRP is not particularly appropriate for the second class of 
personal domain name conflicts: that is, situations in which the registrant does not want 
to sell the name for a profit, but rather wants to use it herself for some reason.  These 
situations really boil down into two sub-categories which can overlap:  commerce and 
commentary.  Some unauthorized uses of a personal domain name will be commercial 
and some will be for commentary purposes – whether it be idolatry, parody or criticism, 
or a combination.  Additionally, it is possible for a website to contain elements of 
commerce and elements of commentary simultaneously.  A fan website may charge a fee 
for joining a relevant fan club, online chat group or the like.  It may equally sell 
unauthorized celebrity merchandise.  A website critical of a particular person may sell or 
advocate the sale of merchandise or information supporting a view critical of that person 
or her views.224  Even a parody website may advocate the sale of merchandise critical of 
the person or institution being parodied.225  These kinds of cases raise difficult questions 
of balancing interests in an individual’s persona against the First Amendment.  
Personality rights law is the body of law that has historically dealt with this balance.  
Trademark law has dealt with a similar balance relating to protecting free speech against 
trademark interests.226  However, the interests of a trademark holder are somewhat 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
223
  See, for example, UDRP, para 4(b) (“the following circumstances, in particular but without 
limitation, if found by the Panel to be present, shall be evidence of the registration and use of a domain 
name in bad faith: (i) circumstances indicating that you have registered or you have acquired the domain 
name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to 
the complainant who is the owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of that complainant, 
for valuable consideration in excess of your documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain 
name; or (ii) you have registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the trademark or service 
mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name, provided that you have engaged in a 
pattern of such conduct; or (iii) you have registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of 
disrupting the business of a competitor; or (iv) by using the domain name, you have intentionally attempted 
to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to your web site or other on-line location, by creating a 
likelihood of confusion with the complainant's mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or 
endorsement of your web site or location or of a product or service on your web site or location.”) 
 
224
  See, for example, Lamparello v Falwell, 420 F 3d 309 (2005) (gripesite contained links to 
amazon.com webpage selling a book critical of the Reverend Jerry Falwell’s views on homosexuality). 
 
225
  People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v Doughney, 113 F Supp 2d 915 (2000); aff’d 263 
F.3d 359 (2001) (parody site linking to websites where fur and animal products antithetical to plaintiff’s 
views were available for sale). 
 
226
  For a general discussion of these issues, see also Jacqueline Lipton, Commerce versus 
Commentary:  Gripe Sites, Parody and the First Amendment in Cyberspace, 84 WASH U L REV 1327 
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different to those of an individual in her persona – and the appropriate body of rules 
should be applied in each case.  Rights in individual personas flow from both theories of 
personhood and theories of property,227 while trademark rights are focused purely on 
commercial source identifiers.228 
 
2. Case Study 1:  Unauthorized Celebrity Websites 
 
Two examples might be useful to illustrate ways in which a personality rights 
framework for personal domain name disputes might differ from a trademark-focused 
model.  Two obvious cases might be: (a) a celebrity concerned about an unauthorized fan 
website utilizing her personal name as a domain name; and, (b) a politician concerned 
about a website that uses her personal name as a domain name and contains messages 
critical of her, or her views.  These examples have been chosen because they both 
implicate First Amendment concerns.  However, the first example may additionally 
implicate commercial values much more than the second example.  Each example deals 
with ways in which a personality rights framework might balance the complainant’s 
rights in her persona against First Amendment concerns. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
(2006); Margreth Barrett, Domain Names, Trademarks and the First Amendment:  Searching for 
Meaningful Boundaries, 39 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW 973 (2007). 
 
227
  On theories of the right of publicity with a focus on personhood and individual autonomy, see 
Haemmerli, supra note ___.  On the property theory basis for the right of publicity, see Dogan and Lemley, 
Right of Publicity, supra note ___, 1181-1183 (critique of Lockean labor theory justifications for 
personality rights as property); McKenna, supra note ___, 247 (“It might be true that identity is sufficiently 
similar to other objects the law regards as property and therefore deserves at least some of the sticks in the 
traditional bundle of property rights.  But far too few courts and commentators have offered a theory as to 
why any of the traditional property justifications lead to that conclusion.”); 251-267 (critique of Lockean 
labor theory justifications for property rights in personal identity); Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The 
Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49 DUKE L J 343, 388 (“Both proponents and critics of the right of 
publicity generally perceive it as a property claim grounded in Lockean labor theory.”), 407-8 (1999) 
(noting dual property and privacy justifications for right of publicity actions), 412 (“To the extent that 
commentators specifically address publicity rights, they tend to do so within this property context, and to 
use Lockean labor theories of property to explain the assertion of a property right in identity or persona.”); 
Kwall, Fame, supra note ___, 15 (“This Article … contends that a property-based conception for publicity 
rights is the natural outgrowth of our cultural norms as well as our theoretical conceptions of property.”); 
David Westfall and David Landau, Publicity Rights as Property Rights, 23 CARDOZO ARTS AND ENT LJ 71 
(2005) (examining property basis for rights of publicity); Rielly, supra note __, 1165-9 (describing 
development of a property rights rationale for the right of publicity).  See also Diane Zimmerman and 
Melissa Jacoby, Foreclosing on Fame: Exploring the Uncharted Boundaries of the Right Of Publicity, 77 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1322 (2002). 
 
228
  Traditional trademark law has generally been premised on two interconnected aims:  (a) to protect 
the public when purchasing a product or service to ensure that the purchasers get what they think they are 
paying for in terms of goods or services from a particular source; and, (b) to ensure that those who invest in 
developing goodwill in a particular mark are protected against unfair misappropriations of that goodwill.  
See GRAEME DINWOODIE and MARK JANIS, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, 563-566 (2004) 
(citing S. Rep. No. 1333. 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1946)); Stacey Dogan and Mark Lemley, Trademarks and 
Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW 777, 786 (2004) (noting the benefits to 
both consumers and producers of consumers having access to ‘truthful information about the source of 
products and services’.) 
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In the first case, the trademark-focused laws would obviously not help the 
celebrity at all unless she could establish a trademark interest in her personal name.229  
Assuming she could establish such an interest, she would have to establish that the 
website in question was confusing consumers for a trademark infringement action,230 was 
dilutive of her name in commerce for a dilution action,231 or was registered and used in 
bad faith for an ACPA action232 or a UDRP arbitration.  This is putting to one side an 
action under the personal name provisions of the Lanham Act on the basis that they only 
prohibit bad faith intents to sell the relevant domain name,233 and not unauthorized uses of 
the name per se.   
 
An unauthorized fan website is probably not confusing to consumers provided 
that it is not passing itself off as an authorized fan website.  Thus, a disclaimer might cure 
any confusion and mitigate against the likelihood of a successful trademark infringement 
action.234  If no commercial activity is conducted on the website, it is not likely to be “in 
commerce” for the purposes of a dilution action.235  However, if there are commercial 
activities, such as charging membership fees or engaging in advertising, could an 
unauthorized fan site be said to be dilutive of a celebrity persona as a mark?  Even if 
there is some commercial activity, it is possible that the use of the domain name could be 
excused under the new “commentary” defense to dilution inserted into the Lanham Act in 
2006.236  Obviously, the fan site creates some “noise” around the celebrity’s name, but 
                                                 
229
  Obviously, 15 U.S.C. § 1129(1) applies in the absence of a trademark interest as discussed above.  
However, it only prohibits cybersquatting and does not cover any other unauthorized uses of a domain 
name corresponding with a person’s name.   
 
230
  15 U.S.C. §§ 1114 (infringement of registered trademarks); 1125(a) (infringement of unregistered 
trademarks). 
 
231
  15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). 
 
232
  15 U.S.C. § 1125(d). 
 
233
  15 U.S.C. § 1129(1). 
 
234
  Bridgestone Firestone v Myers, WIPO Case No, D2000-0190, July 6, 2000, (available at 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0190.html) (“In the cybersquatting cases, 
the domain names in question generally were www.trademark.com domain names, which prevented the 
trademark holder from utilizing the customary commercial domain name for its “official” site …. Here, 
however, the domain name registrant has not usurped the <.com> domain, but has utilized only the <.net> 
domain, has posted disclaimers on the website homepage, and has included criticism or commentary on the 
site so that a reasonably prudent Internet user can tell that the site is not the trademark holder’s “official” 
site.”); Haemmerli, supra note ___, at 400 (noting a non-Internet setting that the use of a highly visible 
disclaimer on a film might negate likelihood of confusion); but see also Planned Parenthood Federation of 
America Inc v Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1430, pp 39-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (defendant’s use of 
plannedparenthood.com domain name for messages critical of the Planned Parenthood organization would 
likely confuse consumers as to the source of various services provided by the plaintiff regardless of the use 
of a disclaimer).  
 
235
  15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(C).     
 
236
  15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A)(ii) (excusing identifying the plaintiff for the purposes of parody, 
criticism and commentary from the scope of a trademark dilution action). 
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such noise may be reinforcing the celebrity’s identity, rather than blurring or detracting 
from it.237  Additionally, a celebrity’s name is unlikely to meet the definition of “famous 
mark”.238  Thus, a dilution action may not be successful in this case.  Further, if the 
domain name has been registered not in bad faith but for the purposes of legitimate fan 
related commentary, the provisions of § 1125(d)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act are unlikely to 
be satisfied in terms of a traditional cybersquatting action.239   
 
Would the right of publicity give a different result here and, just as importantly, 
should it?  One might argue that because trademark laws carry these inherent limitations, 
partly to balance them against First Amendment concerns, the same should be true of 
personality rights law.  Otherwise, individual names and likenesses will be over-
propertized and this result will chill free expression on the Internet.  However, it is 
important not to consider rights in personal names with too much emphasis on trademark 
law.  Personality rights clearly implicate a number of concerns similar to trademark 
law.240  However, they also protect other aspects of an individual’s personality, such as 
the right to keep certain aspects of a persona out of the public domain. Thus, while 
trademark jurisprudence may in some ways inform the development of personality rights 
jurisprudence, trademarks are not the same as personality rights.241 
                                                 
237
  See McKenna, supra note ___, at 269-270 (“Landes and Posner argue that overgrazing on identity 
leads to “face wearout,” a reduction in the value of one’s persona due to declining interest in the person as 
her persona is increasingly used.  Their argument is at odds with the well-known maxim that “all publicity 
is good publicity,” though both sentiments are oversimplifications of the phenomenon of fame.  Publicity 
tends to feed off of itself and, as a result, many uses actually increase the value of a celebrity’s identity, 
whatever the character of those uses.  But additional publicity will increase the value of an individual’s 
identity only until a certain point, after which interest may wane, along with the value of the identity.  In 
other words, early additional uses may create “network effects” that increase the value of an identity, but at 
some point the number of uses will lead consumers to tire of the identity and it no longer will capture their 
attention.  In most cases, consumers lose interest in particular cultural objects simply because something 
has come along that better defines them at that point in time.  The point of tedium, however, may be 
accelerated, at least in terms of chronological time, as a result of overexposure.  Some celebrities have 
more enduring cultural significance than others and, as a result, almost every aspect of an identity’s long-
term value will vary from individual to individual:  the rate at which value is added by early uses, the point 
at which additional uses begin to erode value and the value of the persona at that point, and the rate at 
which the value will decline beyond the wearout point.”) 
 
238
  15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) now defines “famous mark” as follows:  “[A] mark is famous if it is 
widely recognized by the general consuming public of the United States as a designation of source of the 
goods or services of the mark's owner. In determining whether a mark possesses the requisite degree of 
recognition, the court may consider all relevant factors, including the following: (i) The duration, extent, 
and geographic reach of advertising and publicity of the mark, whether advertised or publicized by the 
owner or third parties. (ii) The amount, volume, and geographic extent of sales of goods or services offered 
under the mark. (iii) The extent of actual recognition of the mark….” 
 
239
  The same will be true of an attempt to satisfy the bad faith requirements of the UDRP:  see UDRP, 
clause 4(b). 
 
240
  For a detailed discussion of the similarities between trademark law and the right of publicity, see 
Dogan and Lemley, Right of Publicity, supra note ___. 
 
241
  Dogan and Lemley, Right of Publicity, supra note ___, at 1211 (noting differences between 
personality rights and trademarks, including the fact that there is no “use in commerce” or secondary 
meaning requirement for complainants under the right of publicity). 
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  The right of publicity tort does not require the complainant to establish 
trademark-like incidents in her personal name or likeness.242  This is clearly an advantage 
for complainants over the UDRP.  However, the commercial use requirement could be a 
problem here in the same way that it could be a problem in a trademark-based action.  If 
the view is taken that all Internet conduct is commercial because of the nature of the 
Internet,243 the commercial use requirement is automatically satisfied.  If not, it may be 
that the nature of the activities on the website could satisfy the commercial use 
requirement only if the registrant was advertising, 244 or selling products or services on the 
relevant website.  This may well be as it should be.  A purely expressive website, even in 
the <name.com> space, should perhaps be protected speech where there is no unfair or 
unauthorized commercial gain being made from someone else’s persona.   
 
On the other hand, the right of publicity protects individuals from being thrust 
into the limelight against their wishes245 – this is the privacy aspect of the right, usually 
applied more to private individuals than celebrities on the basis that the latter are 
presumably expecting, and even overtly seeking, the limelight.246  While the privacy-
based aspects of the right of publicity are usually geared towards private individuals, and 
even then at public commercial uses of a private individual’s persona,247 there may be 
some scope to argue that celebrities should have some privacy rights in relation to at least 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
242
  id. 
 
243
  Planned Parenthood Federation of America Inc v Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1430, page 11 (S.D.N.Y. 
1997) (“Internet users constitute a national, even international, audience, who must use interstate telephone 
lines to access defendant's web site on the Internet. The nature of the Internet indicates that establishing a 
typical home page on the Internet, for access to all users, would satisfy the Lanham Act's "in commerce" 
requirement.”).  But note that this reasoning relates to the Lanham Act’s “in commerce” requirement in 
particular and may not automatically apply to the right of publicity.  An example of a similar judicial 
interpretation that everything on the Internet is automatically “in commerce” outside the trademark context 
is found in American Libraries Association v Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“In addition, 
many of those users who are communicating for private, noncommercial purposes are nonetheless 
participants in interstate commerce by virtue of their Internet consumption. Many users obtain access to the 
Internet by means of an on-line service provider, such as America Online, which charges a fee for its 
services. "Internet service providers," including plaintiffs Panix, Echo, and NYC NET, also offer Internet 
access for a monthly or hourly fee. Patrons of storefront "computer coffee shops," such as New York's own 
CyberCafe, similarly pay for their access to the Internet, in addition to partaking of food and beverages sold 
by the cafe. Dial-in bulletin board systems often charge a fee for access.”) 
 
244
  See, for example, Tom Cruise v Alberta Hot Rods, WIPO Case No D2006-0560, 5 July, 2006, 
para. 4 (available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2006/d2006-0560.html) (the 
relevant website included links to services and products that were not connected with the complainant). 
 
245
  See Dogan and Lemley, Right of Publicity, supra note ___, at 1167. 
 
246
  id. 
 
247
  See, for example, Tellado v Time-Life Books, Inc, 643 F Supp 904 (D.N.J. 1986) (involving the 
unauthorized use of a Vietnam war veteran’s photo on promotional materials for a series of books about the 
Vietnam war). 
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<name.com> versions of their names online.  There have been cases where the right to 
publicity has prevented public uses of likenesses of private individuals even where there 
is no direct economic harm to the plaintiff and where the plaintiff’s concern is with moral 
privacy-related objections to the use of the image, rather than economic benefits.248   
 
Although one might argue that celebrities should not be entitled to bring such 
actions because of their admittedly public personas, the nature of the Internet brings a 
new scope and scale to the idea of unauthorized public distribution.249  Whereas a plaintiff 
in the past may have been concerned about emotional distress or loss of privacy in 
relation to an unauthorized billboard advertisement in one or more specific geographical 
locations, today’s plaintiff may face a complete loss of privacy in the face of the whole 
world.250  Thus, even a celebrity may be entitled to some control of Internet content about 
her on this basis, particularly if that control is initially limited to the <name.com> space 
which is likely the most closely associated with the idea of the celebrity’s authorized 
online persona.  A PDRP based on a personality rights framework might justify this 
result.  Decisions under the PRDP based on balancing the rights of a given celebrity in 
her persona against the registrant’s free speech entitlements would create a more nuanced 
jurisprudence for these situations in cyberspace.  Such a jurisprudence might ultimately 
inform the development of personality rights in cyberspace more generally: that is, 
perhaps in other domain spaces, or with respect to the use of unauthorized celebrity 
images on websites that do not use the complainant’s name in the domain space at all.  In 
any event, it is the right of publicity, rather than trademark law, that most appropriately 
deals with these questions. 
 
3. Case Study 2:  Unauthorized Political Websites 
 
With respect to the second hypothetical raised above – a website critical of a 
politician under a <name.com> domain – trademark focused laws are again a poor fit. 251  
They are not aimed at balancing a politician’s rights in her persona against the public 
interest in free speech.  Most politicians do not have, or should not be regarded as having, 
trademarks in their personal names.  The balance of their interests in their names against 
the public’s right to comment about them should not be a part of trademark law.  
However, it might be determined effectively by personality rights principles.   
 
                                                 
248
  id; Kwall, First Amendment, supra note ___, at 96-100 (discussion of Tellado v Time-Life Books, 
Inc, 643 F Supp 904 (D.N.J. 1986) – a publicity rights case involving emotional distress to the plaintiff, 
rather than economic loss). 
 
249
  See DANIEL SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE 
INTERNET, 33 (2007) (“The Internet … makes gossip a permanent reputational stain, one that never fades.  
It is available around the world, and with Google it can be readily found in less than a second.”) 
 
250
  id. 
 
251
  Other than potentially provisions such as 15 U.S.C. § 1129(1) that do not require a trademark 
interest, although this provision is limited to cybersquatting so would not be relevant in a situation where 
the domain name registrant did not want to ultimately sell the name for a profit. 
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Even in a situation where a politician can establish trademark rights in her name, 
a trademark infringement action is an unlikely candidate for resolving issues about 
unauthorized political commentary.  There will likely be no consumer confusion in such 
cases.  It is possible that a court liberally applying the initial interest confusion doctrine252 
would find confusion here in the sense that the Internet user is initially confused by use of 
the <name.com> domain name and ends up on a website she did not desire to access.253  
However, the initial interest confusion test is not universally accepted in trademark law.254  
Even in cases where a court was prepared to adopt the doctrine, the case of a political 
criticism website could be distinguished from prior initial interest confusion cases on the 
basis that the prior cases have generally had something to do with competing commercial 
activity, rather than purely expressive content.255   
 
Trademark dilution will also not be an appropriate fit for these situations.  The 
point of trademark dilution is to protect famous commercial marks from losing their 
distinctiveness in the marketplace,256 and not to protect politicians against undesired 
commentary.257  Even where politicians can establish trademarks in their names for 
infringement purposes, they would have to establish a “famous mark” for dilution 
purposes. 258  This would be difficult even for well-known politicians.259    Even if 
sufficient fame could be shown, the complainant politician would still have to satisfy the 
                                                 
252
  Lastowka, supra note ___, 35-36 (“With respect to search engines … a … significant expansion of 
trademark law is the doctrine of initial interest confusion.  Traditionally, and not surprisingly, most courts 
have focused analysis of consumer confusion on the time period proximate to consumer purchases.  The 
doctrine of initial interest confusion shifts the focus of confusion analysis to a time prior to the time of 
purchase.  Initial interest confusion can be found to exist even if that confusion was not present at the time 
of purchase.”); see also Jennifer Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion:  Standing at the Crossroads of 
Trademark Law, 27 CARDOZO L REV 105 (2005); Goldman, supra note ___, 559 (“[Initial interest 
confusion] lacks a rigorous definition, a clear policy justification, and a uniform standard for analyzing 
claims.  With its doctrinal flexibility, [it] has become the tool of choice for plaintiffs to shut down junior 
users who have not actually engaged in misappropriative uses.”) 
 
253
  See, for example, Planned Parenthood Federation of America Inc v Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1430 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (in which court held that even the use of a disclaimer on the relevant website would not 
detract from such confusion). 
 
254
  Lastowka, supra note ___, at 36 (“Though not all federal circuits have endorsed the doctrine of 
initial interest confusion and the Supreme Court has yet to consider a case applying it, many courts have 
accepted and applied the doctrine.”) 
 
255
  See, for example, survey of relevant cases in Lastowka, supra note ___, at 36. 
 
256
  GILSON LALONDE, supra note ___, § 5A.01[1] (“Federal dilution law protects famous trademarks 
from unauthorized uses that are likely to impair their distinctiveness or harm their reputation.”) 
 
257
  In fact, the recently adopted 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A)(ii) provides an express “commentary” 
defense to a dilution action. 
 
258
  In particular, the new definition of “famous mark” for dilution purposes contemplates fame with 
respect to the sale of goods or services:  15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A).  This is not the kind of interest usually 
associated with politicians’ names. 
 
259
  id. 
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“blurring or tarnishment”260 and “in commerce”261 requirements.  Additionally, there is 
now a new “commentary” defense to dilution that may become relevant in these 
situations.262  Blurring could be difficult to establish here as a website critical of a 
politician is not likely to blur the distinctive power of the politician’s name as a mark, but 
rather reinforces the politician’s identity, while criticizing her.  Internet users accessing 
either <bobkeenan.com> or <lindamcculloch.com> would have a clear and accurate idea 
of the respective personal identities of Bob Keenan and Linda McCulloch.  They would 
simply be exposed to views critical of Keenan and McCulloch.   
 
Tarnishment may be a possibility in such cases, but, again, the registrant’s 
conduct may be tarnishing the politician’s personal reputation, but would be unlikely to 
be tarnishing the politician’s name in a trademark sense.  Criticizing a politician’s views 
on a particular issue will not interfere with the integrity of the politician’s name as a mark 
in connection with the sale of goods or services, such as books and campaign 
merchandise.  It will rather impact on the way in which people regard the politician and 
her suitability for office.  Such criticism may even increase sales of books written by the 
relevant politician by people interested in learning more about the politician’s views 
spurred on by the criticisms of the politician.  Finally, there is the issue of whether purely 
expressive content is “in commerce” for dilution purposes.263  A commentary website, 
such as the <bobkeenan.com> and <lindamcculloch.com> examples do not appear to 
have any commercial application.  Thus, unless all Internet conduct is regarded as 
commercial, pure political gripesites will likely not satisfy the threshold for trademark 
dilution.  Even if the conduct is regarded as being “in commerce”, it may still be excused 
under the new “commentary” defense to a dilution action.264  This is not surprising, 
because trademark dilution was never intended to cover political commentary.   
 
The ACPA and the UDRP will not help much with this balance because of their 
focus on commercial bad faith cybersquatting.  Sections 1125(d) and 1129(1)(A) of the 
Lanham Act each assume that the defendant’s purpose in registering a relevant domain 
name is to make a bad faith commercial profit.  A registrant who has registered a 
politician’s name as a domain name for expressive purposes is unlikely to satisfy the test 
set out in either section.  Section 1125(d) will not apply unless the politician has a 
trademark in her name.  The UDRP would likely excuse commentary about a politician 
under a corresponding domain name, even a <name.com> name, as a legitimate use of 
the name.265  In any event, it will not apply to a politician if her name does not operate as 
a trademark.266  The same may be said of California’s Business and Professions Code, 
                                                 
260
  15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (dilution by blurring); § 1125(c)(2)(C) (dilution by tarnishment). 
 
261
  15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(C). 
 
262
  15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A)(ii). 
 
263
  15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(C). 
 
264
  15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A)(ii). 
 
265
  UDRP, para. 4(c)(iii). 
 
266
  UDRP, para. 4(a)(i). 
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although there is little case law or commentary available on that legislation to date.  Even 
though the key provision in § 17525(a) contemplates bad faith registrations of domain 
names without regard to goods or services of the parties, several of the bad faith factors 
relate to trademark-like concepts.267  The provision that does contemplate misleading 
voters as a bad faith factor does not make it clear whether a political commentary site 
would be excused as not misleading voters as to source or affiliation of the website.268 
 
Again, all of this may well be as it should be.  It may be that there should be no 
law giving a politician any rights against a registrant of a corresponding domain name, 
even a <name.com> name, where the registrant’s purpose is political commentary.  
However, there may be room for a presumption online that <name.com> names, even in 
the political context, would be expected by Internet users to resolve to officially 
sanctioned websites, and that any other use of those names is misleading.  Could a 
personality rights model resolve this dilemma?  For one thing, it would obviously protect 
any politician’s or public figure’s identity regardless of a trademark interest.  However, it 
would only protect them from unauthorized commercial conduct and not necessarily 
against undesired critical commentary.  Thus, like with the previous case study, if the 
defendant’s conduct was purely expressive, rather than commercial, the right of publicity 
may not provide results any different to those currently provided under trademark 
focused rules.   
 
Again, if the defendant’s conduct did contain commercial elements – either 
because the Internet is regarded as a global commercial communications medium,269 or 
because the website engages in some kind of commerce such as advertising books that 
criticize the politician270 – then the politician might have more luck.  As a general matter, 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
267
  See, for example, Cal. Business and Professions Code, §§ 17526(a) (relating to trademark rights in 
a given domain name); 17526(c) (use of domain name in relation to the bona fide offering of goods or 
services);  see discussion in Jacqueline Lipton, Who Owns Hillary.com?  Political Speech and the First 
Amendment in Cyberspace, 49 BOSTON COLLEGE L REV 55 (2008). 
 
268
  Cal. Business and Professions Code, § 17526(j) (providing as a bad faith factor “The intent of a 
person alleged to be in violation of this article to mislead, deceive, or defraud voters.”) 
 
269
  Planned Parenthood Federation of America Inc v Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1430, page 11 (S.D.N.Y. 
1997) (“Internet users constitute a national, even international, audience, who must use interstate telephone 
lines to access defendant's web site on the Internet. The nature of the Internet indicates that establishing a 
typical home page on the Internet, for access to all users, would satisfy the Lanham Act's "in commerce" 
requirement.”).  See also American Libraries Association v Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) 
(“In addition, many of those users who are communicating for private, noncommercial purposes are 
nonetheless participants in interstate commerce by virtue of their Internet consumption. Many users obtain 
access to the Internet by means of an on-line service provider, such as America Online, which charges a fee 
for its services. "Internet service providers," including plaintiffs Panix, Echo, and NYC NET, also offer 
Internet access for a monthly or hourly fee. Patrons of storefront "computer coffee shops," such as New 
York's own CyberCafe, similarly pay for their access to the Internet, in addition to partaking of food and 
beverages sold by the cafe. Dial-in bulletin board systems often charge a fee for access.”) 
 
270
  See, for example, Lamparello v Falwell, 420 F 3d 309 (2005) (gripesite contained links to 
amazon.com webpage selling a book critical of the Reverend Jerry Falwell’s views on homosexuality).  
However, note that in this case, the plaintiff was unsuccessful in establishing any form of trademark 
infringement or dilution despite this conduct of the plaintiff.  This factor was more successful in the 
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unauthorized commercial use may be more difficult to establish in the case of a political 
commentary website than an unauthorized fan website.  This is because the iterations of 
unauthorized fan conduct are more likely to have a commercial aspect in practice than a 
pure political commentary website.  Celebrities names are more likely to attract online 
customers than political names and may thus be more desirable to those seeking to make 
commercial profits from use of corresponding domain names.271   
 
Overall, a personality rights based framework for personal domain name disputes 
that allowed unauthorized expressive uses of <name.com> names, while prohibiting 
unauthorized commercial uses, might achieve a better theoretical focus than the current 
UDRP.  It would remove the requirement for a complainant to establish trademark rights 
in her personal name, or to establish cybersquatting, as opposed to other kinds of 
commercial profit motives by the registrant.  At the same time, it would not unduly chill 
speech because it would preserve the right to engage in purely expressive conduct about 
an individual, and, if limited in the first instance to <name.com> names, would preserve 
other iterations of a relevant name in the domain space for both expressive and 
commercial conduct.  To some extent, these results are similar to those currently found in 
practice in some trademark-based litigation.  However, the use of a personality rights 
model would lead to greater consistency on the question of what is being protected (a 
name rather than a mark), and why (because we care about both the personhood and 
proprietary aspects of an individual’s persona).272 
                                                                                                                                                 
trademark context in People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v Doughney, 113 F Supp 2d 915 (2000); 
aff’d 263 F.3d 359 (2001) (parody site linking to websites where fur and animal products antithetical to 
plaintiff’s views were available for sale). 
 
271
  An obvious example is found in Tom Cruise v Alberta Hot Rods, WIPO Case No D2006-0560, 5 
July, 2006, ¶ 4 (available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2006/d2006-0560.html) 
(respondent had used tomcruise.com domain name to draw custom to a website that advertised products 
and services unrelated to the well-known actor Tom Cruise). 
 
272
  On theories of the right of publicity with a focus on personhood and individual autonomy, see 
Haemmerli, supra note ___.  On the property theory basis for the right of publicity, see Dogan and Lemley, 
Right of Publicity, supra note ___, 1181-1183 (critique of Lockean labor theory justifications for 
personality rights as property); McKenna, supra note ___, 247 (“It might be true that identity is sufficiently 
similar to other objects the law regards as property and therefore deserves at least some of the sticks in the 
traditional bundle of property rights.  But far too few courts and commentators have offered a theory as to 
why any of the traditional property justifications lead to that conclusion.”); 251-267 (critique of Lockean 
labor theory justifications for property rights in personal identity); Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The 
Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49 DUKE L J 343, 388 (“Both proponents and critics of the right of 
publicity generally perceive it as a property claim grounded in Lockean labor theory.”), 407-8 (1999) 
(noting dual property and privacy justifications for right of publicity actions), 412 (“To the extent that 
commentators specifically address publicity rights, they tend to do so within this property context, and to 
use Lockean labor theories of property to explain the assertion of a property right in identity or persona.”); 
Kwall, Fame, supra note ___, 15 (“This Article … contends that a property-based conception for publicity 
rights is the natural outgrowth of our cultural norms as well as our theoretical conceptions of property.”); 
David Westfall and David Landau, Publicity Rights as Property Rights, 23 CARDOZO ARTS AND ENT LJ 71 
(2005) (examining property basis for rights of publicity); Rielly, supra note __, 1165-9 (describing 
development of a property rights rationale for the right of publicity).  See also Diane Zimmerman and 
Melissa Jacoby, Foreclosing on Fame: Exploring the Uncharted Boundaries of the Right Of Publicity, 77 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1322 (2002). 
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III.  CRAFTING A NEW PERSONAL DOMAIN NAME DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
POLICY (“PDRP”) 
 
A.  BASIC STRUCTURE AND SCOPE OF A PDRP 
 
Obviously, the right of publicity can be applied to some personal domain name 
cases now.
273
  Even after the implementation of a new PDRP, this would continue to be 
the case, as contractual arbitration procedures will not oust the jurisdiction of domestic 
courts.274  Thus, even if a PDRP was limited to <name.com> disputes, conflicts about 
personal domain names in other domain spaces could arguably be litigated under right of 
publicity laws in relevant jurisdictions.275  The main problem with the right of publicity in 
domestic law is that it raises jurisdictional and cost problems that are largely avoided or 
minimized by using an inexpensive and efficient online dispute resolution procedure.  
Thus, merging the substance of the right of publicity with the procedural advantages of 
the UDRP in a new PDRP would be a useful innovation in domain name dispute 
resolution policy and practice.     
 
This article has suggested that most relevant disputes arise in <name.com> 
cases,
276
 and that initially a new PDRP should be limited to these cases until a clearer 
                                                 
273
  It has, in fact, been argued in several domain name cases involving personal domain names to 
date:  Kevin Trudeau v George Lanoue, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7956 (2006) (in which a right of publicity 
claim was made, amongst other unfair competition claims, in a dispute involving a domain name 
corresponding with the plaintiff’s personal name); Paul Wright v Domain Source Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 16024 (2002) (plaintiff brought a claim under § 17525 of the Californian Business and Professions 
Code, which is a cyberspace analog to right of publicity law in some respects as it protects personal names 
in the domain space against certain unauthorized uses). 
 
274
  This is expressly recognized currently in paragraph 4(k) of the UDRP:  “The mandatory 
administrative proceeding requirements set forth in Paragraph 4 shall not prevent either you or the 
complainant from submitting the dispute to a court of competent jurisdiction for independent resolution 
before such mandatory administrative proceeding is commenced or after such proceeding is concluded.” 
 
275
  And of course <name.com> disputes could be litigated in domestic courts under right of publicity 
laws as well. 
 
276
  See, for example, Julia Fiona Roberts v Russell Boyd, WIPO Case No. D2000-0210, 30 May, 
2000 (available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0210.html ) (involving 
juliaroberts.com domain name); Tom Cruise v Alberta Hot Rods, WIPO Case No D2006-0560, 5 July, 2006 
(available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2006/d2006-0560.html) (involving 
tomcruise.com domain name); Kevin Spacey v Alberta Hot Rods, National Arbitration Forum Claim No 
114437, August 1, 2002 (available at http://www.arb-forum.com/domains/decisions/114437.htm) 
(involving the domain name kevinspacey.com); Anna Nicole Smith v DNS Research Inc, Claim No. 
FA0312000220007, National Arbitration Forum, Feb 21, 2004 (available at:  
http://www.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/220007.htm) (involving annanicolesmith.com domain name); 
Bjorn Borg v Miguel Garcia, WIPO Case No. D2007-0591, June 21, 2007 (available at:  
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2007/d2007-0591.html ) (involving the domain name 
bjornborg.com); Hillary Rodham Clinton v Michele Dinoia, National Arbitration Forum Claim No 
FA0502000414641, March 18, 2005 (full text available at http://www.arb-
forum.com/domains/decisions/414641.htm) (involving hillaryclinton.com domain name); Bruce 
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jurisprudence about the protection of personas in cyberspace emerges.  This approach 
also goes some way towards alleviating concerns about the potential chilling effect on 
free speech of any new procedure for personal domain name dispute resolution.  There 
may be some question as to whether a PDRP should automatically apply to registrations 
in the newer <.name> gTLD, although there are already other protections for that gTLD 
that might assist people in the protection of their personal names there.277  Thus, a new 
PDRP should, at least initially, only be incorporated by reference into domain name 
registration agreements for <.com> domain names.  It could later be extended or 
modified if the need arose. 
 
A new PDRP could be drafted in terms very similar to the UDRP.  It could adopt 
the UDRP’s basic structure and general terms, including representations and warranties 
made by the registrant,278 orders that could be made by arbitrators,279 and procedural 
matters such as how to lodge communications relating to a dispute.280  As with the UDRP, 
a person who has registered a <name.com> domain name281 would be required to submit 
to a mandatory arbitration proceeding if a complainant with the relevant personal name 
established the matters set forth in the policy.  Again, as with the UDRP, an 
administrative proceeding under the PDRP would not prevent either party from taking the 
dispute to a relevant court.282  The idea would be to streamline disputes in a more 
                                                                                                                                                 
Springsteen v Jeff Burgar, WIPO Case No D2000-1532, Jan 25, 2001 (available at 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-1532.html). 
 
277
  Jacqueline Lipton, Beyond Cybersquatting:  supra note ___, at 1420-1421 (describing domain 
name “watch” service and “defensive registration” service; the former allows individuals to be notified if 
anyone else attempts to register a given domain name without having to register it herself, while the latter 
allows a person with a legitimate interest in a domain name to register it without having to actively use it in 
order to maintain the registration). 
 
278
  UDRP, para. 2 (“By applying to register a domain name, or by asking us to maintain or renew a 
domain name registration, you hereby represent and warrant to us that (a) the statements that you made in 
your Registration Agreement are complete and accurate; (b) to your knowledge, the registration of the 
domain name will not infringe upon or otherwise violate the rights of any third party; (c) you are not 
registering the domain name for an unlawful purpose; and (d) you will not knowingly use the domain name 
in violation of any applicable laws or regulations. It is your responsibility to determine whether your 
domain name registration infringes or violates someone else's rights.”) 
 
279
  UDRP, para. 4(i) (“The remedies available to a complainant pursuant to any proceeding before an 
Administrative Panel shall be limited to requiring the cancellation of your domain name or the transfer of 
your domain name registration to the complainant.”).  For a more detailed discussion of proposed PDRP 
remedies, see Part III.D infra. 
 
280
  See Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, available at 
http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-rules-24oct99.htm , last viewed on November 23, 2007. 
 
281
  And perhaps ultimately some other iterations of the name if there was ever a need to extend the 
policy more broadly. 
 
282
  UDRP, para 4(k) (“The mandatory administrative proceeding requirements set forth in Paragraph 
4 shall not prevent either you or the complainant from submitting the dispute to a court of competent 
jurisdiction for independent resolution before such mandatory administrative proceeding is commenced or 
after such proceeding is concluded. If an Administrative Panel decides that your domain name registration 
should be canceled or transferred, we will wait ten (10) business days (as observed in the location of our 
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accessible forum than is currently available in court proceedings due to cost and 
jurisdiction issues.  The new PDRP may also fill some gaps in the legal systems of some 
jurisdictions that do not have specific protections for personal names or identities outside 
of trademark law.283 
 
B.  THE BASIS OF A PDRP COMPLAINT 
 
To establish a complaint under the new PDRP, a complainant should be required 
to establish that: (a) the registrant’s domain name corresponds letter for letter with the 
complainant’s personal name, (b) the registrant has no legitimate interests in the domain 
name, and (c) the registrant has registered or used the name for an unauthorized 
commercial purpose.  This would be the PDRP analog to clause 4(a) of the UDRP.284  
Rather than establishing a trademark interest, the complainant would only have to 
establish what her own name is – this should be easier than establishing a trademark right 
in a personal name for obvious reasons.  The provision should cover a complainant’s 
actual personal name, as well as a name she is commonly known by.  Thus, it would 
cover “Cher” for “Cheryl Sarkisian LaPiere” and “Madonna” for “Madonna Louise 
Veronica Ciccone”.285  It could also potentially cover “Tyra” for “Tyra Banks” and 
“Trump” for “Donald Trump”.286 
                                                                                                                                                 
principal office) after we are informed by the applicable Provider of the Administrative Panel's decision 
before implementing that decision. We will then implement the decision unless we have received from you 
during that ten (10) business day period official documentation (such as a copy of a complaint, file-stamped 
by the clerk of the court) that you have commenced a lawsuit against the complainant in a jurisdiction to 
which the complainant has submitted under Paragraph 3(b)(xiii) of the Rules of Procedure. (In general, that 
jurisdiction is either the location of our principal office or of your address as shown in our Whois database. 
See Paragraphs 1 and 3(b)(xiii) of the Rules of Procedure for details.) If we receive such documentation 
within the ten (10) business day period, we will not implement the Administrative Panel's decision, and we 
will take no further action, until we receive (i) evidence satisfactory to us of a resolution between the 
parties; (ii) evidence satisfactory to us that your lawsuit has been dismissed or withdrawn; or (iii) a copy of 
an order from such court dismissing your lawsuit or ordering that you do not have the right to continue to 
use your domain name.”) 
 
283
  The United States is the only country that has created a specific right of publicity tort.  Other 
jurisdictions may protect similar rights in other ways: for example, Trade Practices Act, § 52 in Australia 
(prohibiting misleading and deceptive conduct in commerce).  In the United Kingdom, privacy laws have 
been utilized to create a right similar to the right of publicity in practice:  see, for example, Douglas and 
others v Hello! Ltd, [2001] 2 All ER 289; [2001] 1 FLR 982, [2002] 1 FCR 289 (U.K.) (concerned with 
compensation for unauthorized publication of photographs of the Michael Douglas/Catherine Zeta-Jones 
wedding under on a privacy basis in the absence of a right of publicity in the United Kingdom).  Note also 
that not all states within the United States recognize the right of publicity so the adoption of a PDRP would 
also help with otherwise potentially problematic conflicts issues between state laws. 
 
284
  UDRP, para. 4(a) (requiring a domain name registrant to submit to mandatory arbitration under 
the UDRP when:  (i) the registrant’s domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or 
service mark in which the complainant has rights; and (ii) the registrant has no rights or legitimate interests 
in respect of the domain name; and (iii) the registrant’s domain name has been registered and is being used 
in bad faith.”) 
 
285
  This would accord with the way in which the right of publicity currently works.  See, for example, 
Indiana Code Title 32 (Property), Art. 36 (Publicity), Chap. 1 (Rights of Publicity), § 32-36-1-3 (defining 
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The requirement to show that the registrant has no legitimate interests in the 
domain name would be necessary to cover cases where, for example, the registrant 
happens to have the same personal name as a complainant.  In cases of competing 
legitimate interests in the same name, probably a “first come, first served” rule, subject to 
private negotiation between the parties, is preferable to a dispute resolution mechanism in 
which the arbitrators have little to go on as to who has the best interest in a given domain 
name.  This accords with the way the UDRP works in the case of competing legitimate 
trademark interests.287  It may be that ultimately domain name sharing arrangements 
could be developed for such situations either by private agreement between parties or 
facilitated through a body such as the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers (“ICANN”).288   
 
There is a possibility that a domain name registrant might change her personal 
name to match that of a given individual purely in order to register a relevant domain 
name.  This would be the analog to a domain name registrant who registers a trademark 
she never intends to use in order to clothe herself with a “legitimate interest” in a 
corresponding domain name in order to engage in abusive conduct with respect to the 
name.  An obvious example arose in the <madonna.com> dispute where the initial 
registrant of that domain name was obviously a cybersquatter and had registered a 
“Madonna” trademark in Tunisia in order to argue that he had a legitimate trademark 
                                                                                                                                                 
“name” for the purposes of the statute as including “the actual or assumed name of a living or deceasd 
natural person that is intended to identify the person”). 
 
286
  It may or may not cover intentional misspellings of complainants’ names such as “Tom Kruse” for 
“Tom Cruise”.  See, for example, Lamparello v Falwell, 420 F 3d 309 (2005) (involving an intentional 
misspelling of the Reverend Falwell’s name as a domain name).  However, perhaps such names should not 
be covered in the first instance of the policy in the interests of avoiding the chilling of speech.  This may be 
a little like the “look-a-like” and “sound-a-like” cases under the right of publicity in the “real world” which 
have been criticized for extending the right too far.  See, for example, William Heberer, The 
Overprotection of Celebrity:  A Comment on White vs Samsung Electronics America Inc, 22 HOFSTRA L 
REV 729 (1994); Steven Clay, Starstruck:  The Overextension of Celebrity Publicity Rights in State and 
Federal Courts, 79 MINN L REV 485 (1994). 
 
287
  See discussion in A Winning Solution for Youtube and Utube?  Corresponding Trademarks and 
Domain Name Sharing, (forthcoming, HARVARD JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY, 2008). 
 
288
  ICANN is the body that manages the Internet domain name system:  see www.icann.org, last 
viewed on November 23, 2007.  The author has canvassed the possibility of domain name sharing 
previously in the trademark context, and the mechanics of such arrangements for personal names would 
work similarly, so domain sharing strategies for personal names are not discussed further here.  See 
Jacqueline Lipton, A Winning Solution for Youtube and Utube?  Corresponding Trademarks and Domain 
Name Sharing, (forthcoming, HARVARD JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY, 2008). 
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interest in the domain name.289  The name was transferred to the popular singer Madonna 
who herself had registered American trademark interests in the name.290   
 
It could be that the incorporation of a “bad faith” element in the PDRP would be 
useful to prevent such conduct.  However, this leaves open the door for arbitrators to 
interpret that element in line with trademark based laws involving Internet domain 
names.291  This would not necessarily be a major problem, although it might fail to catch 
conduct under the new policy that ought to be prohibited under a personality rights 
framework.  An unauthorized fan website, for example, may not be in “bad faith” in the 
trademark sense, but perhaps should be prohibited under the new policy if it was creating 
a commercial gain in the hands of the registrant by using the complainant’s name in an 
unauthorized manner.  Thus, it would be better not to require a showing of bad faith in 
the PDRP, and wait and see how many situations arise where a person is prepared to go 
to the lengths of changing her name in order to register a domain name corresponding 
with someone else’s name.  In actual fact, many people who speculatively register 
domain names corresponding with the names of well known persons register multiple 
names292 and would obviously not be able to change their own personal name to all of 
those names.  They could attempt to register trademarks relating to a large group of 
personal names, but these trademarks would be subject to invalidation if they are not 
being used in conjunction with the sale of goods or services as required by trademark 
law.293  
                                                 
289
  Madonna Ciccone, p/k/a Madonna v. Dan Parisi and "Madonna.com", WIPO Case No. D2000-
0847, October 12, 200 (available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-
0847.html, last viewed on November 23, 2007). 
 
290
  id. 
 
291
  For example, both ACPA and the UDRP infringements rest on bad faith conduct on the part of the 
domain name registrant:  15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(d)(1), 1129(1), UDRP, para. 4(a)(3), 4(b). 
 
292
  Julia Fiona Roberts v Russell Boyd, Case No. D2000-0210 , May 29, 2000, WIPO Arbitration and 
Mediation Center, para. 4 (full text available at 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0210.html , last viewed on November 6, 
2007)(“ The Respondent has also registered over fifty (50) other domain names, including names 
incorporating other movie stars names within <madeleinestowe.com> and <alpacino.com> and a famous 
Russian gymnast’s name within <elenaprodunova.com>.”); Bruce Springsteen v Jeff Burgar and Bruce 
Springsteen Club, WIPO Case No. D2000-1532, Jan. 25, 2001, para 5 (available at 
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-1532.html) (“Mr Burgar is the owner of around 
1,500 names, and that many of those names, including the domain name at issue, take the internet user to 
his own site, "celebrity1000.com". They therefore point to the fact that this constitutes bad faith under 
paragraphs 4(b)(ii) and (iv) of the UDRP”). 
 
293
  GILSON LALONDE, supra note ___, § 1.03[7][c] (describing the trademark “use” requirement).  On 
trademark use, see also Graeme Dinwoodie and Mark Janis, Confusion Over Use:  Contextualism in 
Trademark Law, 92 IOWA L REV 1597, 1629-1638 (2007); Stacey Dogan and Mark Lemley, Grounding 
Trademark Law Through Trademark Use, 92 IOWA L REV 1669, 1690-1698 (2007).  In situations involving 
an individual registrant’s name that happens coincidentally to correspond with a famous person’s name, 
there may be some problems.  If such a person uses a domain name that incidentally corresponds with the 
name of a famous person and makes a commercial profit from doing so, should that conduct be prohibited 
under the new policy?  In terms of its affect on Internet users, they probably are attracted to the website by 
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With respect to the unauthorized commercial use requirement, the PDRP could 
give examples of such uses or could leave the wording vague and allow arbitrators over 
time to determine what constitutes an unauthorized commercial use on a case by case 
basis.  If the PDRP were to be drafted more comprehensively to include examples of 
unauthorized commercial use, these could be taken from current right of publicity 
statutes.  For example, the Indiana statute294 defines “commercial purpose” in the context 
of the right of publicity as:  “the use of an aspect of a personality’s right of publicity … 
(1) On or in connection with a product, merchandise, goods, services, or commercial 
activities. (2) For advertising or soliciting purchases of products, merchandise, goods, 
services, or for promoting commercial activities. (3) For the purpose of fundraising.”295  
The incorporation of such a definition would give arbitrators some clear guidance in 
applying the PDRP to the registrant’s activities, and may be helpful at least in the early 
days of such a dispute resolution policy.  It would also allow disputing parties to draw to 
some extent on existing personality rights jurisprudence to help inform initial 
determinations under the PDRP.  Although this test does reflect some concepts 
traditionally associated with trademark law, it is somewhat broader with its inclusion of 
uses such as the promotion of commercial activities for fundraising purposes. 
 
C.  THE “LEGITIMATE INTEREST” DEFENSE UNDER THE PDRP 
 
It may be a good idea for the PDRP to include a defense such as that found in 
clause 4(c) of the UDRP to give the registrant some guidance on how to establish a 
legitimate interest in a given domain name.  The indicia of a legitimate interest in the 
UDRP largely relate to good faith uses of the domain name in commerce in connection 
with the registrant’s own commercial or non-commercial endeavors.296  Any legitimate 
interest provision included in a new PDRP would have to be drafted differently because 
                                                                                                                                                 
the connection with the famous name and then may avail themselves of some unrelated information or 
commercial activity as a result.  This sounds like the kind of thing covered by the right of publicity even 
though the result may be incidental due to the similarity of two people’s names.  Perhaps the PDRP would 
require a special provision to deal with these unusual cases, leaving some discretion to arbitrators to decide 
who has the better interest in the name in any given case.  However, such a provision may be very difficult 
to draft.  Alternatively, these matters might ultimately be resolved by courts applying right of publicity 
principles or other tort principles relating to unfair competition:   GILSON LALONDE, supra note ___, § 7.01 
(on federal unfair competition law). 
 
294
  Indiana Code Title 32 (Property), Art. 36 (Publicity), Chap. 1 (Rights of Publicity). 
 
295
  id., § 32-26-1-2. 
 
296
  UDRP, para. 4(c) which gives examples of legitimate use as including the registrant’s ability to 
establish that:  “(i) before any notice to [the registrant] of the dispute, [the registrant’s] use of, or 
demonstrable preparations to use, the domain name or a name corresponding to the domain name in 
connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services; or (ii) [the registrant] (as an individual, business, 
or other organization) [has] been commonly known by the domain name, even if [she has] acquired no 
trademark or service mark rights; or (iii) [the registrant is] making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use 
of the domain name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the 
trademark or service mark at issue.” 
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the policy would actually prohibit some unauthorized commercial uses even if they are 
associated with a bona fide business plan of the registrant.  The UDRP, for example, 
currently excuses as a legitimate use a registrant’s use, or demonstrable preparation to 
use, a relevant domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or 
services.297  This makes sense in a trademark-based system because it amounts to two 
competing legitimate interests in using the mark in a domain name presumably in 
different areas of commerce.298  For example, if the complainant has registered the 
trademark “Hypo” for medical syringes and I have registered the domain name 
<hypo.com> for a business involving the sale of practice law exam questions, and I have 
registered the domain name in good faith for these purposes, I should be entitled to use 
it.299   
 
However, comparing this to the proposed PDRP, if the policy behind the right of 
publicity is to prevent anyone from making any kind of unjust profit out of another 
person’s name or likeness, the PDRP should not permit a domain name registrant to 
register another person’s name as a domain name even for some bona fide offerings of 
goods or services.  In any event, it is difficult to think of a situation in which a registrant 
would register someone else’s name as a domain name with such an intent.  Why would 
anyone register, say, <tomcruise.com> for the sale of goods or services completely 
unrelated to Tom Cruise unless they wanted to use the name to attract attention to their 
                                                 
297
  UDRP, para. 4(c)(i). 
 
298
  The issues arising in relation to two competing trademark interests with one corresponding domain 
name are taken up in more detail in Jacqueline Lipton, A Winning Solution for Youtube and Utube?  
Corresponding Trademarks and Domain Name Sharing, (forthcoming, HARVARD JOURNAL OF LAW AND 
TECHNOLOGY, 2008).  
 
299
  If such a case was brought under domestic trademark law, I may have some difficulties under the 
“initial interest confusion” doctrine.  The medical supply company might argue in a court proceeding for 
trademark infringement that, even though consumers are not confused about the source of the products 
when they get to my website, I am potentially diverting custom from them by attracting consumers to my 
website by using a similar online address.   It may be that consumers who assume that <hypo.com> is the 
website of the medical supply company would accidentally access my website and then cease looking for 
the other company on the basis that it is too difficult to find.  Regardless of what view a court would take of 
this argument under domestic trademark law, the UDRP currently has no “initial interest confusion” 
doctrine built into it in this sense and seems to allow as a defense that the registrant was using, or planning 
to use, the relevant domain name in a bona fide trademark manner.  On the initial interest doctrine in 
trademark law generally, see Lastowka, supra note ___, 35-36 (“With respect to search engines … a … 
significant expansion of trademark law is the doctrine of initial interest confusion.  Traditionally, and not 
surprisingly, most courts have focused analysis of consumer confusion on the time period proximate to 
consumer purchases.  The doctrine of initial interest confusion shifts the focus of confusion analysis to a 
time prior to the time of purchase.  Initial interest confusion can be found to exist even if that confusion 
was not present at the time of purchase.”); see also Jennifer Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion:  Standing 
at the Crossroads of Trademark Law, 27 CARDOZO L REV 105 (2005); Goldman, supra note ___, 559 
(“[Initial interest confusion] lacks a rigorous definition, a clear policy justification, and a uniform standard 
for analyzing claims.  With its doctrinal flexibility, [it] has become the tool of choice for plaintiffs to shut 
down junior users who have not actually engaged in misappropriative uses.”) 
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own goods, services, or advertising?300  This would hardly be in good faith if we accept 
that individuals have a right to prevent an unauthorized commercial profit being made 
from their online persona in certain cases, such as with respect to <name.com> versions 
of their personal names.  Even if Tom Cruise himself has no intention of using 
<tomcruise.com> to sell particular goods or services, the unauthorized registrant has 
interfered with his ability to control his persona in commerce which may be prohibited 
under a personality rights framework.   
 
There may be conflicts between the UDRP and the new PDRP where a personal 
name truly is a trademark, as when an individual runs a business under her own name.  In 
such a case, it is arguable that trademark-based laws should apply with respect to the 
trademarked version of the name.  Of course, this happens routinely in judicial 
proceedings under trademark law.  In such cases, courts have the power to determine 
trademark-based claims and right of publicity claims in the alternative.301  It may be that 
the new PDRP should include some provision for joining UDRP proceedings with PDRP 
proceedings in such situations, allowing one arbitrator or panel to hear the entire dispute 
and decide whether the name in question is really being used by the registrant in a 
trademark sense or in a personal sense.  If PDRP claims are to be at least initially limited 
to <.com> registration agreements, a procedure for joining PDRP and UDRP disputes 
would only have to be developed and incorporated into those agreements.  There would 
be no need to incorporate a joining procedure into other registration agreements, such as 
<.net> and <.org> registrations, into which only the UDRP would be incorporated. 
 
There may also be situations in which a domain name registrant simply happens 
to have the same name as a complainant and has registered the domain name for her own 
personal use: for example, to set up her own webpage.  These situations may actually be 
more difficult than they seem as a matter of policy.  It may be that a complainant is 
actually harmed in a right of publicity sense even where the registrant herself has a 
legitimate interest in the name by virtue of having a similar name to the complainant.  As 
the right of publicity has no consumer confusion requirement, it may be that simply using 
the complainant’s name in a domain name on a personal website might contravene the 
right in some cases, particularly if the website contains some unrelated commercial 
advertising.  One way to deal with these situations would be to leave the “hard cases” to 
the courts and hope for resolution that way.  In terms of the drafting of the new PDRP, 
though, it should suffice to excuse, as a legitimate interest, the conduct of a person who 
has been commonly known by the relevant name and is only using the name for her own 
personal website.   
D.  REMEDIES UNDER THE PDRP 
 
                                                 
300
  This appears to have been the strategy utilized by the domain name registrant of tomcruise.com 
under discussion in Tom Cruise v Alberta Hot Rods, WIPO Case No D2006-0560, 5 July, 2006 (available 
at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2006/d2006-0560.html). 
 
301
  See, for example, Kevin Trudeau v George Lanoue, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7956 (2006); Rogers v 
Grimaldi, 875 F 2d 994 (1988). 
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Like, the UDRP, the PDRP would be limited in terms of possible remedies to a 
cancellation or transfer order over the relevant domain name.302  Thus, a successful 
complainant could either have the registration of the domain name cancelled altogether, 
or could have the name transferred to her.  In most personal domain name disputes under 
the UDRP to date, the registrant has sought a transfer,303 even where she does not intend 
to use the name herself, presumably in order to maintain control over the most intuitive 
version of her online persona – the <name.com> version of her name. 
 
Because of these limitations on remedies, the proposed PDRP may actually have 
less of a potential chilling effect on online speech, if any, than the threat of litigation 
under the right of publicity.  Although the usual remedy in a right of publicity action is an 
injunction,304 which, in the domain name case, may be tantamount to a cancellation or 
transfer order under the PDRP, courts can award other remedies for infringement of 
personality rights.  These include damages based on injury to a plaintiff’s feelings,305 
damages based on unjust enrichment,306 and accounts of profits.307  Additionally, even an 
injunction may be tailored to a given case more broadly than a mere transfer or 
cancellation order:  for example, it may prohibit the defendant from engaging in any 
commerce online utilizing the name or likeness of a plaintiff, regardless of the domain 
name used by the defendant. 
 
Given the broad range of potential remedies under the right of publicity, a domain 
name registrant may be more deterred from engaging in unauthorized online use of a 
personal domain name than she would be if most personal domain name disputes were 
arbitrated under a PDRP.  One might argue that the threat of personality rights litigation 
is available for personal domain name disputes today, and it does not appear to be 
chilling online conduct involving unauthorized uses of individual’s names in the <.com> 
domain space.  However, this may be a temporary situation.  If, for example, the trend in 
UDRP arbitration changes, and UDRP arbitrators become less prepared to accept 
                                                 
302
  See UDRP, para. 4(i) (“The remedies available to a complainant pursuant to any proceeding 
before an Administrative Panel shall be limited to requiring the cancellation of your domain name or the 
transfer of your domain name registration to the complainant.”) 
 
303
  See, for example, Julia Fiona Roberts v Russell Boyd Case No. D2000-0210 , May 29, 2000, 
WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center (full text available at 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0210.html , last viewed on November 6, 
2007); Tom Cruise v Alberta Hot Rods, WIPO Case No D2006-0560, 5 July, 2006 (available at 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2006/d2006-0560.html). 
 
304
  GILSON LALONDE, supra note ___, ¶2.16[6] (“Upon proof of a violation of the right of publicity 
the courts almost always grant injunctive relief.  Since the primary purpose of the right of publicity is to 
prevent the unauthorized use of a person’s name and likeness, an injunction may be perfectly tailored to 
prevent further violation.”) 
 
305
  id. 
 
306
  id. 
  
307
  id. 
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trademark rights in individual’s names, then right of publicity litigation may become a 
much more realistic prospect.  It may in fact be the case that right of publicity actions 
have not been brought more often in domain name disputes simply because many people 
have not thought of it yet.  It is possible that such actions will become more common in 
the future.  There have already been some right of publicity actions involving personal 
domain names in recent years.308 
 
If right of publicity disputes gain popularity in the personal domain name context, 
the development of a PDRP would be a welcome addition for both complainants and 
domain name registrants.  It would be quicker, easier and cheaper for both parties.  It 
would also provide the most appropriate remedy in such cases – a transfer or cancellation 
order - and may deter complainants from seeking additional remedies in judicial 
proceedings.  If the cost is significantly less to a complainant, but the remedy is limited, 
the complainant may still prefer this course of action than more time consuming and 
costly litigation, despite the fact that litigation may provide more valuable and varied 
remedies.  This move towards arbitration with its more limited remedies may thus create 
less of a chilling effect on online speech than would personality rights litigation. 
 
E.  POLITICIANS’ NAMES:  A SPECIAL CASE? 
 
As noted in Part II.B.3, the names of politicians in the domain space, particularly 
in the lead-up to an election, may pose special problems.  Where a registrant has taken a 
politician’s name and registered it as a domain name for purely expressive purposes, 
there are obvious First Amendment arguments that this conduct should not be proscribed.  
Speech critical of politicians and their policies is an essential aspect of a representative 
democracy.309  However, it is also important that Internet users are not misled about the 
authorized web presence of a given politician.  The question is:  What is the correct 
presumption here?  Should there be a presumption that all <name.com> domain names 
automatically belong to the relevant politician, so that others wishing to comment on 
them are to be relegated to “lesser” domain spaces such as <name.net>, or 
<namesucks.com>?  Or are we better off with no such presumption and a “first come, 
first served” system in which even a critic of a politician is entitled to the <name.com> 
version of the name if she registers it first? 
 
                                                 
308
  See, for example, Kevin Trudeau v George Lanoue, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7956 (2006) (in which 
a right of publicity claim was made, amongst other unfair competition claims, in a dispute involving a 
domain name corresponding with the plaintiff’s personal name); Paul Wright v Domain Source Inc., 2002 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16024 (2002) (plaintiff brought a claim under § 17525 of the Californian Business and 
Professions Code, which is a cyberspace analog to right of publicity law in some respects as it protects 
personal names in the domain space against certain unauthorized uses). 
 
309
  See discussion in Jacqueline Lipton, Who Owns Hillary.com?  Political Speech and the First 
Amendment in Cyberspace, 49 BOSTON COLLEGE L REV 55 (2008);  Matthew Coleman, Domain Name 
Piracy and Privacy:  Do Federal Election Regulations Offer a Solution?, 19 YALE L & POL’Y REV 235, 
263 (2000) (“[W]idespread use of a new and inexpensive communications medium has the potential to lead 
to unprecedented citizen participation in politics…”).  
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Any personality rights framework for dispute resolution will only assist 
individuals, including politicians, against unauthorized commercial conduct.310  Thus, 
where the conduct complained of is purely expressive with no commercial elements, the 
right of publicity will not assist the politician.  On this view, a PDRP based on the right 
of publicity should also not assist the politician, unless all conduct on the Internet is 
regarded as “commercial”311 - which may well not be an accurate reflection of the law.312  
If the view is taken that a personality rights based PDRP only prohibits commercial 
conduct, then some conduct involving a <name.com> version of politician’s name will be 
prohibited and other conduct will not.   
 
The example of the <kerryedwards.com> domain name from the 2004 American 
presidential election, for example, may have been a candidate for protection under a 
PDRP as suggested here.  An individual called Mr Kerry Edwards did have a legitimate 
interest in the name in the sense that it was his personal name.  However, he was also 
using the name for a commercial purpose during the electoral race by attempting to 
auction it to the highest bidder.313  An arbitrator under the PDRP would have needed to 
decide whether Mr Kerry Edwards’ legitimate interest in his personal name outweighed 
his conduct that clearly sought to profit from Senator John Kerry’s and Senator John 
Edward’s respective names.  In actual fact, it is likely that Senators Kerry and Edwards 
would have had no luck even under the PDRP contemplated in this Article.  For one 
thing, Mr Kerry Edwards did have a legitimate interest in the name by virtue of his 
personal name, and for another thing, <kerryedwards.com> does not correspond letter for 
letter with the name of either senator.  It is assumed here that, at least initially, the PDRP 
should be narrowly confined to names that exactly match a complainant’s personal name 
in the <.com> space to avoid chilling effects on speech.  If the facts were different and 
                                                 
310
  GILSON LALONDE, supra note ___, § 2.16[1] (“The right of publicity … is the right of an 
individual to control the commercial use of his or her name, likeness, signature, or other personal 
characteristics.”) 
 
311
  As was suggested, at least with respect to the Lanham Act’s “in commerce” requirement in 
Planned Parenthood Federation of America Inc v Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1430, page 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) 
(“Internet users constitute a national, even international, audience, who must use interstate telephone lines 
to access defendant's web site on the Internet. The nature of the Internet indicates that establishing a typical 
home page on the Internet, for access to all users, would satisfy the Lanham Act's "in commerce" 
requirement.”).  See also American Libraries Association v Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) 
(“In addition, many of those users who are communicating for private, noncommercial purposes are 
nonetheless participants in interstate commerce by virtue of their Internet consumption. Many users obtain 
access to the Internet by means of an on-line service provider, such as America Online, which charges a fee 
for its services. "Internet service providers," including plaintiffs Panix, Echo, and NYC NET, also offer 
Internet access for a monthly or hourly fee. Patrons of storefront "computer coffee shops," such as New 
York's own CyberCafe, similarly pay for their access to the Internet, in addition to partaking of food and 
beverages sold by the cafe. Dial-in bulletin board systems often charge a fee for access.”) 
 
312
  Lastowka, supra note ___, at 64 (“[I]t is not clear how Bucci had used the Planned Parenthood 
mark in commerce, given that he lacked any product or service.  Those who advocate for an expansion of 
trademark use often criticize Bucci for this reason.”) 
 
313
  See discussion in Jacqueline Lipton, Who Owns Hillary.com?  Political Speech and the First 
Amendment in Cyberspace, 49 BOSTON COLLEGE L REV 55, 64-65 (2008). 
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the name in question was <johnkerry.com>, a registrant attempting to auction the name 
for profit may well have lost a PDRP proceeding. 
 
If as a matter of policy there is a presumption that the <name.com> version of a 
politician’s name should rightfully belong to the politician whatever the circumstances, 
particularly in the electoral context, then the PDRP would need to reflect that.  It may be 
that there would need to be a special provision limited to politicians’ names in the 
electoral context stating that the politician has the right to that name without having to 
establish anything other than that she is running for office and the domain name in 
question corresponds letter for letter with her personal name in the <.com> domain space.  
It may be that there should be no legitimate interest defenses for registrants in these 
cases, and that perhaps a temporary licensing scheme314 needs to be set up to allow 
politicians to use (or share)315 the relevant domain name during the course of the 
campaign where a prior registrant has a legitimate claim to the name.  This may be 
difficult to draft and may not be worth the effort, given that politicians may prefer to 
attempt private negotiations with registrants in order to avoid unnecessary negative 
publicity.316  Presumably, over time, politicians are becoming more savvy about 
protecting their names in the domain space and the need for such interventions may not 
be necessary going forwards.   
 
There may also be First Amendment difficulties implementing a scheme 
prioritizing <name.com> domain names for politicians with corresponding names against 
all unauthorized uses, whether purely expressive or commercial, or both.317  Even though 
the PDRP would effectively be a private system and not Congressional action, it may still 
incidentally attract First Amendment checks and balances if ICANN, the body adopting 
the procedure, was regarded as a governmental, or governmentally-controlled, 
organization.318 
 
In any event, during the initial phases of the operation of a new PDRP, there are 
good arguments for putting aside any specific plans to protect politician’s names in the 
                                                 
314
  Jacqueline Lipton, Beyond Cybersquatting, supra note ___, at 1433-1435 (suggesting a temporary 
compulsory licensing scheme for these situations). 
 
315
  On the attributes of a potential domain name sharing system, see discussion in Jacqueline Lipton, 
A Winning Solution for Youtube and Utube?  Corresponding Trademarks and Domain Name Sharing, 
(forthcoming, HARVARD JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY, 2008). 
 
316
  Like UDRP proceedings, it would probably be useful if PDRP disputes were all published online 
for ease of reference. 
 
317
  The differences between these two kinds of conduct and how they might be treated by the legal 
system are discussed in more detail in Jacqueline Lipton, Who Owns Hillary.com?  Political Speech and 
the First Amendment in Cyberspace, 49 BOSTON COLLEGE L REV 55 (2008). 
 
318
  There have certainly been cases in the past where publicly funded bodies have been subject to 
First Amendment constraints.  See, for example, United States v American Library Association, 539 U.S. 
194 (2003); Mainstream Loudoun v Board of Trustees of the Loudoun Co. Library, 2 F Supp 2d 783 (E.D. 
Va. 1998). 
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domain space that do not accord with personality rights principles.  A rule that 
<name.com> versions of a politician’s name automatically belong to a politician against 
all comers may not be an accurate reflection of these principles, or perhaps even of 
current social norms.  This may differ from celebrity domain names in the sense that 
unauthorized registrants of <name.com> versions of celebrities’ names in the domain 
space are perhaps more likely to be seeking commercial profit than registrants of 
politicians’ names.  In cases where an unauthorized use of a politician’s name in a 
<name.com> domain is commercial, the PDRP would cover this without the need for any 
special provisions relating to politicians’ names.  Certainly, the PDRP as contemplated 
here would prevent political cybersquatting: that is, registration of a politician’s name as 
a domain name with the intent to sell it for a profit.319  It may simply not cover registrants 
with purely expressive motives.  Politicians may also become more careful about their 
names in the domain space over time, and they may become better at negotiating with 
those who have registered their domain names before them.  If, after some years of 
operation of the PDRP, a need is perceived to do something more specifically directed at 
creating clearer rules or presumptions for political domain names, such rights could be 
added to the PDRP at a later date.   
 
F.  DURATION AND DESCENDABILITY OF PERSONAL NAME RIGHTS 
UNDER THE PDRP 
 
One contentious issue that arises under personality rights theory relates to the 
duration of those rights.320  Related questions are whether the rights are transferable or 
descendable.321  The PDRP as contemplated in this Article has presumed protection for a 
personal domain name during the course of the relevant person’s lifetime and has not 
focused on issues of transferability or descendability.  This is implicit in the suggestion 
that the PDRP should require the complainant to establish that the domain name in 
question corresponds letter for letter with her personal name.  Once she is deceased, she 
can no longer establish this.  Her estate may be able to establish that the name 
corresponds with her name, but that is not the intent of the PDRP as crafted here.  The 
idea here has been to protect individuals against unauthorized commercial conduct with 
respect to their names in a domain space where perhaps an individual has not thought to 
register the name herself, but the public might expect her to have done so.  In this sense, 
the rights as contemplated here spring more from personhood than from property 
theory.322 
                                                 
319
  As would 15 U.S.C. § 1129(1)(A), although this has the time and cost disadvantages associated 
with any litigation. 
 
320
  In particular, there has been some disagreement as to whether personality rights should survive a 
person’s death:  GILSON LALONDE, supra note ___, § 2.16[4] (“There is sharp disagreement among the 
courts, and even within some courts, as to whether the right of publicity is inheritable or whether it dies 
with the individual.”)  See also Kwall, First Amendment, supra note ___, 81-86. 
 
321
  id.  See also GILSON LALONDE, supra note ___, at § 2.16[5] (acknowledging that the right of 
publicity may be sold and assigned). 
 
322
  On theories of the right of publicity with a focus on personhood and individual autonomy, see 
Haemmerli, supra note ___.  On the property theory basis for the right of publicity, see Dogan and Lemley, 
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  If, for example, I enter <tomcruise.com> into my web browser, I might expect to 
find the authorized Tom Cruise website or no content at all if Mr Cruise has not 
established an authorized website.  However, if I were to enter the name of a deceased 
famous person into a web browser, such as <marlonbrando.com>, would I necessarily 
assume that this was an authorized website for Mr Brando?  Or would I rather assume 
that, after his death, his estate has little interest in maintaining such a website?  In actual 
fact, the <marlonbrando.com> domain name, along with domain names corresponding to 
a number of other famous deceased persons, are used for “official” websites managed by 
assignees of intellectual property rights in those people’s names.323  However, by way of 
contrast, a UDRP dispute involving Albert Einstein’s name was decided against 
Einstein’s estate.324  The decision was made largely on the grounds that an Internet user 
would not necessarily expect the domain name <alberteinstein.com> to resolve to a 
website actually run by Einstein’s estate such a lengthy period after his death.325 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Right of Publicity, supra note ___, 1181-1183 (critique of Lockean labor theory justifications for 
personality rights as property); McKenna, supra note ___, 247 (“It might be true that identity is sufficiently 
similar to other objects the law regards as property and therefore deserves at least some of the sticks in the 
traditional bundle of property rights.  But far too few courts and commentators have offered a theory as to 
why any of the traditional property justifications lead to that conclusion.”); 251-267 (critique of Lockean 
labor theory justifications for property rights in personal identity); Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The 
Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49 DUKE L J 343, 388 (“Both proponents and critics of the right of 
publicity generally perceive it as a property claim grounded in Lockean labor theory.”), 407-8 (1999) 
(noting dual property and privacy justifications for right of publicity actions), 412 (“To the extent that 
commentators specifically address publicity rights, they tend to do so within this property context, and to 
use Lockean labor theories of property to explain the assertion of a property right in identity or persona.”); 
Kwall, Fame, supra note ___, 15 (“This Article … contends that a property-based conception for publicity 
rights is the natural outgrowth of our cultural norms as well as our theoretical conceptions of property.”); 
David Westfall and David Landau, Publicity Rights as Property Rights, 23 CARDOZO ARTS AND ENT LJ 71 
(2005) (examining property basis for rights of publicity); Rielly, supra note __, 1165-9 (describing 
development of a property rights rationale for the right of publicity).  See also Diane Zimmerman and 
Melissa Jacoby, Foreclosing on Fame: Exploring the Uncharted Boundaries of the Right Of Publicity, 77 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1322 (2002). 
 
323
  See also <marilynmonroe.com> and <johnwayne.com>, last viewed on November 24, 2007.   
 
324
  The Hebrew University of Jerusalem v Alberta Hot Rods, WIPO Case No. D2002-0616, October 
7, 2002, (available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2002/d2002-0616.html) 
(involving a complaint with respect to the domain name <alberteinstein.com>). 
 
325
  id, para (b)(III) (“There is a significant difference between the expectations of Internauts entering 
a domain name of a celebrity (alive or dead) who is (or was) famously associated in commerce with the 
supply of goods or services, on the one hand, and their expectations entering a domain name of a celebrity 
long since dead who was not so associated, on the other. The former expect to find a site offering goods or 
services associated with the celebrity’s trademark. The latter cannot reasonably have such an expectation 
Albert Einstein has been dead for 47 years. He was one of the most famous people of the 20th century. The 
name Albert Einstein is universally associated with him. That operates to the disadvantage of Complainant 
in this case. Internauts entering the disputed domain name would not expect to find a site offering goods or 
services with which Dr. Einstein was known to have been associated during his lifetime because, on the 
evidence, he was not known as having any such association. Nor would they expect to find a site associated 
with Complainant because Complainant has not established that it has any common law trademark rights.”) 
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What explains the differences here?  Obviously, the estates of some famous 
people have been extremely vigilant about protecting all relevant intellectual property 
rights, including personality rights.326  If estates – or transferees – of intellectual property 
rights pertaining to famous people are vigilant about those rights and ensure registration 
of relevant domain names before anyone else has done so, there is no problem.  There is 
no need for a PDRP to operate here because estates of famous people that are aggressive 
about protecting relevant rights will already have registered important domain names.  
This may explain why Einstein’s estate lost its arbitration.  Perhaps the combination of 
the period of time since Einstein’s death and the fact that the estate had not been 
sufficiently vigilant to register the domain name before anyone else were sufficient 
factors to justify the result.  On the other hand, given that the current registrants of 
<einstein.com> and <alberteinstein.com> do not appear to be using the names for any 
particular purpose,327 it is arguable that the names would be better utilized by Einstein’s 
estate for information about Einstein and his life. 
 
Given this possibility of wasteful uses of a deceased person’s name, and the fact 
that personality rights are transferable in at least some jurisdictions,328 there is a plausible 
argument that the PDRP should allow for assignees and beneficiaries of personality rights 
to bring complaints in the name of the assignor or deceased person.  If this were to be 
done, the PDRP as contemplated above would have to be amended to allow a 
complainant to show either that she has a personal name corresponding with the given 
domain name or that she controls personality rights relating to a person with such a name.  
This raises some practical difficulties, including the fact that if the beneficiary or 
transferee of the deceased lives in a jurisdiction that has no personality rights laws, or has 
personality rights laws that do not allow for transfer or descendability, there is little 
plausible basis for bringing a PDRP complaint.  In other words, the complainant would 
not be able to show that she controlled the relevant personality rights.   
 
Additionally, it may be difficult for arbitrators to determine the validity of a claim 
that a complainant controls personality rights in another person’s name.  It is a simple 
enough task for arbitrators to accept evidence of what a complainant’s personal name 
actually is under the PDRP as contemplated here.  It may be more difficult for them to 
evaluate evidence of claims about personality rights of deceased persons or persons who 
have allegedly transferred personality rights to others.  The PDRP procedure is intended 
to achieve the same advantages in terms of time, cost, and procedural simplicity as the 
                                                 
326
  See, for example, Estate of Elvis Presley v Russen, 513 F Supp 1339 (1981).   
 
327
  As at the date of writing, they both look like cybersquatting sites perhaps disguised as legitimate 
sites.  One has no commentary at all – just a graphic and the name “einstein.com”, while the other contains 
lists of services unrelated to the domain name <alberteinstein.com>.  Each of these sites was last viewed on 
November 24, 2007. 
 
328
  GILSON LALONDE, supra note ___, at § 2.16[5] (acknowledging that the right of publicity may be 
sold and assigned).  For an example of a specific state law on the transferability of publicity rights, see 
Indiana Code Title 32 (Property), Art. 36 (Publicity), Chap. 1 (Rights of Publicity), § 32-36-1-16 (“The 
rights recognized under this chapter are property rights, freely transferable and descendible, in whole or in 
part …”). 
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UDRP does for trademark-related claims.  If arbitrators are asked to evaluate more 
complex questions than simply what a person claims her name actually is, this could 
interfere with the operation of the procedure in terms of time, cost and perhaps even 
predictability of outcome.  These might be good reasons to leave out matters relating to 
transferability and descendability of personal rights in domain names until a later 
iteration of the PDRP if the need arises.   
   
Other arguments against the initial inclusion of a provision allowing assignees 
and beneficiaries of personality rights to bring complaints under the PDRP include 
concerns about how long a person’s image should be controlled by her estate after her 
death.329  There may also be concerns that the transferability and descendability of rights 
in a persona are not universally accepted even within the United States,330 so it may be a 
mistake to foist them on a global system for protecting personal name interests in domain 
names.331    
 
Further, there may be some question as to how often these issues would arise in 
practice in the domain name context.  As noted above, the estates of many famous people 
currently hold the domain names corresponding with the relevant names,332 while 
celebrities and politicians are now getting better about aggressively fighting for control of 
relevant domain names during their lifetimes.333  The result may be that the question of 
post-mortem personal domain name disputes has very minimal practical importance.  If a 
PDRP is established now to help those who want to assert interests in relevant domain 
names to obtain those names, those people can presumably hold on to the names and pass 
them to their estates in the future as a matter of contract law.  It is a simple matter for a 
successful complainant to transfer the domain name to anyone she wants, either during 
her lifetime or presumably post mortem if she executes the transfer formalities prior to 
her death.   
 
IV.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
This Article has identified why over-reliance on trademark-focused rules, such as 
the UDRP, to resolve personal domain name disputes leads to inconsistent and arbitrary 
results.  It has suggested that a personality rights model would create a better substantive 
                                                 
329
  See, for example, discussion in Kwall, First Amendment, supra note ___, 81-86 (1994). 
 
330
  See discussion in GILSON LALONDE, supra note ___, at §§ 2.16[4]-[5]. 
 
331
  Of course, the same argument could be made more generally in terms of foisting a PDRP on the 
global economy that is based on unharmonized American state law.  However, this Article suggests that it 
may be less objectionable to base the PDRP on personality rights theory if some of the more contentious 
aspects of the theory, such as questions of duration and descendability of rights, can be avoided, at least in 
the initial iteration of the PDRP. 
 
332
  See, for example, www.marlonbrando.com, www.johnwayne.com, www.marilynmonroe.com, last 
viewed on November 24, 2007. 
 
333
  See, for example, discussion in Moreland, supra note ___; Beezy, supra note ___. 
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framework for dealing with these disputes.  However, personality rights litigation suffers 
from cost and procedural disadvantages.  It is also exists today largely as a matter of 
unharmonized state law within the United States.  The aim of this Article has been to 
suggest a new procedure for personal domain name disputes – a PDRP - that marries 
together the procedural and globalization advantages of the UDRP with the substantive 
theoretical advantages of the right of publicity.  This approach achieves the best of both 
worlds in that it maintains the procedural benefits of the UDRP – the avenue most often 
chosen by complainants in personal domain name disputes today – while basing the 
decisions on a theory that more appropriately protects interests in an individual’s persona 
than trademark law.   
 
Drafting and implementing a new PDRP would be a relatively easy and cost-
effective matter.  It would require the drafting and adoption of such a procedure by 
ICANN.  Implementation would simply require the incorporation of the new PDRP by 
reference into <.com> registration agreements in the first instance.  The drafting of the 
PDRP would generally mirror the drafting of the UDRP except for some changes in 
substance to the text of UDRP’s clause 4 relating to the matters the claimant needs to 
prove, and the nature and scope of the legitimate use defense available to the registrant. 
 
The continued development of personal domain name jurisprudence based on 
trademark principles threatens to warp the boundaries of trademark law and to 
unjustifiably extend trademark practice online into areas where the alleged trademarks 
are mere fictions.  Alternatively, it could fail to protect interests that really should be 
protected as a matter of tort law under the right of publicity.334  In any event, the 
application of the trademark-based UDRP to personal domain name disputes is clearly 
creating inconsistent results.335 
                                                 
334
  See, for example, Bruce Springsteen v Jeff Burgar and Bruce Springsteen Club, WIPO Case No. 
D2000-1532, Jan. 25, 2001 (available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-
1532.html) (involving brucespringsteen.com domain name); Anna Nicole Smith v DNS Research Inc, Claim 
Number FA0312000220007, Feb 21, 2004, National Arbitration Forum, full text available at 
http://www.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/220007.htm, last viewed on October 25, 2007; The Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem v Alberta Hot Rods, WIPO Case No. D2002-0616, October 7, 2002, (available at 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2002/d2002-0616.html) (involving a complaint with 
respect to the domain name <alberteinstein.com>). 
 
335
  Why, for example, should Julia Roberts and Tom Cruise be regarded as having trademark interests 
in their personal names when the same is not necessarily true for Bruce Springsteen, or the late Anna 
Nicole Smith?  Why should “Hillary Clinton” be recognized as a trademark when the same is not true for 
other politicians such as Kathleen Kennedy Townsend?  See, for example, Julia Fiona Roberts v Russell 
Boyd, WIPO Case No. D2000-0210, 30 May, 2000 (available at 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0210.html ) (involving juliaroberts.com 
domain name); Tom Cruise v Alberta Hot Rods, WIPO Case No D2006-0560, 5 July, 2006 (available at 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2006/d2006-0560.html) (involving tomcruise.com 
domain name); Anna Nicole Smith v DNS Research Inc, Claim No. FA0312000220007, National 
Arbitration Forum, Feb 21, 2004 (available at:  http://www.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/220007.htm) 
(involving annanicolesmith.com domain name); Hillary Rodham Clinton v Michele Dinoia, National 
Arbitration Forum Claim No FA0502000414641, March 18, 2005 (full text available at http://www.arb-
forum.com/domains/decisions/414641.htm) (involving hillaryclinton.com domain name); Bruce 
Springsteen v Jeff Burgar, WIPO Case No D2000-1532, Jan 25, 2001 (available at 
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Another important advantage of a PDRP over the UDRP with respect to personal 
domain name disputes is that it might refocus judicial attention on the appropriate legal 
principles when these disputes do end up in court.  While the trademark-focused UDRP 
remains most people’s first port of call with respect to domain name disputes, litigation 
also seems to be centered around the trademark-based provisions of domestic law.  The 
Falwell case,336 for example, was argued purely with respect to trademarks and did not 
raise personality rights claims at all.337  The Kathleen Kennedy Townsend complaint338 
would likely have been successful if it had been litigated under § 1129(1)(A) of the 
Lanham Act, but was brought under the trademark-based UDRP instead.339  It may be 
that if the cost-effective avenue of choice for complainants focuses on more appropriate 
issues than trademark law, litigants would think to bring judicial proceedings under more 
appropriate provisions of domestic law in the event that the dispute does end up in court. 
 
This Article has demonstrated the importance of developing a mechanism 
specifically and appropriately tailored for personal domain name disputes.  This would be 
a simple and easy task for ICANN in practice.  If a PDRP could be adopted along the 
lines described here, it might well result in a more effective resolution of domain name 
disputes involving personal names.  It might also assist more generally with appropriately 
nuanced developments in cyberlaw, particularly pertaining to the protection of 
personality rights online.  Given that Internet regulators are constantly striving to balance 
property and property-like rights online against free speech interests, the creation of more 
sophisticated laws and regulations that more clearly define the scope of relevant interests 
is of paramount importance.  Trademark law in particular is currently under a lot of 
pressure in cyberspace.340  If we are truly concerned about identifying the boundaries of 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-1532.html); Kathleen Kennedy Townsend 
v Birt, WIPO Case No D2002-0030, April 11, 2002 (available at 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2002/d2002-0030.html ). 
 
336
  Lamparello v Falwell, 420 F 3d 309 (2005). 
 
337
  This is not a criticism of the holding in the Falwell litigation, but merely an observation that it is 
interesting the entire case was argued under trademark law, rather than the right of publicity, when the case 
revolved around rights in a personal name. 
 
338
  Kathleen Kennedy Townsend v Birt, WIPO Case No D2002-0030, April 11, 2002 (available at 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2002/d2002-0030.html). 
 
339
  id. (“The Panel finds that the protection of an individual politician's name, no matter how famous, 
is outside the scope of the Policy since it is not connected with commercial exploitation as set out in the 
Second WIPO Report.  This does not mean that Complainant is without remedy. The ACPA contains 
express provisions protecting the rights in personal names. Complainant is free to pursue her claims in that 
forum. And, as mentioned, the committee may have rights in the marks that are sufficiently commercial as 
to entitle the committee to protection under the Policy.”). 
 
340
  See Lastowka, supra note ___, Goldman, supra note ___, Graeme Dinwoodie and Mark Janis, 
Confusion Over Use:  Contextualism in Trademark Law, 92 IOWA L REV 1597, 1629-1638 (2007); Stacey 
Dogan and Mark Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through Trademark Use, 92 IOWA L REV 1669, 
1690-1698 (2007). 
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trademark law on the Internet, we must be prepared to address situations that do not 
really involve trademarks by more targeted and effective means.  Personality rights are a 
more well-tailored and effective theoretical basis for resolving personal domain name 
disputes, if we can avoid the current procedural and jurisdictional pitfalls.  A new PDRP 
as suggested in this Article could achieve this result in practice. 
 
